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INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS BY DOMESTIC COURTS
AND THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL
TREATY RELATIONS: REFLECTIONS ON
SOME RECENT DECISIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Martin A. Rogoff

LNTRODUCTION
In its 1993 decision in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.,' the
United States Supreme Court upheld the policy of the Clinton administration of intercepting on the high seas Haitians bound by ship for the
United States and forcibly repatriating them without first determining
whether they could be classified as refugees, thereby qualifying for
political asylum in the United States. More specifically, the Court held
that the forced repatriations undertaken by the Coast Guard beyond the
territorial sea of the United States violated neither the Immigration and
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1. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs., Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993). See generally Thomas D. Jones, Aliens-Interdiction of Haitians on the High Seas-Definition
of "Return" Under U.S. Statute, Extraterritorial Effect of Statute: Sale v. Haitian
Centers Council, Inc., 88 Am. J. INT'L L. 114 (1994).
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Nationality Act of 1952,2 nor Article 33 of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.3 The decision was widely criti-

cized on humanitarian grounds, as repatriated Haitians were very likely
to face persecution on their return to Haiti.4 Moreover, according to the
critics, the United States policy upheld by the Court in this case represented a fundamental reversal of long-standing American generosity
toward those fleeing from tyrannical governments.' Also, commentary
on the legal basis of the Court's holding has been uniformly critical.6
There is, however, another disturbing aspect of this case which merits
full discussion: the Supreme Court's approach to the interpretation of the
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The
majority opinion limited the scope of applicability of the Convention's
prohibition of expelling or returning refugees to actions taken by the

2. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)
(1994).
3. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951,
art. 33 (1), 19 U.S.T. 6259, 6276, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 176 [hereinafter United Nations
Refugee Convention].
4. See, e.g., Joyce A. Hughes & Linda R. Crane, Haitians: Seeking Refuge in
the United States, 7 GEo. IMMIGR. LJ. 747 (1993); Thomas D. Jones, The Haitian
Refugee Crisis: A Quest for Human Rights, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 77 (1993) (characterizing the Sale case as the "Dred Scott case of immigration law"); see also Harold
Hongju Koh, The Human Face of the Haitian Interdiction Program, 33 VA. J. INT'L
L. 483, 487 (1993) (characterizing the policy of the United States Government as
"not only lawless, but also heartless and mindless"); William G. O'Neill, The Roots
of Human Rights Violations in Haiti, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 87 (1993); Jose de Cordoba, Voodoo Politics: In Impoverished Haiti, Taking Sides Can Be a Life or Death
Matter, WALL STi., Apr. 6, 1994, at Al.
5. See, e.g., A. M. Rosenthal, The Haitian Mirror, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1994,
at A23.
6. See, e.g., Hughes & Crane, supra note 4; Jones, supra note 4; Nicholas R.
Koberstein, Without Justification: Reliance on the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 569 (1993); Robert L. Newmark, Non-Refoulement Run Afoul: The Questionable Legality of Extraterritorial Repatriation Programs, 71 WASH. U. L. Q. 833 (1993); The Supreme Court,
1992 Term, Leading Cases, 107 HARv. L. REV. 144 (1993); see also Bill Frelick,
Haitian Boat Interdiction and Return: First Asylum and First Principles of Refugee
Protection, 26 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 675 (1993); Hiroshi Motomura, Haitian Asylum
Seekers: Interdiction and Immigrants Rights, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 695 (1993);
Thomas D. Jones, Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. James Baker, III: The Dred Scott
Case of Immigration Law, 11 DICK. J. INT'L L. 1 (1992); Abigail D. King, Note,
Interdiction: The United States' Continuing Violation of International Law, 68 B.U. L.
REv. 773 (1988); Scott M. Martin, Non-Refoulement of Refugees: United States Compliance with International Obligations, 23 HARv. INT'L L.J. 357 (1983).
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United States within its territorial limits." According to the Court, the
relevant provision of the Convention does not apply to actions of United
States Government officials taken on the high seas.' The Court's reading of the Convention was determinative, since the potentially applicable
provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act had been amended to
conform to the requirements of the 1967 Protocol which made the substantive provisions of the Convention applicable to the United States. In
his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun takes issue with the territorial
limitations of the Court's reading of the Convention In Justice
Blackmun's view, the Convention is clearly applicable to the actions of
parties wherever undertaken. ° He thought that the majority's limiting
interpretation of the scope of territorial application of the Convention
was counter to its express language, its object and purpose, and its
humanitarian intent."
Although the Court's interpretation of the U.N. Refugee Convention is
regrettable, since it significantly narrows the scope of a multilateral
agreement entered into for humanitarian purposes without a firm textual
basis for doing so, it is even more regrettable that the restrictive method
of interpretation employed by the Court in this case is not unique. It
represents rather the continuation of an approach that has been consistently applied by the Court to the interpretation of international agreements for the past decade. For example, a year earlier, in 1992, in United States v. Alvarez-Machain2 the Court decided that a foreign national

7. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs., Inc., 113 S. CL 2549, 2564 (1993).
8. Id. at 2562, 2564.
9. Id. at 2568 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).

10. Id. at 2568.
11. Id. at 2568-70 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
12. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992). See generally
Jacques Sernmelman, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 811
(1992). Professor Henkin has commented on the link between the Supreme Court's
approach to treaty interpretation in its decisions in Sale and Alvarez-Machain:
For the second time in two years the Supreme Court has adopted an eccentric,
highly implausible interpretation of a treaty. It has interpreted those treaties, I

am persuaded, not as other state parties would interpret them, not as an international tribunal would interpret them, not indeed as the United States Supreme
Court would have interpreted them earlier in our history when the justices took
the law of nations seriously, when they appeared to recognize that in such
cases U.S. courts were sitting in effect as international tribunals. Is it not time
for the U.S. Supreme Court to think afresh about its role in determining and
applying international law and obligations, and to assure that they are faithfully
complied with?
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could be tried in United States courts for a crime against American law
committed abroad, even though the accused had been forcibly kidnapped

with the complicity of United States agents from a state (Mexico) with
which the United States had an extradition treaty and the foreign state
had protested against the kidnapping and the subsequent prosecution in
the United States." Crucial to the Court's decision in that case was its
narrow reading of the sphere of applicability of the extradition treaty
between Mexico and the United States. The Court found that the treaty
did not provide the sole means for the United States to obtain custody
of an accused who was physically present in Mexico. 4 According to
the Court, the treaty provided only an optional procedure and did not
proscribe other, even clearly illegal, possibilities. 5 Justice Stevens, in
his dissenting opinion, disagreed with the majority on the scope of applicability of the extradition treaty. He would have found that the question of the legality of the United States prosecution was governed by
the treaty, that is to say, that the extradition procedures elaborated in the
U.S.-Mexican treaty were not optional, but provided the sole means for
the United States to obtain custody of an accused physically located in
Mexico) 6 Predictably, reaction to the Court's decision was almost uniformly negativeY

Louis Henkin, Notes from the President, ASIL

NEWSLETTER, Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 1, 7;
see Justice Blackmun Remarks at the Annual Dinner of the American Society of
International Law, reprinted in ASIL NEWSLETTER, Mar.-May 1994, at 1; Harry A.
Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39 (1994);
Harold Hongju Koh, Justice Blacknun and the "World Out There," 104 YALE L.J. 23
(1994).
13. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 668-70.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 671-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
17. See, e.g., Jonathan A. Bush, How Did We Get Here? Foreign Abduction
After Alvarez-Machain, 45 STAN. L. REv. 939 (1993); Michael J. Glennon, StateSponsored Abduction: A Comment on United States v. Alvarez-Machan, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 746 (1992). Student notes and comments too numerous to cite have sharply
criticized the Court's decision. For a sampling, see Hector H. Cdrdenas, Jr., Note,
United States v. Alvarez-Machain: Result Oriented Jurisprudence, 16 HOUs. J. INT'L
L. 101 (1993); Aimee Lee, Comment, United States v. Alvarez-Machain: The Deleterious Ramifications of Illegal Abductions, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 126 (1993); Analisa
W. Scrimger, Comment, United States v. Alvarez-Machain: Forcible Abduction as an
Acceptable Alternative Means of Gaining Jurisdiction, 7 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J.
369 (1993); Royal J. Stark, Comment, The Ker-Frisbie-Alvarez Doctrine: International
Law, Due Process, and United States Sponsored Kidnapping of Foreign Nationals
Abroad, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 113 (1993); Andrew L. Wilder, Comment, The Supreme
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The approach to the interpretation of international agreements employed by the Court in Sale and Alvarez-Machain can be characterized
as "restrictive," since the Court chooses to read the treaty narrowly, or
restrictively, leaving to national decision-makers the largest latitude
possible. This approach can also be seen in several other important cases
decided by the Supreme Court during the 1980s. For example,
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk,"8 decided by the Court

in 1988, involving the scope of applicability of the Hague Service Convention, Socigtj Nationale Industrielle Mrospatiale v. U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 9 decided in 1987, involving
the Hague Evidence Convention, and Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v.
Avagliano,"' decided in 1982, involving the Treaty of Friendship Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan, each exhibit
the Court's tendency to limit the sphere of applicability of United States
treaty commitments. While each of these cases is usually viewed narrowly, within the context of its particular substantive area of the law
(e.g., Sale, immigration law; Alvarez-Machain, law enforcement;
Volkswagenwerk and Adrospatiale, transnational litigation; Sumitomo,
civil rights or FCN agreements), the cumulative effect of these decisions

provides reasonable ground for apprehension on the part of a foreign
nation contemplating the conclusion of an international agreement with
the United States.2

Court Decision in United States v. Alvarez-Machan, 32 VA. J. INT'L L 979 (1992).

For a representative foreign reaction, see Brigitte Stem, Note, L'extraterritorialit;
revisitie: 04 it est question des affaires Alvarez-Machain, Pdte de bois et de
quelques autres ....
1992 ANNUAIRE FRANcAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 239, 26888. But see Jimmy Gurul6, Terrorism, TerritorialSovereignty, and the Forcible Apprehension of International Criminals Abroad, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 457
(1994); Malvina Halberstam, In Defense of the Supreme Court's Decision in Alvarez-

Machan, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 736 (1992). Finally, see also the thoughtful and provocative analysis of Fernando R. Tes6n, International Abductions, Low-Intensity Conflicts
and State Sovereignty: A Moral Inquiry, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 551 (1994).

18. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988).
19. Socidtd Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482
U.S. 522 (1987).
20. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
21. In addition to the five cases mentioned as representative of the current trend
toward restrictive interpretation, the Supreme Court has decided a number of other
cases involving the interpretation of international agreements of the United States
during the same period. None of these cases involved the high profile political issues
involved

in Sale, Alvarez-Machain, Schlunk, A&ospatiale, and Sumitomo.

See

Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 64 LW 4055 (1996) (concerning a damage ac-
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Perhaps at one time a narrow or restrictive reading of consensual

international obligations was justified by international law. According to
past concepts of state sovereignty and to contemporary views regarding
the undertaking of international obligations, international agreements
were to be strictly construed.2 Limitations on the sovereignty of states
were not to be presumed. In cases of doubt or ambiguity, intemationtion for loss of a relative in an airplane crash against an international air carrier); Itel
Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60 (1993) (concerning the application
of a state tax to cargo containers used in international trade); Eastern Airlines v.
Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991) (concerning a damage action for mental distress by an
airline passenger against an international air carrier); Chan v. Korean Air Lines, 490
U.S. 122 (1989) (concerning a damage action by an airline passenger against an international air carrier); United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353 (1989) (concerning the
validity of a summons issued by the Internal Revenue Service pursuant to its interpretation of the 1942 Convention Respecting Double Taxation between the United States
and Canada); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (concerning the application of a domestic immigration statute, where the Court decided that a "more generous" domestic standard applied rather than a standard based on an international agreement); O'Connor v. United States, 479 U.S. 27 (1986) (concerning a claim by United
States citizens for tax refunds from the United States Government); Air France v.
Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985) (concerning a damage action by an airline passenger
against an international air carrier); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint, 466
U.S. 243 (1984) (concerning a damage action by a shipper against an international air
carrier). Floyd, Chan, Saks, and Franklin Mint involved the application of the Warsaw
Convention, Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (1934) in private
damage actions. In Itel (imposition of tax by state legislature) and O'Connor (refusal
by IRS to refund taxes) the actions of United States public officials were upheld
against United States nationals despite their arguments that such actions violated international obligations of the United States. In Stuart (issuance of summons by IRS to
Canadian national and to United States banks), once again, the actions of United
States public officials were upheld; even though a foreign national was involved, the
IRS was acting pursuant to a request made by the Canadian Government. In CardozaFonseca, the Court reversed a determination of the INS, directing it to apply a more
lenient standard than the one contained in the statutory provision which enacted into
domestic law the requirement of an international agreement. Finally, David Scheffer
highlights the instability in treaty relations that results from "radical methods of reinterpretation posing as legitimate tools of foreign policy making." David J. Scheffer,
Nouveau Law and Foreign Policy, 76 FOREIGN POL'Y 44, 44 (1989).
22. See, e.g., J. G. STARKE, AN INTRODUCrION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 456-57
(9th ed. 1984); Mustafa Kamil Yasseen, L'Interpretation des Traitds d'apres La Convention de Vienne sur le Droit des Traits, 151 REC. DES COURS 1, at 10 (1976); H.
Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 48 (1949) [hereinafter Lauterpacht,
Restrictive Interpretation].
23. International law governs the relations between independent states. The rules
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al agreements were to be interpreted to preserve a state's maximum
freedom of action. There is even authority supporting the view that the
presumption against derogation of sovereignty may be applied even
more stringently when a national court, rather than an international
tribunal, is faced with a question of treaty interpretation.24 From this
point of view, the Supreme Court, in Sale, Alvarez-Machain, and the
other recent cases mentioned above, is following a well-established and
time-sanctioned tradition of interpretation of international agreements.
United States courts, however, have traditionally not taken a restrictive
approach to treaty interpretation, but rather have liberally construed
United States treaty obligations.' Thus, the Court's recent trend toward
of law binding upon states therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in
conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the
independence of states cannot therefore be presumed. Judgment of Sept. 7, 1927
(France v. Turkey), P.C.I.J., Ser. A., No. 10.
24. See, C. H. Schreuer, The Interpretation of Treaties by Domestic Courts, 45
BRiT. Y.B. INT'L L. 255, 290-94 (1971) [hereinafter Schreuer, Interpretation of Treaties] (discussing decisions of the German Reichsgericht and other German courts).
25. ld. at 283-88; Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretation, supra note 22, at 67.
According to the Supreme Court:
When a treaty provision fairly admits of two constructions, one restricting, the
other enlarging rights which may be claimed under it, the more liberal interpretation is to be preferred.
Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 52; see Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 193
(1960) (stating, "This Court has many times set its face against treaty interpretations
that unduly restrict rights a treaty is adopted to protect."); Bacardi Corp. of Am. v.
Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 163 (1940) (commenting "[Aiccording to the accepted canon, we should construe the treaty liberally to give effect to the purpose which animates it"); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293 (1933) (noting, "[nn choosing
between conflicting interpretations of a treaty obligation, a narrow and restricted construction is to be avoided as not consonant with the principles deemed controlling in
the interpretation of international agreements."); Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 127
(1928) (holding "[Tihe principles which should control the diplomatic relations of
nations, and the good faith of treaties as well, require that their obligations should be
liberally construed so as to affect the apparent intention of the parties to secure
equality and reciprocity"); Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 342 (1923) (stating,
"Mreaties are to be construed in a broad and liberal spirit, and, when two constructions are possible, one restrictive of rights that may be claimed under it and the other
favorable to them, the latter is to be preferred'); DeGeofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258,
271 (1890). In DeGeofroy, the court explained
[lit is a general principle of construction with respect to treaties that they shall
be liberally construed, so as to carry out the apparent intentions of the parties
to secure equality and reciprocity between them. As they are contracts between
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restrictive interpretation of treaties is a disturbing innovation in American jurisprudence.
In addition to the legal conceptions and perceived political imperatives
operative at the international level, domestic political and legal consider-

ations frequently operate in favor of a narrow construction of the applicability of international agreements by United States courts. American
courts often follow the lead of the executive branch in interpreting international agreements,' or they interpret international obligations so as to
allow maximum freedom for the actions of domestic officials27 or for
the operation of domestic legislation.' For example, in Sale and
independent nations, in their construction words are to be taken in their ordinary meaning, as understood in the public law of nations, and not in any artificial or special sense impressed upon them by local law, unless such restricted
sense is clearly intended.
Id.; Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879) (asking, "If the treaty admits of two
interpretations, and one is limited, and the other liberal; why should not the most
liberal expositions be adopted?"). Cf. Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317 (1911);
Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424 (1901).
26. According to the Restatement:
(1) The President has authority to determine the interpretation of an
international agreement to be asserted by the United States in its relations with
other states.
(2) Courts in the United States have final authority to interpret an international agreement for purposes of applying it as law in the United States, but
will give great weight to an interpretation made by the Executive Branch.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 326 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW]; see also
Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982); Harold Hongju Koh,
Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1305-17 (1988) (discussing "judicial tolerance" for
executive action on foreign affairs questions).
27. See Manuel R. Angulo & James D. Reardon, Jr., The Apparent Political and
Administrative Expediency Exception Established by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Humberto Alvarez-Machan to the Rule of Law as Recognized by Principles
of International Law, 16 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 245 (1993); Kevin R. Johnson,
Responding to the "Litigation Explosion": The Plain Meaning of Executive Branch
Primacy Over Immigration, 71 N.C. L. REv. 413 (1993); see also Japan Whaling
Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986) (holding that the application

of sanctions under the Pelley and Packwood Amendments is optional); Note, Discretion and Legitimacy in International Regulation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1099 (1994)

(arguing that "it is possible to secure the benefits of effective international regulation
while maintaining norms of democracy and accountability").
28. See Detlev F. Vagts, Treaty Interpretation and the New American Ways of
Law Reading, 4 EuR. J. INT'L L. 472, 505 (1993) (citing Sale) (concerning the interpretation to be given to a United States statute, Professor Vagts remarks that "[Tihe
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Alvarez-Machain, the challenged actions were undertaken by the executive branch of government,29 in Volkswagenwerk0 and Agrospatiale2'

the actions in question were undertaken by American courts, and in
Sumitomo,32 the applicability of federal civil rights legislation was at
issue. In addition, particularly troublesome domestic legal difficulties
(such as the conflict between prior treaty and subsequent statutory provi-

sionsP or the question of whether a treaty or certain parts of a treaty
are self-executing or not ) may be circumvented by finding that the
international agreement in question is inapplicable.

The decisions in Sale and Alvarez-Machain indicate that the time has
come to reexamine the approach taken by the Supreme Court as to the

interpretation of international agreements.' An approach which restricts

record of the United States Supreme Court reveals a tendency in fact to favor maintenance of US interests and legal structures even over plain meaning").
29. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993); United States v. AlvarezMachain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
30. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988).
31. Socidt6 Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482

U.S. 522 (1987).
32. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
33. See MIcHAEL J. GLENNON, CONsTrrtmONAL DiPLOMACY 232-38 (1990);
Louis HENKiN, FOREIGN APAiRs AND THE CONTrrUTrON 163-64 (1972); Jordan J.
Paust, Rediscovering the Relationship Benveen Congressional Power and International
Law: Exceptions to the Last in Tune Rule and the Primacy of Custom, 28 VA. J.
INT'L L. 393 (1988); Donna McKeage, Note, Posteriores Priores: An Unconstitutional

CongressionalRole in Treaty Termination, 35 ME. L. REV. 363 (1983).
34. See HENKIN, supra note 33, at 156-61; Carlos M. Vi.squez, The "Self-Executing" Character of the Refugee Protocol's Non-Refoulement Obligation, 7 GEO.
IMMIGR. LJ. 39 (1993); John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Sys-

tems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 310 (1992); Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760 (1988); Yuji Iwasawa, The Doctrine of SelfExecuting Treaties in the United States: A Critical Analysis, 26 VA. J. INT'L L 627

(1986).
35. This Article focuses on the interpretation of international agreements by national courts, especially the United States Supreme Court. In practice, however, international agreements are frequently interpreted by executive branch officials for a variety of political and administrative purposes. With respect to non-judicial interpretation
of international agreements, see Ian Johnstone, Treaty Interpretation: The Authority of

Interpretative Communities, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 371 (1991) (arguing that treaty autointerpretation is not an unconstrained activity determined entirely by short-term national interests and power politics, but is in fact constrained by a set of conventions and
institutional practices that structure the interpretative process); Kenneth J. Vandevelde,
Treaty Interpretation from a Negotiator's Perspective, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L
281 (1988) (arguing that international law needs a theory of treaty interpretation
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the sphere of applicability of such agreements may neatly solve a num-

ber of domestic legal problems or allow the actions of United States
officials to be sustained, but it is certainly not conducive to international
cooperation and in actuality no longer serves the real interests of the
United States. Moreover, such an approach is no longer in accord with
current thinking about international agreements nor with the expectations
of the parties to such agreements. Finally, domestic legal problems involving the status and applicability of treaties can be satisfactorily resolved by different, more forthright, legal approaches, which are more in
keeping with current views regarding the relationship between domestic
and international law.
The reexamination of the Supreme Court's approach to treaty interpretation must extend beyond the analysis and critique of the Court's use
of the various rules and methods of interpretation recognized by international and domestic law.36 Textual, intentional, or teleological approach-

grounded on the perspective of a negotiator rather than that of a court); see also the
literature occasioned by the ABM treaty interpretation controversy, especially David A.
Koplow, Constitutional Bait and Switch: Executive Reinterpretation of Arms Control
Treaties, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1353 (1989); Abraham D. Sofaer, Treaty Interpretation:
A Comment, 137 U. PA.L. R'v. 1437 (1989); Eugene V. Rostow, The Reinterpretation Debate and ConstitutionalLaw, 137 U. PA.L. Rn'V. 1451; Phillip R. Trimble, The
Constitutional Common Law of Treaty Interpretation: A Reply to the Formalists, 137
U. PA. L. REv. 1461; Lawrence J. Block et al., The Senate's Pie-in-the-Sky Treaty
Interpretation: Power and the Quest for Legislative Supremacy, 137 U. PA. L. REv.
1481; Louis Fisher, Congressional Participationin the Treaty Process, 137 U. PA. L.
REv. 1511.
36. For an excellent critique of the treaty interpretation decisions of the
Rehnquist Court, see David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation,
41 UCLA L. REv. 953 (1994). Professor Bederman characterizes his critique as "an
internal critique," by which he means "one that chiefly focuses on the inherent cohesion and cogency of a set of interpretative norms, as expressed by the Supreme
Court." Id. at 1021 n.450. He proposes the following rules for treaty interpretation:
1. Rule One: Begin interpretation with the treaty's text.
2. Rule Two: When an interpreter is permitted to break from the treaty's text
and search for extrinsic sources of meaning, it should remember that negotiating
history and evidence of subsequent practice by a relevant number of treaty
parties are to be vastly preferred over the legislative history of the advice and
consent process or subsequent, unilateral interpretations by the executive
branch ....
3. Rule Three: If textual and extratextual sources fail, the interpreter should
construe the treaty so as to reasonably ensure that the United States will not be
charged later by another country with breaching the agreement.
Id. at 1030-33. While seconding the interpretative rules proposed by Professor
Bederman and also regarding principled decision according to preexisting rules as
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es to the interpretation of international agreements can each be employed to justify either an expansive or restrictive reading of the scope
of applicability of an agreementY Thus, the particular interpretative
rule or methodology used by the Court to justify its reading of a specific treaty provision in an individual case is not the determinative factor
in a case. Analysis therefore must focus rather on clarifying the legal
context (e.g., whether a particular interpretation will create or avoid
conflict with an act of Congress, or whether a particular interpretation
will require a further determination as to whether the agreement is selfexecuting or not) and the institutional context (e.g., the specific interests
of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government in the
subject of the litigation) in which the question of interpretation arises. It
is only to the extent that such considerations are appropriately reflected
in rules of interpretation that such rules will act as real determinants of
decision. This is particularly true in the foreign relations arena, where
United States law has traditionally accorded broad scope to executive action.3" In other words, any attempt to explain and critique Sale,
Alvarez-Machain, and the other cases under review in this Article must
take account of the political, as well as the legal, factors at work."'

highly desirable, I nevertheless believe that movement toward principles such as those
proposed by Professor Bederman must be based on a realistic understanding of the
possibilities and limitations inherent in the legal and institutional context within which
the process of treaty interpretation takes place in United States courts.
37. Compare the different interpretative approaches and sources utilized, especially
the different relative emphasis given to each, in Sale v. Haitain Ctrs., Inc., 113 S. Ct.

2549 (1993) (emphasis on close textual and contextual analysis, with lexicographic
references to terms in both English and French; consideration of operation of Convention in United States legal context; reference to negotiating history); United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (textual and contextual analysis with emphasis
on what is not expressly included; consideration of operation of treaty in context of
United States practice; reference to negotiating history from United States perspective
and to contemporary events); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486
U.S. 694 (1988) (reference to United States law to provide a standard for "occasion
to transmit," a key term, which is lacking in treaty; reference to negotiating history);
Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522

(1987) (textual and contextual analysis; history of ratification of Convention in United
States); and Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982) (principal

reliance on subsequent agreed interpretation of parties to the Treaty; textual and contextual analysis).
38. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Ctrs., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993); Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino. 376
U.S. 398 (1964); United States v. Curtiss-Vright Export Corp., 229 U.S. 304 (1936).
39. See SERGE SUR, L'INTERPRTATION EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBuc 60. 81,
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It is the thesis of this Article that when an examination of an international agreement, whether bilateral or multilateral, reasonably indicates
that the parties sought to deal comprehensively with a particular problem
area or relationship, in case of doubt or ambiguity in applying the
agreement in a specific situation, the agreement should be interpreted as
applicable to that problem or relationship and as providing the sole
means for dealing with that problem or arising out of that relationship.
Interpreting international agreements in this manner would, it is submitted, actually best effectuate the intent of the parties to the agreement
and would be most conducive to predictability and stability in the relationship of states.' When states have concluded an agreement for the
purpose of removing certain matters from the "realm of contentiousness," 41 any interpretation of the scope of applicability of that agreement must keep this objective foremost in mind.42
This Article begins with an analysis of the Court's interpretation of
the international agreements involved in the Sale and Alvarez-Machain
cases. Then, the Volkswagenwerk, Agrospatiale, and Sumitomo cases are
discussed. Next, the article considers the legal factors involved in the
interpretation of international agreements by national courts. The focus
in this section is on conceptions of intention and sovereignty. Finally,
the political functions of international agreements at both the intemational and national levels are analyzed with a view to understanding the
interrelationship of politics and law in the interpretation of international
agreements.

99 (1974) (stressing the close interrelationship between law and politics in the interpretation of international agreements and other international acts); see also infra notes
386-89 and accompanying text.
40. One need only peruse the current issue of the United States Treaties in
Force to see that we are parties to thousands of treaties and agreements establishing
civilized rules of travel, trade, diplomacy, arms control, the environment, antiterrorism,
health, military base management and myriad other subjects of profound practical
concern to Americans. A nation that deliberately sets out to debase its treaty-worthiness, quite simply, is in danger of becoming a global street person: self-destructive
and heedless of its own best interests. Thomas M. Franck, Taking Treaties Seriously,
82 AM. J. INT'L L. 67, 68 (1988).
41. Case Concerning Claims Arising out of Decisions of the Mixed Graeco-German Arbitral Tribunal Set up Under Article 304 in Part X of the Treaty of Versailles
(Greece v. Federal Republic of Germany), 19 R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 27 (1972), at
60.
42. Id.
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In Sale, the Supreme Court had to decide whether forced repatriations
by the United States Coast Guard, acting pursuant to an Executive Order, of persons fleeing from Haiti and interdicted in international waters
violated section 243(h)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952.' 3 Critical to this determination was the question of whether Article 33(1) of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees:" applied to action taken by the United States Coast Guard on
the high seas. The operative Executive Order explicitly states the
government's view that:
[The international legal obligations of the United States under the United
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees ...to apply Article
33 of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
do not extend to persons located outside the territory of the United
Stateso
The government's action was challenged by Haitian Centers Council,
representing a number of interdicted Haitians, which argued that the
obligations contained in Article 33(1) of the Convention applied to actions by United States Government officials on the high seas.
It is not my intention to rehash the arguments for respondent Haitian
Centers Council, Inc. which have been ably presented in briefs by counsel and by numerous amici curii and in law review articles written both
before and after the decision. I do, however, want to examine the
Court's approach to the interpretation of the international agreement at
issue in Sale and to discuss the likely legal and political consequences
of that approach.
Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention provides:
No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler') a refugee in any
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.'

43. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)
(1994).
44. United Nations Refugee Convention, supra note 3, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 176.
45. Exec. Order No. 12,807, 3. C.F.R. § 303 (1993), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. § 182

(1994).
46. United Nations Refugee Convention, supra note 3, art. 33(l).

572

AM. U. J. INTL L. & POL'Y

[VOL. 11:4

The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
was concluded at a conference of plenipotentiaries in Geneva in 1951.4
The Convention subsequently entered into force in 1954.' The 1951
Convention was adopted to deal with the massive refugee problems
caused by World War IIand its aftermath. 49 Thus, the applicability of
the Convention was specifically limited to "events occurring in Europe
before 1 January 1951," or to "events occurring in Europe or elsewhere
before 1 January 1951. " " A state becoming a party to the Convention
could specify which meaning applied to the obligations it was assum5
ing. 1
Most of the substantive provisions of the Convention deal with the
status of refugees in the nations to which they fled. Discrimination on
the basis of race, religion, or country of origin is prohibited." Specific
provisions cover juridical status (personal status, access to courts, etc.),
employment, welfare (housing, public education, labor legislation and
social security, etc.), and administrative measures (freedom of movement, travel documents, transfer of assets, etc.).53 In 1967, a Protocol
was adopted to increase the sphere of applicability of the Convention.54
The Protocol incorporated the substantive provisions of the Convention
and extended them by eliminating the geographic and temporal limitations." The Protocol entered into force for the United States in
1968.56 The United States had not been a party to the 1951 Convention. In 1980, Congress amended United States immigration law to conform to the requirements of the Protocol.

47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. Id. art. 1.
51. Id.
52. Id. art. 3.
53. Id. passim.
54. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter Refugee Protocol].
See generally P. Weis, The 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees and
Some Questions of the Law of Treaties, 42 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 39 (1967) (providing
background material to the 1967 Protocol).
55. Refugee Protocol, supra note 54, art. 1.
56. Id. art. 1.
57. Refugee Act of 1980, § 203(e), Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 STAT. 102; INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 421
(1984). See generally David A. Martin, The Refugee Act of 1980: Its Past and Future, 1982 MICH. Y.B. INT'L STUD. 91.
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The practice in some states of returning refugees to Nazi Germany
where they faced almost certain persecution, torture, imprisonment, or
death was of immediate concern to the drafters of Article 33 of the
1951 Convention. 8 The non-return, or non-refoulement, obligation contained in Article 33 of the Convention is different from most of the
other provisions. It does not relate to the situation of the refugee in the
country of refuge, but rather to his right not to be returned to the country in which he fears persecution. 9 The drafters saw this provision as
especially significant, as evidenced by the fact that Article 42 includes it
in its short list of provisions to which no reservations can be made.'

58. As one participant in the conference which drafted the Convention said with
respect to Article 33:
a state could not seize a refugee in its territory and hand him over to
his oppressors. It may not-indeed, a fortiori--reach out beyond its borders,
pick up a refugee off of the high seas and forcibly return him into the hands
of his oppressors.
Brief for Respondents, Appendix A (Affidavit of Louis Henkin), Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2549 (1993) (No. 92-344).
The origins and purpose of the Refugee Convention reveal that petitioners' core
claim---that a contracting State's obligation under Article 33 of the Convention
not to return refugees to their country of persecution somehow dissolves at its
borders-turns the intent of the Convention's drafters on its head .. .. The
Convention was triggered by the Second World War, primarily in response to
the tragic experience of Jewish refugees during that period. If petitioners' reading is correct, and history repeated itself, the United States could escape its
obligations under Article 33 simply by dispatching the Coast Guard to the high
seas, apprehending fleeing Jews before they reached our waters, and deliberately
returning them to their Nazi persecutors. This cannot be the law.
Argument, I.B.2, id. (No. 92-344).
Some authors have advanced suggestions for a thorough-going rethinking and
modernization of international refugee law. See, e.g., Pierre Bertrand, An Operational
Approach to International Refugee Protection, 26 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 495 (1993);
James C. Hathaway, A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law, 31
HARv. INT'L L. J. 129 (1990) (commenting on the inadequacy of refugee laws in
reference to the global refugee program); Jack I. Garvey, Toward a Reformulation of
International Refugee Law, 26 HARv. INT'L L. J. 483 (1985) (asserting that the humanitarian premise of refugee law limits constructive response to refugee issues).
59. United Nations Refugee Convention, supra note 3, art. 33. It is important to
note that Article 33 says nothing about the admission of refugees; it deals simply
with the obligation of non-return to a country where a refugee's life or freedom
would be threatened on account of his "race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion."
60. Id. art. 42.
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Before turning to Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, the Sale
Court began its analysis by considering the sphere of applicability of
section 243(h)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. That section
reads as follows:
The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien ... to a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom
would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.6
The Court concluded that this section applies only to domestic actions
of the Attorney General.6' The Court based its view on the reference in
section 243(h)(1) to the Attorney General and to the presence of other
provisions in the Act which expressly confer certain responsibilities on
the President, the Secretary of State, and other officers.6' Moreover, the
Court thought that the placement of section 243(h)(1) in Part V of the
Act (entitled "Deportation; Adjustment of Status") indicated that it applied only to domestic exclusion and deportation proceedings.' If there
were any remaining doubts about the scope of application of the section,
however, "the presumption that Acts of Congress do not ordinarily apply
outside our borders would support an interpretation of section 243(h) as
applying only within United States territory.' 65
The Court next considered the history of the Refugee Act of 1980,
which amended section 243(h)(1) to delete the words "within the United
States" and to add the word "return.'" As originally enacted, the Act
authorized the Attorney General to withhold the deportation of aliens
within the United States.67 The Court explained that the reason for the

61. Immigration
§ 1253(h)(1994).

and

Nationality

Act

of

1952,

§ 243(h)(1),

8

U.S.C.

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.

65. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (1993). The Court's application of the presumption against extraterritoriality in Sale has been convincingly criticized in Nicholas R. Koberstein, supra note 6, and in The Supreme Court, 1992
Term, Leading Cases, supra note 6, at 352-61. See also Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal
of the ExtraterritorialReach of U.S. Laws, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1 (1992).

66. Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 57, § 243(h)(1).
67. Before the amendments made by the Refugee Act of 1980, section 243(h)(1)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 read as follows:
The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any alien ...
within the United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien
would be subject to persecution on account of race, religion, or political opin-
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1980 changes relates to a 1958 decision of the Court, Leng May Ma v.
Barber,' which created a category of aliens who were physically within the United States but not considered so under immigration law.' In
the Court's view, the term "deport" would not apply to such an individ-

ual, who was technically not considered to be "within the United
States."7' Therefore, to cover an alien physically within United States

territory but not yet technically "within the United States," the Leng
May Ma situation, it was necessary to add the word "return" to the
statute and to delete the phrase "within the United States."

The Court then considered the possibility that the changes in section
243(h)(1) were not driven by domestic considerations, but rather were

the result of conforming United States nationality law to the requirements of the U.N. Refugee Convention and Protocol!'TWhile the Court

read the legislative history of the Act to include this possibility, it characterized the intent to harmonize United States law with the Protocol as
only a "general intent," presumably not determinative with respect to
the technical reading to be given to particular provisions of the Act.
Moreover, the Court was of the view that "[t]he President and the Sen-

ate believed that the Protocol was largely consistent with existing
law." In any event, amending the Act by extending the protections of
the Convention to the Leng May Ma-type alien (those aliens physically,

ion and for such period of time as he deems to be necessary for such reason.
Justice Blackmun points out that the Refugee Act of 1980
explicitly amended this provision in three respects:
Congress (1) deleted the words "within the United States;" (2) barred the Government from "return[ing]," as well as "deport[ing]" alien refugees; and
(3) made the prohibition against return mandatory, thereby eliminating the discretion of the Attorney General over such decisions.
Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2574 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see Kevin Johnson, Judicial Acquiescence to the Executive Branch's Pursuit of Foreign Policy and Domestic Agendas
in Immigration Matters: The Case of the Haitian Asylum-Seekers. 7 GEo. Im?tGR. L
J.1, 6-11 (1993) [hereinafter Johnson, Judicial Acquiescence] (arguing that "Congress
designed the Refugee Act of 1980 to end foreign policy-linked refugee admissions");
Deborah E. Anker, Discretionary Asylum: A Protection Remedy for Refugees Under
the Refugee Act of 1980, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1987) (stating that the Attorney
General retained the authority to grant asylum status even though the eligibility for
asylum is supposedly governed by international standards).
68. 357 U.S. 185 (1958).
69. Sale, 113 S. CL at 2562.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2562, n.3.
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but not technically, present within the United States) would harmonize
United States immigration law with the requirements of the Convention.
Thus, in the Court's view, it was entirely consistent to interpret the
1980 amendment to section 243(h)(1) as conforming United States immigration law to the requirements of Article 33 of the Convention while
at the same time restrictively interpreting the geographic sphere of applicability of section 243(h)(1).
The Court then turned to an analysis of Article 33 of the Convention.
The Court found an analysis of Article 33 necessary because of the
"possibilities" that "under the Supremacy Clause, the broader treaty
' or that in
obligation might . . . provide the controlling rule of law"74
interpreting the Act the "general intent" to conform it to the Protocol
might be relevant.'
The Court indicated at the outset that it regarded both the text and
the negotiating history of Article 33 to "affirmatively indicate that it was
not intended to have extraterritorial effect."76 As for the text, the Court
compares Article 33(1) and Article 33(2), which allows a nation to
deport "a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a
danger to the security of the country in which he is . . . ." and concludes from this comparison that it would "create an absurd anomaly" if
Article 33(1) applied on the high seas.77 In that case a nation could
expel dangerous refugees located within its territory, but would have to
accord the benefits of Article 33(1) to dangerous refugees intercepted on
the high seas. Also, the Court did not regard the French term "refouler"
(which is included in a parenthetical in the English version of the Convention as well as in the equally-authoritative French version) as equivalent in meaning to the word "return." ' Thus, according to the Court,
the word "return" has a narrower meaning in the Convention than in
colloquial English.79 In the Court's view, "return," as used in the Convention, "means a defensive act of resistance or exclusion at a border
rather than an act of transporting someone to a particular destination."8
The Court properly commences its interpretation of the Convention
with the text itself. Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Sale v. Haitian Ctrs., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2562 (1993).
Id.
Id. at 2563.
Id.
Id.
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2563 (1993).
Id. at 2564.
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of Treaties"' provides that "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose."' The
Court's textual analysis can be faulted, however, in several respects.
First, it is highly doubtful that the Court's technical and narrow interpretations of the words "return" and "refouler" reflect those word's
ordinary meanings, in English or in French. While the French term
"refouler" may certainly be translated as "repulse, repel, drive back", the
word does not contain a geographic referent. Presumably the repulsing,
repelling, or driving back can occur at any geographic point; it is not
inherent in the meaning of the word that the act take place "at a border" as the Court thought. Moreover, according to Article 31(4) of the
Vienna Convention, "[a] special meaning shall be given to a term if it
is established that the parties so intended.""n
This provision would appear to place the burden squarely on the
proponent of the special meaning. There are indications that the French
term "refouler" was inserted in the English text to refer to the European
practice with respect to non-refoulement. 4 Whether this practice, however, was limited to the prohibition of returning only those aliens physically in the territory of the state of refuge is unclear.' Thus, it is unlikely that the government could have sustained its burden as required
by Article 31(4).
Second, even though Article 31 of the Vienna Convention is generally
regarded as directing a court's attention first and foremost to the text,
that article contains within it an explicit reference to "the object and
purpose" of the treaty.' The Court makes a brief mention of the

81. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) (hereinafter
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). According to the RESTATMETsr OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, supra note 26, § 325, cmt. a:

[The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties] represents generally accepted
principles and the United States has also appeared willing to accept them despite differences of nuance and emphasis.
See also Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Lav of Treaties Before
United States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 281 (1988).
82. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. supra note 81, art. 31.
83. Id. art. 31(4).
84. See GuY S. GOODWI-GuIL, THE REFuGEE iN INTERNATIONAL LAW 72, 69100 (1983); 2 AT.E GRAHL-MADSFN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw 93-98 (1972).
85. GOODwIN-Gn., supra note 84, at 74-75.
86. The Vienna Convention states:
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"Protocol's broad remedial goals"87 and its "general humanitarian intent."88 The opinion does not, however, seek to discover the object and
purpose of Article 33 in order to interpret its words in the light of that
object and purpose, nor does it describe more specifically than "broad
remedial goals" and "general humanitarian intent" the object and purpose
of the Convention as a whole.
Finally, the Court did not take into account those means of interpretation enumerated in Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention. Article 31(3)
provides:
There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties. 9
In this regard, the Court should have considered the 1981 agreement
between the United States and Haiti which contains a provision stating
that "

. .

. under these arrangements [for the interdiction and selective

return to Haiti of certain Haitian migrants and vessels interdicted on the
high seas by the United States Coast Guard] the United States Government does not intend to return to Haiti any Haitian migrants whom the
United States authorities determine to qualify for refugee status."' Furthermore, in its preambulatory language, the Agreement speaks of respect for "the international obligations mandated by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees .
"...,9'
A reasonable inference from
these provisions is that both Haiti and the United States understood the

A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of
its object and purpose. (emphasis supplied)

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 81, art. 31(1).
87. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2563 (1993).
88.

Id. at 2565.

89. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 81, art. 31(3).
90. Agreement on Migrant(s)-Interdiction, Sept. 23, 1981, United States-Haiti, 33
U.S.T. 3559, T.I.A.S. No. 10241 [hereinafter Agreement on Migrant(s)-Interdiction]. In
April 1994, exiled Haitian President Rev. Jean-Bertrand Aristide notified the United
States Government that he intends to terminate the Agreement. Steven Greenhouse,
Aristide to End Accord That Allows U.S. to Seize Refugee Boats, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 8,

1994, at A6.
91. Agreement on Migrant(s)-Interdiction, supra note 90.
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Protocol as mandating the non-return of fleeing Haitians who qualify for
refugee status. Moreover, since the 1981 agreement encompasses operations in international waters, it also seems reasonable to infer that both
Haiti and the United States regarded the Protocol as applying in those
waters.
Well over 100 nations are parties to the Refugee Convention and
Protocol. An examination of the "subsequent practice" of those nations
would thus appear to be part of the Article 31 analysis mandated by the
Vienna Convention.' While current evaluation of relevant practice is
not unanimous, there are strong indications that the broader interpretation of the non-refoulement obligation of Article 33 of the Refugee
Convention has now become a principle of customary international
law.93 This would certainly appear to be relevant in ascertaining the
meaning of Article 33 of the Convention, particularly since at the time
of its conclusion it is probably safe to say that "there was no unanimity,
perhaps deliberately so" as to the sphere of geographic applicability of
the non-refoulement obligation.'
After completing its textual analysis of Article 33, the Court then
looked to the negotiating history of the Convention to support its view
that Article 33 has no extraterritorial application. The Court cites statements made by two delegates at the Geneva Conference which support
its restrictive reading of Article 33. According to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, however
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including
the preparatory work of a treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion,
in order to conform the meaning resulting from the application of article

92. According to article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
supra note 81:

There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (b) any subsequent
practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the
parties regarding its interpretation; ....
93. See GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 84. at

81, 97-98.
94. Id at 74; see JWAEs C. HATHAWAY, THE LAw OF REFUGEE STATUs 24-27
(1991) (analyzing British, Canadian, and United States interpretation of the term "refugee" used in the Refugee Convention); Deborah Perluss & Joan F. Hartman, Temporary Refuge: Emergence of a Customary Norm, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 551 (1986) (arguing that temporary refuge should be recognized as a norm of customary international
law). But see Kay Hailbronner, Non-Refoulement and "Humanitarian" Refugees: Customary International Law or Wishfid Legal Thinking?, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 857 (1986)

(disputing the emergence of a customary norm).
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31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable."
As has been demonstrated above, the Court's interpretation falls far
short of the requirements of Article 31. Therefore, reference to the preparatory work "to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of
article 31" would at best be premature. Reference to the preparatory
work on the grounds of ambiguity, obscurity, absurdity, or unreasonableness is also not justified. The text is quite clear and straight-forward. A
literal reading produces a result that is clear and sensible. The use of
preparatory work in this case is an excellent example of the dangers of
resorting to such material before undertaking a thorough textual analysis,
including consideration of the object and purpose of the agreement."
Even if the Court were justified in looking to the preparatory work to
ascertain the intent of the parties concerning the geographic applicability
of the non-refoulement obligation, the two statements quoted are at best
inconclusive, and, to the extent that they do express a geographic limitation regarding the obligation of non-refoulement, are not necessarily
representative of the views of all, or even the majority, of the parties to
the Convention.
To appreciate the Sale court's approach to statutory and treaty interpretation, it is important to understand that the court never loses sight of
the fact that what is really at issue in the case is the exercise of presidential power. Even though certain tasks may be assigned to the Attorney General, the operative source of law for the forcible repatriation of
the people fleeing from Haiti is an Executive Order.' According to the

95. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 81, art. 32.
96. The United Nations Conference states:
If there was too ready admission of the preparatory work, the State which had
found a clear provision of the treaty inconvenient for one reason or another
was likely to be furnished with a tabula in naufragio, because there was generally something in the preparatory work that could be found to support almost
any contention.
United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Ist. sess., U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.39/11, at 170 (March 26-May 24 1968) (remarks of Mr. Jim6nez de
Ar0chaga).
97. Exec. Order No. 12,807, supra note 45.
[The presumption that Acts of Congress normally do not have extraterritorial
application unless such an intent is clearly manifested] has special force when
we are construing treaty and statutory provisions that may involve foreign and
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court, the President may act unless he is "clearly prohibit[ed]" from
doing so by the Convention or statute." In this case, despite many indications to the contrary, neither the statute nor the Convention expressly accord extraterritorial effect to the non-refoulement obligation of
Article 33 or section 243(h)(1). In the absence of an express prohibition, is the Court to strike down the action of the president, particularly
an action that appears to enjoy broad domestic political support?"°
What the Court is really doing in Sale is applying the restrictive
approach to both statutory and treaty interpretation. Since this case deals
with foreign affairs, both the statute and the treaty in question are narrowly construed so as not to interfere with presidential action.'0 ' When
interpreting the Convention, the Court does not employ the term national
sovereignty or talk in terms of a presumption in favor of freedom of
action of states. Nevertheless, its interpretative approach is similar. Rather than resolve doubt in favor of restrictions on state action, it preserves
maximum freedom of action for national officials. The effect of the
Court's decision is to narrow the scope of applicability of the treaty to
the territorial limits of the United States, rather than to regard the Convention and Protocol as dealing comprehensively with the refoulement
problem, as was probably the intention of the drafters."
Likewise, the Court neglects to consider the current state of the international law with respect to non-refoulement. According to a number of
scholars in the field, the obligation to return aliens to countries where
they may be subject to torture, imprisonment, or death has become a
norm of customary international law.' There are even those who regard such a norm as jus cogens.' 4

military affairs for which the President has unique responsibility.
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2567 (1993).
98. Sale, 113 S. CL at 2567.

99. Id. at 2562.
100. See Frelick, supra note 6, at 680-81 (illustrating the highly political nature of
the refugee issue in the United States); see also Johnson, Judicial Acquiescence, supra
note 67, at 1 (asserting that domestic politics plays an influential role in executive
decision-making).
101. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs., Inc., 113 S. Ct 2549, 2567 (1993).
102. See Report of the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees. U.N.
GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 12, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/43/12 (1988) (declaring that the

protective norm of nonrefoulment is "[t]he most fundamental of protection principles
and the first of refugee rights").
103. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 84, at 76; Perluss & Hartnan, supra note 94, at

551.
104. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, U.N. Doc.
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The Sale case is an example of the Supreme Court reading a treaty
which on its face appears to deal comprehensively with a particular

matter (the problem of non-refoulement) and interpreting it narrowly so
as to exclude its operation in a factual situation that appears reasonably
to fall within the parameters of the agreement. While the effect of the
decision may be to uphold a national policy that is desirable in the
short-run, 5 the Court's interpretation creates the potential for similar
action by other nations seeking to avoid or limit their obligations to
refugees. 6 "This Court's interpretation of this fundamental safeguard
may well influence, for years to come, the behavior of other countries
and thus the fates of untold numbers of refugees throughout the
world."
Thus, the Court's restrictive interpretation given to the geo-

E/1985/62, T11 22-23(1985).
105. See Frelick, supra note 6, at 680-81 (justifying United States interdiction
policy in humanitarian terms: by sending a clear signal to Haitians not to attempt the
perilous sea voyage to United States shores in unseaworthy vessels, the policy will
save many lives). Recent reports indicate, however, that rather than discourage Haitian
emigration, United States interdiction policy has merely displaced it, particularly by
sea to the Turks and Caicos Islands and overland to the Dominican Republic. Haitians, Thwarted at Sea, Look for a Back Door, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1994, at All;
see Howard W. French, Across the Mist, Haiti's Solution May Lie Offshore, N.Y.
TIMES, May 7, 1994, at A4 (suggesting that the United States might use the sparsely
populated Ile de ]a Gonave, 11 miles off the coast of Haiti, to establish a facility for
the screening of Haitian refugees); Grover J.Rees, To the Rescue?, N.Y. TIMES, May
24, 1994, at A2 (stating that former General Counsel of United States Immigration
and Naturalization Service suggests that the Guanthnamo operation be reopened with
U.N. participation). On May 7, 1994, President Clinton announced that he was reversing the policy upheld in Sale and would now grant asylum hearings at sea or at
other countries in the region to Haitians trying to reach the United States. Gwen Ifill,
Clinton Grants Haitian Exiles Hearings at Sea, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1994, at Al; see
also Douglas Jehl, U.S. Sees New Policy on Haitian Refugees as Buying Time, N.Y.
TIMES, May 10, 1994, at A3 (documenting Clinton's change in policy). For more
recent developments, see infra notes 470-475 and accompanying text.
106. Newmark, supra note 6, at 858 (stating that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the United Nation Convention's prohibition against refoulement is likely to
have a significant impact on the field of refugee law). One should bear in mind that
affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals enjoining the Coast Guard from foreibly repatriating would not have opened the doors of the United States to all those
persons fleeing Haiti. The United States would then have had to screen the Haitians
to see if they qualified for refugee status. This would essentially have required the
government to devote more resources to processing the Haitian applicants for refugee
status.
107. Brief of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.,
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graphic sphere of applicability of Article 33 of the Convention will
certainly provide a precedent for other nations faced with similar choices."°s Moreover, it will preclude the United States from protesting
against actions taken pursuant to such restrictive interpretations, no matter how contrary particular actions are to our views of fundamental
humanitarian behavior."°
The Court's decision also represents a strong endorsement of presidential prerogative in the foreign affairs area, at the expense of Congress
and the courts. Congressional wil as expressed in the 1980 amendments
to the INA is thwarted through strained interpretations of both treaty and
statute."' Moreover, the Court shows such great deference to executive
interpretation of both statute and treaty, that effective judicial review is
all but illusory."

II. UNITED STATES v. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN
United States v. Alvarez-Machainm2 presents an even more egregious
example than Sale of the short-sightedness of the Court's restrictive
method of treaty interpretation. This case gives rise to similar concerns
regarding the Court's overall approach to questions involving the interpretation of international agreements and the separation of powers."'
In Alvarez-Machain, the Court's decision not only frustrates the reasonable expectations of Mexico as a party to an extradition treaty but also
condones, in effect, a flagrant violation of some of the most fundamental principles of international law by agents of the executive branch of
the United States Government." 4 Furthermore, as Professor Henkin

113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993) (No. 92-344).
108. Newmark, supra note 6, at 858.
109. Id.
110. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs., Inc., 113 S. CL 2549, 2561 (1993).
111. Id. at 2567.
112. United States v.Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
113. While, as indicated in the text, the legal implications of Alvarez-Machain
may very well be more disturbing than those of Sale (e.g., because the Sale court
simply construed a consensual obligation narrowly, while the Alvarez-Machain court
also upholds a governmental action that clearly violated basic principles of international law), the humanitarian implications of Sale are not any less compelling and disturbing than those of Alvarez-Machain.
114. See Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, entered
into force, Dec. 13, 1951, art. 18, 119 U.N.T.S. 3 (stating that '[n]o State has the

right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or
external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed
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comments, "in reaction to the general outrage, the United States will, at
the least, have to disown that interpretation if it is to maintain its network of extradition treaties . . . ,,...
Thus, the Court's interpretation of
the extradition treaty with Mexico jeopardizes the important interest of
the United States in the smooth functioning of international extradition
procedures."' The decison destabilizes and renders problematic the international extradition system of the United States, and also creates a
focal point for international tensions and hard feelings, particularly with
our neighboring states of Mexico and Canada.' In addition, it repre-

force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural elements."); id. art 19
(stating that "[n]o State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an
economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of another State
and obtain from it advantages of any kind."); id. art. 20 (stating that "[t]he territory
of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of any other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly,
on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained
either by force or by other means of coercion shall be recognized."); id. art. 21 (stating that "[t]he American States bind themselves not to have recourse to the use of
force ....
"); see also U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4) (stating that "[a]ll members shall
refrain . . . from the threat or use of force against the territorial or political independence of any state"); Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933,
entered into force, Dec. 26, 1934, arts. 8, 11, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.
115. Notes from the President, ASIL NEWSLETTER, Aug.-Sept. 1992, at I (commenting further that "[t]he larger, longer question is whether the Government of the
United States-all branches-is prepared to commit itself to taking international law
seriously"). For the most part extradition depends on the existence of bilateral treaties
between states. IVAN A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971) (remarking that the present system of bilateral treaties is ineffective in providing a comprehensive method for apprehending the fugitive criminal). The gaps in the international treaty network are, at present, allowing so many criminals to circulate with
impunity that they can confidently be said to represent the single most serious handicap under which international co-operation in the suppression of crime is now laboring. Id. at 42.
116. Statement by Deputy Legal Adviser Alan J. Kreczko before the Subcomm. on
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Comm., 103d Congress, 1st
Sess. (1992). A United States Department of State spokesman indicated that the
Court's decision caused considerable concern among a wide range of governments. Id.
Many governments expressed outrage that the United States believes it has the right
to decide unilaterally to enter their territory and abduct one of their nationals. Id.
Some governments indicated that the decision could affect their parliaments' review of
pending law enforcement agreements with the United States. Id.
117. For the international reception of the Alvarez-Machain decision, see Wilder,
supra note 17, at 992-95; Brief for the Government of Canada, United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, (1992), 504 US. 655 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 919 (setting
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sents one more important precedent for United States courts to apply
the restrictive approach to the interpretation of international obligations
of the United States.
Although the Court's opinion focuses on demonstrating that no violation of the U.S.-Mexican Extradition Treaty" 8 occurred, there are other
approaches that the Court might have taken. Perhaps the most straightforward way to have reached the same result, without engaging in a
tortured construction of the treaty, would have been for the Court to
regard the abduction as violating the Treaty but to preclude the defendant from raising the treaty violation as a bar to jurisdiction." 9 This
result can be justified as an application of the Ker-Frisbierule: that "the
power of a court to try a person for a crime is not impaired by the fact
that he has been brought
within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a
'' '
'forcible abduction. 0
forth the official position of the Canadian Government); Brief for the United Mexican
States, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M.
919 [hereinafter Brief for the United Mexican States] (setting forth the official position of the Mexican Government); Ethan A. Nadelman, The Evolution of United States
Involvement in the International Rendition of Fugitive Criminals, 25 N.Y.U. I. INT'L

L. & POL. 813, 860 (1993) (noting that most "irregular extraditions" to the United
States have involved Canada and Mexico). For further discussion on this issue, see
generally M. CHERIF BASSiOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADMrION AND WORLD PUBUC
ORDER 121-276 (1974); Abraham Abramovsky, ExtraterritorialAbductions: America's
"Catch and Snatch" Policy Run Amok, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 151 (1991) (highlighting

the probability that other nations will retaliate against American citizens abroad and
seriously threaten international relations); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Kidnapping by Government Order: A Follow-up, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 712 (1990); Andreas F. Lowenfeld,
U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and International Law, Continued, 84
AM. J. INT'L L. 444 (1990) (documenting the ardent protest of the Mexican Government); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and
International Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 880 (1989) (stating that the acts were viewed

by foreign governments as violations of international law and incompatible with
extradition treaties in force); Paul O'-iggins, Unlawful Seizure and Irregular Extradition, 35 Brr. Y.B. INT'L L. 279 (1960); Lawrence Preuss, Kidnapping of Fugitives
from Justice on Foreign Territory, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 502 (1935); see also Tim
Golden, Dispute Holds Up U.S. Extradition Treaty With Mexico, N.Y. TImEs, May 15,

1994, at A6.
118. Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, United States-United Mexican States. 31
U.S.T. 5059 [hereinafter Extradition Treaty].
119. See Bush, supra note 17, at 947-48 (suggesting that the Court could have
reached the same result by conceding a treaty violation, but nevertheless applying the
Ker-Frisbie rule). Furthermore, the Court does not deal with the issue of the direct
application customary international law under the Paquete Habana principal. The Supreme Court, 1991 Term, Leading Cases, 106 HARV. L. REV. 163. 322-28 (1992).
120. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522, reh'g denied 343 U.S. 937 (1952); see
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The Court, however, may have been concerned with its decision in
United States v. Rauscher,2 1 which held that persons brought before a
United States court pursuant to an extradition treaty may not be tried for
a crime other than the crime for which they have been extradited.' 2
Read broadly, Rauscher could prohibit a trial if the accused's presence
before the court or aspects of the proceedings violate an extradition
treaty. In Alvarez-Machain, the Court does not read Rauscher in this
manner. Instead, it restricts the holding to defendants brought to the
United States by way of an extradition treaty and regards the Rauscher
exception to Ker-Frisbie as inapplicable to forcibly abducted defendants."z In sum, if a nation elects to proceed pursuant to an extradition treaty, it must abide by the terms of that treaty. If it elects not to
invoke the treaty and employs alternative means to gain custody of a
defendant, even if those means violate the extradition treaty, Rauscher
will not necessarily bar prosecution. Thus, even taking account of
Rauscher, the Court could have upheld the prosecution of AlvarezMachain while at the same time finding that the United States violated
its extradition treaty with Mexico.
The Court might also have decided to overrule Ker or to distinguish
it from Alvarez-Machain on its facts. 124 Proceeding in either manner,
however, would have required the Court to affirm the decision of the
court of appeals prohibiting the prosecution of the defendant." The
Court quite obviously did not want to uphold the lower court decision.
Either rationale for not applying the Ker-Frisbie rule (overruling or
distinguishing Ker) may also have allowed the Court to side-step the
treaty interpretation question. The internationally illegal act of forcible
abduction or the violation of domestic due process, which forcible ab-

Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886) (holding that forcible abduction is not sufficient
reason for a party to escape trial in a court with proper jurisdiction).
121. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
122. Id. at 433.
123. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 660-63 (1992).
124. See John G. Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEo.
L. J. 1441, 1449-55 (1988) (emphasizing the distinctions between the facts of Ker and
Alvarez-Machain).
125. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), affg U.S.
v. Caro-Quintero et al., 745 F.Supp. 599 (C.D. Cal. 1990); see Wilson G. Jones, The
Ninth Circuit's Camarena Decisions: Exceptions or Aberrations of the Ker-Frisbie
Doctrine?, 27 TExAS INT'L L. J. 211 (1992) (discussing the court's holding in the
Caro-Quintero case).
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duction would entail, would, without more, bar prosecution before a
court in the United States.'12
There are strong reasons for overruling or distinguishing Ker. The
Ker precedent is both antiquated and problematic. International law has
developed considerably since the 1880s in giving expression to the requirements of peaceful and cooperative solutions to problems between
states. More specifically, the principles of non-intervention and the prohibition of the use of force in international relations are fundamental and
widely-accepted concepts in contemporary international law. Although
courts in the United States have recently reaffirmed the Ker-Frisbierule
and the Supreme Court has approved it in dicta,'" Alvarez-Machain
provided the Court with the opportunity to reassess the doctrine in light
of modem developments in international law.
There are several important distinctions between Ker and AlvarezMachain." First, Ker was an American national,'" while AlvarezMachain was a Mexican national.'"0 Second, Peru made no formal protest to Ker's prosecution in a United States court,' but in AlvarezMachain, Mexico protested vigorously." Third, Ker was abducted by
a private party,' while the abduction in Alvarez-Machain involved
agents of the United States Government." Fourth, Ker's abduction
took place during a period of serious internal disorder in Peru, when
compliance with a request for extradition may not have been possible by
local authorities.'35 No such problems existed regarding the a request
for Alvarez-Machain's extradition.
In light of current developments in international law and the factual
differences between Ker and Alvarez-Machain, the Court had the options

126. See generally Jacques Semmelman, Due Process, International Law, and
Jurisdiction over Criminal Defendants Abducted Extraterritorially: The Ker-Frisbie
Doctrine Reexamined, 30 COLUm. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 513 (1992) (suggesting that alternative interpretations of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine would have reached a better result in
the eyes of the world community).
127. Id. at 515.
128. See Charles Fairman, Ker v. minois Revisited, 47 AM. J. INT'L L 678

(1953).
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 438 (1886).
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 657 (1992).
Fairman, supra note 128, at 685.
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 658.
Ker, 119 U.S. at 438.
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 657.
Fairman, supra note 128.
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of distinguishing Ker or overruling it with respect to international abductions. The Court took neither route, which indicates that the Court was
determined to uphold the federal power to prosecute in this case in spite
of the illegal international abduction. After reaffirming the Ker-Frisbie
rule, the Court states that "[i]f we conclude that the Treaty does not
and the court
prohibit respondent's abduction, the rule in Ker applies,
36
it.'
before
came
respondent
how
to
as
inquire
not
need
The treaty interpretation issue in Alvarez-Machain is straight-forward:
whether the United States-Mexican Extradition Treaty, explicitly or implicitly, prevents the prosecution in a United States court of a Mexican
national abducted from Mexico with the complicity of United States
agents, when Mexico has formally protested against the abduction. The
threshold question is whether the abduction violates the extradition treaty
between the United States and Mexico. To answer this question, the
Court first looks to the terms of the Treaty.'37 According to the Court,
"[t]he Treaty says nothing about the obligations of the United States and
Mexico to refrain from forcible abductions of people from the territory
of the other nation, or the consequences under the Treaty if such an
abduction occurs."' 38 The Court then goes on to reject respondent's
claims that various articles of the Treaty, particularly article 22(1),
which says that the Treaty shall apply to certain enumerated offenses
(including murder, which was the offense involved in this case),'39 and
article 9, which says that neither party "shall be bound to deliver up its
own nationals . . . .""4 must be understood to presuppose a context in
which the Treaty is the exclusive means by which one party can obtain
custody of a national of the other party physically located in his national state. 4' Any other interpretation of the Treaty, in respondent's view,
would undercut and thereby defeat the obvious intent of these provisions. 42
Although the Court was obviously unimpressed by this contention,
respondent's argument based on the express language of article 9 is
compelling. While article 9 recognizes the right of a party to withhold
the extradition of its own national, it explicitly provides alternative

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 662 (1992).
Id.
Id.
Extradition Treaty, supra note 118, art. 22(1).
Id. art. 9.
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 664 (1992).
Id. at 666.
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procedures for dealing with such situations. 43 Thus, the requested na-

tion must grant extradition or "submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, provided that Party has jurisdiction

over the offense."'" It appears that the Treaty does in fact provide explicitly and comprehensively for dealing with nationals of the requested

state.
In its textual analysis, the Court also looks to the object and purpose
of the treaty, 45 which it determines not by direct reference to language
in the treaty itself, but by consulting Moore's 1891 treatise on
extradition.'" The Preamble to the U.S.-Mexican Treaty, however, says
that the parties entered into this agreement "desiring to cooperate more
closely in the fight against crime and, to this end, to mutually render
better assistance in matters of extradition."'" Citing a passage in
Moore's 100-year-old treatise dealing with extradition treaties in general

is certainly not an adequate way of ascertaining the object and purpose
of a treaty entered into in 1978 against the background of modem problems in fighting crime and the post-war growth in the interdependence

and cooperation of nations.'"

143. Extradition Treaty, supra note 118, art. 9.
144. Id.
145. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
146. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 664 (citing 1 JOHN BAssErT
MOORE, A TREATISE ON EXTRADrmON AND INTERSTATE RENDITION 82 (1891) which
states that "[e]xtradition treaties exist so as to impose mutual obligations to surrender
individuals in certain defined sets of circumstances, following established procedures").
Moore stresses the importance of assuring reciprocity in the duty of delivering up
fugitives upon demand in discussing the purpose of concluding extradition treaties.
147. Extradition Treaty, supra note 118, pmbl.
148. It is significant that the Extradition Treaty was signed the same day as two
other bilateral agreements between the United States and Mexico: Treaty on Maritime
Boundaries, United States-United Mexican States, May 4, 1978, reprinted in 17 LL.M.
1073 (1978), and Tourism Agreement, United States-United Mexican States, May 4,
1978, 30 U.S.T. 4443, reprinted in 17 LL.M. 1076 (1978). The Preamble to the
Tourism Agreement states "[t]hat both countries face an historic opportunity for creating a new concept of neighborly relations . . . " and "(t]hat international cooperation
and economic exchange should serve to foster man's development, to enhance mutual
respect for human dignity, and to promote shared well-being .... ." A short time
later, the United States and Mexico entered into another agreement for cooperation,
Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation on Environmental Programs and
Transboundary Problems, United States-United Mexican States, June 14, 1978. 30
U.S.T. 1574, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1056 (1978). Also relevant. as an indication of
the meaning of "to cooperate more closely in the fight against crime" and also perhaps as an indication of subsequent practice, is the Mutual Legal Assistance Coopera-

AM. U. J. INTL L. & POL'Y

[VOL. 11:4

Next the Court considers "whether the Treaty should be interpreted so
as to include an implied term prohibiting prosecution where the
defendant's presence is obtained by means other than those established
in the Treaty."' 9 In other words, should the Treaty be regarded as
governing the relationship of the parties with respect to questions concerning the obtaining of custody by a party of a national of the other
party physically located in his national state. Simple common sense
would seem clearly to mandate that this be so. If not, why would the
parties have entered into an agreement containing a detailed set of standards and procedures for accomplishing a certain result if it were contemplated that the same result could be achieved by other means. Also,
considering that the violation of the territorial sovereignty of one state
by the agents of another state is clearly prohibited by international law
(and here there is no disagreement between any of the participants in
this case-the Court as well as the parties). 5 Is it reasonable to suppose that the parties considered abduction a viable law-enforcement
option and that if they had wanted to preclude this possibility they
would have included a provision to that effect in the agreement?
Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states
that "[t]here shall be taken into account, together with the context: ...
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties.'' This rule is known as the principle of consistency; its purpose is to make clear that the parties to a treaty "intend
something not inconsistent with generally recognized principles of international law . . .. ""' In light of this principle of customary international law, codified in the Vienna Convention, the Court should have
given considerable weight to other applicable and well-established princi-

tion Treaty, United States-United Mexican States, Dec. 9, 1987, reprinted in 27 I.L.M.
443 (1988). Article 1 of that Treaty provides:
1. The Parties shall cooperate with each other by taking all appropriate
measures that they have legal authority to take, in order to provide mutual
legal assistance in criminal matters ....
2. This Treaty does not empower one Party's authorities to undertake, in
the territorial jurisdiction of the other, the exercise and performance of the
functions or authority exclusively entrusted to the authorities of that other Party
by its national laws or regulations.
149. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 666.
150. Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 37 (1987).
151. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 81, art. 31(3).
152. Lassa Oppenheim, OPPENEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1275 (9th ed., pts. 2-4,
R. Jennings & A. Watts eds., 1992); see STARKE, supra note 22, at 457.
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ples of international law, like non-intervention, respect for the territorial
integrity and political independence of sovereign states, and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. The Court could also
have made reference to the concept of due process or the international
law of human rights. It appears, however, that the Court approached this
inquiry in the spirit suggested by the petitioner's brief: that the relevant
background principles of international law within whose context the
treaty must be interpreted are not the broad prohibitions against intervention or the use of force, but rather are limited to the more specific
principle permitting prosecution after forcible abduction that is expressed
in United States jurisprudence by the Ker-Frisbie rule." The United
States thus urged the Court in effect to apply the municipal law maxim
lex specialis derogat generali (special provisions should control the
general). 54 The problem with that argument in this case, however, is
that showing that municipal legal systems have allowed prosecutions
before their courts in spite of the forcible abduction of the defendant
from another sovereign state is far from demonstrating the existence of a
norm of customary international law to that effect, especially when the
internationally wrongful act involves the violation of the territorial integrity of a sovereign state.'55
The Court attaches considerable importance to the United States contention that Mexico was aware, when it entered into the U.S.-Mexican
Extradition Treaty of 1978 (the Treaty at issue in this case), of United
States caselaw sanctioning the prosecution in United States courts of
individuals abducted in violation of international law from nations with
which the United States had extradition treaties. 5 Thus, the Court
cites diplomatic correspondence between the United States and Mexico
regarding the Martinez Incident of 1905, in which United States Secretary of State called the attention of the Mexican Government to the
1886 decision of the Supreme Court in Ker v. Illinois, in which the
Court held that an American citizen abducted from Peru could be tried
in an Illinois court even though at the time there was an extradition
treaty in force between the United States and Peru.'" The Secretary

153. Brief for Appellant, at 11, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655
(1992) (No. 91-712).
154. STARKE, supra note 22, at 457.
155. Asylum Case (Coiom. v. Peru), 1950 I.CJ. 266; The 5.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v.
Turk.), supra note 12.
156. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); see Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519,
reh'g denied, 343 U.S. 937 (1952).
157. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 665 (1992).
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suggested that the proper remedy for Mexico was a request to the United States for the extradition of Martinez' abductor.'
Even if Mexican Government representatives were aware of the Ker
decision and the diplomatic correspondence concerning the Martinez
Incident when the 1978 treaty was negotiated, it would be unlikely that
they would regard prosecution following the illegal kidnapping as an
accurate statement of contemporary law. Thus, a South African court
passing recently on the legality of a domestic prosecution following an
illegal international abduction regarded United States law as moving
away from the Ker and Frisbie decisions.'59 The South African court
relied principally on the 1974 Court of Appeals decision in United
States v. Toscanino,'60 which it interpreted as refusing to follow the
decisions in Ker and Frisbie. This view of American law by the South
African court certainly represents a reasonable reading of the United
States cases.
Finally, it should be noted that a holding by the Court that prosecution in United States courts of a person illegally abducted from a foreign nation with which the United States had an extradition treaty would
not necessarily lead to the disallowing of prosecution in United States
courts of persons illegally abducted from all foreign nations.16 ' The bar
to prosecution would depend on the existence of an extradition treaty
between the United States and the foreign nation. Thus, such a holding
would not apply in the case of abduction from countries like Libya,
Syria, Iran, Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen, Tunisia, China, Viet Nam, Kampuchea, Afghanistan, North Korea, Morocco, Kuwait, Somalia, the Sudan,
Ethiopia, and Mozambique, with which the United States presently does
6
not have extradition treaties.1 1

158. Id. at 665 n. 11.
159. S. v. Ebrahim, 1991 (2) SA 553 (a), reprinted in 31 LL.M. 888 (1992) (John
Dugard ed. and trans.).
160. 500 F.2d 267 (2nd Cir.) (en banc), reh'g denied 504 F.2d 1380 (2nd Cir.
1974).
161. See, e.g., Bush, supra note 17, at 977-83 (mentioning seven possible situations in which the United States should be able to prosecute persons illegally abducted from foreign nations, including: the unimaginably evil fugitive-an Eichman exception; a fugitive abducted from a territory no longer functioning as a sovereign
state; a fugitive who worked for or was controlled by an asylum state which is unlikely to surrender him; a fugitive located in a country which refuses to make good
faith efforts to arrest and prosecute him).
162. Brief Amicus Curiae of Lowenstein Center, at 65 n.7, United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (No. 91-712).
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III. SCHLUNK, AEROSPATIALE, AND SUMITOMO

The same narrow reading of international agreements employed by the
Court in Sale and Alvarez-Machain is apparent in three treaty interpretation cases decided by the Supreme Court during the 1980s. Although
these decisions did not involve high-profile and highly-charged issues
and therefore did not arouse the same public outcry as Sale and

Alvarez-Machain,

they indicate that the restrictive approach to the

interpretation of international agreements that results in sustaining the

actions of American officials and favoring domestic policies over international cooperation may be more than an outcome-oriented technique
used by the Court in certain politically-sensitive situations. Indeed, as at
least two, and perhaps all three, of these cases demonstrate, the Court
could have reached the same result even it had taken a more expansive
view of the coverage or the substantive requirements of the relevant international agreements. The restrictive approach thus appears to represent
a consistent approach followed by the Court over the past decade to the
interpretation of the international obligations of the United States."

163. The Arospatiale decision, however, was "almost uniformly condemned as
inconsistent with America's obligations under the Evidence Convention and offensive
to other signatories." Russell J. Weintraub, The Need for Awareness of International
Standards When Construing Multilateral Conventions: The Arbitration. Evidence, and
Service Conventions, 28 TEXAS INT'L L. J. 441, 460 (1993).
164. There are of course some exceptions to the Court's recent tendency to interpret international agreements restrictively. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (broadly interpreting the United Nations Arbitration Convention, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3);
see Weintraub, supra note 163, at 446-54 (criticizing the Mitsubishi Court for an
overly broad reading of the Arbitration Convention); see also Thomas E. Carbonneau,
The Exuberant Pathway to Quixotic Internationalism: Assessing the Folly of
Mitsubishi, 19 VANDERBILT J. TRANS. L. 265, 297 (1986) (maintaining that "[t]he
doctrine that emerges from Mitsubishi is excessive and does injustice to the domestic
interest in public law by minimizing the public policy character of antitrust regulation"). But see Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, reh'g denied, 419 U.S.
885 (1974) (enforcing an agreement to arbitrate in an international contract); The
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (strongly endorsing the use arbitration in international commercial transactions).
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A. VOLKSWAGENWERK AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT V. SCHLUNK
In Schlunk, the Court interpreted the Hague Service Convention 65 to
allow service on a foreign corporation by serving its wholly-owned
domestic subsidiary in the United States free from the requirements of
the Convention."6 While concurring in the Court's decision, Justice
Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, strongly disagreed
with the majority's interpretation of the relevant provision of the Convention. The basic disagreement between the majority and the concurring
justices centered on their varying interpretations of the scope of the
Convention, as defimed in Article 1. The majority took a narrow, textual
approach to the construction of Article 1, unwilling to impose obligations not clearly stipulated in the Convention, while Justice Brennan
read Article 1 more expansively, viewing its specific language in the
light of the Convention's broad remedial and cooperative purposes.

165. Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in
Civil and Commercial Matters, opened for signature Nov. 15, 1965, 658 U.N.T.S. 163
[hereinafter Hague Service Convention]. See generally Philip Amram, Report of the
Tenth Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 59 AM. J.
INT'L L. 87, 90-91 (1965) [hereinafter Amram, Report of the Tenth Session]; Note,
The Effect of the Hague Service Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, 2 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 125
(1969). For a discussion of the treaty interpretation aspects of the Schlunk decision,
see Weintraub, supra note 163, at 466-76; Note, Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft
v. SchIunk: The Supreme Court Interprets the Hague Service Convention, 23 GEo.
WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 769 (1990) [hereinafter Note, The Supreme Court Interprets the Hauge Service Convention]. See also Recent Developments, Service of Process: Application of the Hague Service Convention in United States Courts, 30 HARv.
INT'L L. J. 277 (1989) [hereinafter, Service of Process]; Note, Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk-An Examination Into the Scope of the Hague Service
Convention, 8 WISC. INT'L L. J. 421 (1990); Peter D. Trooboff & Carlos M.
Vfzquez, Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 816 (1988).
166. See Hague Service Convention, supra note 165, art. 2 (requiring each state
party to designate a Central Authority to receive requests for service from other state
parties); art. 5 (providing that the Central Authority "shall serve the document or
arrange to have it served by an appropriate agency ....
"); art. 15 (providing an
important limitation on default judgments, which may be entered only if timely service "by the method prescribed by the internal law of the State addressed for the
service of documents in domestic actions upon persons who are within its territory"
or "actual[] deliver[y] to the defendant or his residence" can be established); see also
id., art. 16 (empowering judges to extend the time for appeal if the defendant did not
have timely notice of a document required to be transmitted according to the Convention or of the judgment and he has shown a prima facie defense on the merits).
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The Hague Service Convention provides a mechanism for the service
of legal documents abroad. Its principal purposes are to facilitate service
abroad and to ensure that persons affected by foreign proceedings receive timely notice." Article 1 provides: "The present Convention
shall apply in all cases, in civil or commercial matters, where there is
occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service
abroad." To decide whether plaintiff (who brought suit in a state court
in Illinois) had to employ the procedures of the Convention to serve
defendant (a German corporation) the Court had to interpret the words
"where there is occasion to transmit a .. . document for service
abroad." The act of serving defendant's wholly-owned American subsidiary did not of course require the physical transmission of a legal document abroad; but in order for the document to reach defendant, transmission abroad by the American subsidiary would be necessary. Thus,
the Court had to decide whether service on the German corporation was
effected for purposes of the Convention when service was made on its
American subsidiary or whether transmittal of the document to the corporation in Germany triggered the application of the Convention by
satisfying the "for service abroad" language of Article 1.
In determining whether there is "occasion to transmit" a complaint
"for service abroad," the Court decided that it should look to the internal law of the forum state, stating that "[i]f the internal law of the
forum state defines the applicable method of serving process as requiring the transmittal of documents abroad, then the Hague Service Con-

167. Weintraub, supra note 163, at 467. The Preamble to the Hague Evidence

Convention states that the signatories "[d]esir[e] to create appropriate means to ensure
that judicial and extrajudicial documents to be served abroad shall be brought to the
notice of the addressee in sufficient time, [and] Desirlel to improve the organisation
of mutual judicial assistance for that purpose by simplifying and expediting the procedure .. . ." Hague Service Convention, supra note 149, pmbl. From the perspective
of the United States, "the convention makes no basic changes in United States practice, while it makes substantial changes in the practices of many of the civil law
countries, moving their practices in the direction of our generous system of international judicial assistance and our concepts of "due process" in the service of process . . . " Philip Amram, Report of the Tenth Session, supra note 165, at 90.
168. There was no disagreement that if the transmittal in question came within the
scope of Article 1 the provisions of the Convention were mandatory. Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988); see Socidtd Nationale
Industrielle Adrospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522. 534 n.15 (1987).
See generally I BRUNo A. RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE (CIvIL AND
COERcIAL)

128-33 (1986).
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Applying this standard, the Court referred to the

law of Illinois, which deemed service on a wholly-owned subsidiary to
be effective service on the parent corporation. 70 The concurring justices took issue with the Court's reading of the Convention. For them, the
appropriate standard for determining whether the transmittal of documents abroad was required should be set not by the domestic law of the
forum state, but rather by a uniform international standard, developed
with the purposes of the Convention clearly in view."
The Court's approach to the interpretation of the Convention, in
marked contrast to that of Justice Brennan, makes the sphere of application of the Convention ultimately depend on domestic law. It is to national law, unfettered, apparently, by any international standards, that a
domestic court must look when it seeks to determine if transmittal
abroad of judicial documents is required for their effectiveness. Again,
as with the decisions in Sale and Alvarez-Machain, the decision in
Schlunk is arguably not in the best interests of the United States."
Moreover, the Court's interpretation runs counter to a principal purpose
of the Convention, which was to eliminate the much criticized practice
of several of the European signatories called notification au parquet."

169. Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 700.
170. Id. at 706. Schlunk has been narrowly construed in two subsequent lower
court cases. Fleming v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 774 F. Supp. 992 (W.D. Va. 1991)
(holding the Hague Service Convention applicable in the absence of a state service
statute similar to the Illinois statute involved in Schlunk); McClennon v. Nissan Motor
Corp., 726 F. Supp. 822 (N.D. Fla. 1989) (holding that since the Florida service
statute required transmittal of documents abroad, the Hague Service Convention was
applicable).
171. Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 708 (Brennan, J., concurring). Brennan states:
I do not join the Court's opinion because I find it implausible that the
Convention's framers intended to leave each contracting nation, and each of the
50 States within our Nation, free to decide for itself under what circumstances,
if any, the Convention would control. Rather, in my view, the words "service
abroad," read in light of the negotiating history, embody a substantive standard
that limits a forum's latitude to deem service complete domestically.
Id.
172. Weintraub, supra note 163, at 471.
173. Notification au parquet permits service of process on a foreign defendant by
the deposit of documents with a designated local official. Although the official generally is supposed to transmit the documents abroad to the defendant, the statute of
limitations begins to run from the time that the official receives the documents, and
there allegedly is no sanction for failure to transmit them . . . . At the time of the
10th Conference, France, the Netherlands, Greece, Belgium and Italy used some type
of notification au parquet . . . . There is no question that the Conference wanted to
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By interpreting the Convention to refer to the law of the forum state in
determining whether transmittal of documents abroad is necessary, the

Court in effect sanctioned the continuance of the European practice of
notification au parquet."

It is probably fair to say that the meaning of the Convention is obscure with regard to the precise question involved in Schunk.'75 This
obscurity appears to have resulted from the inability of the delegates to
the Tenth Hague Conference to reach agreement.'76 The majority chose
to restrict the applicability of the Convention thereby rendering it subject

to the differing service requirements of the state parties (and perhaps
even, as in the case of the United States, their constituent units). Perhaps one could say that the majority chose to accord primacy to domes-

tic freedom of action rather than to international cooperation. Or perhaps

eliminate notification au parquet. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486
U.S. 694, 703 (1988).
174. Id. at 705. The majority states that "[olur interpretation of the Convention
does not necessarily advance this particular objective [to ensure that there will be
adequate notice in cases in which there is occasion to serve process abroad], inasmuch as it makes recourse to the Convention's means of service dependant on the
forum's internal law." Id. The Court then goes on to state that "we do not think that
this country, or any other country, will draft its internal laws deliberately so as to
circumvent the Convention in cases in which it would be appropriate to transmit
judicial documents for service abroad." Id. Justice Brennan makes the following telling
reply- "[t]he fact remains, however, that had we been content to rely on foreign notions of fair play and substantial justice, we would have found it unnecessary, in the
first place, to participate in a Convention 'to ensure that judicial . .. documents to

be served abroad [would] be brought to the notice of the addressee in sufficient
time."' Id. at 716.
175. Note, The Supreme Court Interprets the Hague Service Convention, supra

note 165, at 769, 774-75. But see RiSTAU, supra note 168 (quoting the Convention
drafting Commission). The Commission states:
Moreover, it was thought that it is up to the law of the forum state to
prescribe under what circumstances resort should be made to the Convention,
and that it would not be proper to limit, in this respect, the discretion of the
judge who is seized with the case ....
In granting the court of the forum state the discretion to determine, under the domestic law, when the Convention machinery should or should not be
employed, the Convention establishes more of a freedom than an obligation.
Under the actual text of the Convention, the obligatory character of the Convention does not depend upon the presence of certain objective conditions; the
Convention needs to be applied by a contracting state only if the law of that
state says so.
Id.at 130.
176. Id.
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the Court was simply uncomfortable with having to develop substantive
standards to fill in the gaps in Article 1, such as defining the term
"service" without a clear textual basis in the Convention for doing so.
One additional consideration is that the domestic service requirements at
issue in Schlunk were based on state law. Thus, besides having had to
develop substantive rules, the Court would have also had to preempt
state law by creating an international standard at the federal level, again
without a clear textual basis in the Convention for doing so.
Even though the majority's approach is understandable and its legal
justification, based on the text of the Convention and its negotiating
history, "plausible,"'" the decision advances neither the purposes of
the Convention stipulated by the contracting states in its preamble nor
the purposes of the United States in becoming a party.'78
B. SOcIfTt9 NATIONALE INDUSTRIELLE A0ROSPATIALE V. UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA

Extraterritorial discovery between litigants located in different nations
has long been a source of difficulty for litigants.'79 It is often costly,
cumbersome, and time-consuming. Extraterritorial discovery has also led
to serious problems between nations, as it may be perceived by foreign
nations as infringing upon their sovereign rights. 8 This has been particularly true with regard to extraterritorial discovery by United States
courts. The strong negative reaction of foreign nations to discovery in
connection with proceedings in American courts is well known and has
led a number of foreign states to enact so-called "blocking statutes" to
impede the discovery efforts of United States courts. 8' Friction is even
more pronounced when litigants in proceedings before American courts
seek discovery in civil law countries, which approach the performance

177. See Service of Process, supra note 165, at 284.
178. See supra notes 163 and 173 and accompanying text. See also Note, The
Supreme Court Interprets the Hague Service Convention, supra note 165, at 793-96.
179. See Charles Platto, Taking Evidence Abroad for Use in Civil Cases in the
United States-A Practical Guide, 16 INT'L LAw. 575 (1982).
180. For a discussion of the Hague Evidence Convention which focuses on issues
of sovereignty and jurisdiction, see Bernard H. Oxman, The Choice Between Direct
Discovery and Other Means of Obtaining Evidence Abroad: The Impact of the Hague
Evidence Convention, 37 U. MIAMI L. REv. 733 (1983).
181. See, e.g., A. V. Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British
Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (1981).
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of functions in connection with litigation, including the gathering of evidence, from significantly different legal perspectives."s

In 1968, in an attempt to deal with the problems arising from the
need for extraterritorial discovery, the United States and twenty-three
other nations met at the Hague and drafted the Hague Evidence Convention." The Convention was eventually signed by twenty nations, including the United States and France.' s' An important purpose of the

Convention was to provide a practical mechanism for easing the burden
on litigants in common-law countries in procuring evidence located

abroad.'"
In the Mrospatiale case, the Supreme Court had to deal with the
problem of the relationship between the requirements of the Hague
Evidence Convention and the power of the federal courts to order extraterritorial discovery under the Federal Rules, free from the requirements
of the Convention.'" As in Sale, Alvarez-Machain, and Schhmnk, the

182. See Diana Lloyd Muse, Discovery in France and the Hague Convention: The
Search for a French Connection, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1073, 1079-90 (1989) (discussing
the French system and indicating that "[t]he two major features of the French system
that distinguish it from the American are the judge's plenary power over the evidence-gathering process and the limited scope of evidence gathering;" furthermore,
"important policies [particularly those pertaining to judicial and national sovereignty]
lie behind these components of the French system"); Brigitte E. Herzog, The 1980
French Law on Documents and Information, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 382 (1981) (indicating that one of the principal motivations for the highly restrictive 1980 French law
pertaining to extraterritorial discovery was that "the terms of the Hague [Evidence]
Convention . . . , and in particular the reservations made by France in ratifying that
Convention, were frequently disregarded by American litigants").
183. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter Hague
Evidence Convention].
184. For current information concerning the parties to the Hague Evidence Convention, see Secretariat of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, Information Concerning the Hague Conventions on Private International Law, 38 NETH.
INT'L L. REv. 215, 230-34 (1991).
185. Harold G. Maier, ExtraterritorialDiscovery: Cooperation, Coercion and the
Hague Evidence Convention, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 239, 242 (1986) (citing
Report of the United States Delegation to the Eleventh Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 8 I.L.M. 785, 806-08 (1969)). Professor Maier
explains that "[the Convention sought to establish a system for transnational evidence-gathering which was acceptable to the states parties and which would harmonize
conflicting views about sovereignty and jurisdiction reflected in differing systems of
civil procedure used by the members." Id.
186. Maier, supra note 185, at 239-40; see Axel Heck, U.S. Misinterpretation of
the Hague Evidence Convention, 24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 231 (1986) (discussing
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Court in Arospatiale interpreted an international agreement of the United States in order to determine its applicability. The Court asked whether the Convention provided the sole, or at least the preferred means of
obtaining evidence abroad, or did it provide only one among other possible options, to be employed by the American judge at his discretion?
Agrospatiale was a products liability case brought in the Federal
District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. Plaintiffs sought discovery from two French corporate defendants of documents and other information located in France. Defendants filed a motion for a protective
order, arguing that the Hague Evidence Convention dictated the exclusive procedures that must be followed for pretrial discovery.'87 Defendants motion was denied by a Federal Magistrate, and that decision was
affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.'
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, posed the
question presented as "the extent to which a Federal District Court must
employ the procedures set forth in the Convention when litigants seek
answers to interrogatories, the production of documents, and admissions
from a French adversary over whom the court had personal jurisdiction."'89 The Court outlined four possibilities:
First, the Hague Convention might be read as requiring its use to the
exclusion of any other discovery procedures whenever evidence located
abroad is sought for use in an American court. Second, the Hague Convention might be interpreted to require first, but not exclusive use of its
procedures. Two other interpretations assume that international comity,
rather than the obligations created by the treaty, should guide judicial
resort to the Hague Convention. Third, then, the Convention might be
viewed as establishing a supplemental set of discovery procedures, strictly
optional under treaty law, to which concerns of comity nevertheless require first resort by American courts in all cases. Fourth, the treaty may
be viewed as an undertaking among sovereigns to facilitate discovery to

which an American court should resort when it deems that course of
action appropriate ....

the interpretation of the Hague Convention by the United States courts prior to the
Aerospatiale decision).
187. Socidt6 Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482
U.S. 522, 524-26 (1987).
188. 782 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1986).
189. Agrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 524.
190. Id. at 533.
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The Court then went on to "reject the first two of the possible interpretations as inconsistent with the language and negotiating history of
the Hague Convention,"''
stressing that neither the preamble nor the
text itself speaks in mandatory terms or in any way expresses an intent
to preempt other means of discovery." As previously seen in Sale,
Alvarez-Machain, and Schlunk, the Court in Agrospatiale was unwilling
to interpret the Convention to create binding legal obligations "[i]n the
absence of explicit textual support . . ,""It should be noted that by
rejecting the first two possible interpretations, the Court rejected even
the lesser legal obligation of first use of the Convention in extraterritorial discovery situations. 94 Also, the Court did not require first use of
the Convention's procedures on the basis of comity. Rather, it accorded
discretion to the trial court to determine on a case-by-case basis whether
the procedures of the Convention should be utilized.
Justice Blackmun, concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor, interpreted the Convention as
establishing "a general presumption that, in most cases, courts should
resort first to the Convention procedures."'" He castigates the Court's
decision as "an affront to the nations that have joined the United States
in ratifying the Hague Convention . . . .""' In Justice Blackman's
view, "[tihe Court ignores the importance of the Convention by relegating it to an 'optional' status . .. ."
He correctly points out that
"[t]he Convention . . .serves the long-term interests of the United States
in helping to further and to maintain the climate of cooperation and
goodwill necessary to the functioning of the international legal and
commercial systems . . . ."" The concern on the part of other nations

191. Id. at 534.

192. Id. at 534-40.
193. Id. at 537.
194. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk. 486 U.S. 694 (1988) (illustrating that Justice Blackmun's observation in his concurring opinion is equally appropriate here).
195. Socit6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482
U.S. 522, 548-49 (1987) (Blackmun, 1.). Professor Bermann remarks, "In sum, while
the doctrinal divergence between the Airospatiale majority and minority is not vast, it
is important in substance and tone." George A. Bermann, The Hague Evidence Convention in the Supreme Court: A Critique of the Adrospatiale Decision, 63 TtJL L

REv. 525, 550 (1989).
196. Agrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 547.
197. Id. at 548.
198. Id. at 550. Bermann writes:
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concerning the particular issues and more general principles involved in
Airospatiale is amply evidenced by the amicus briefs filed by Germany,
France, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.' According to Professor Weintraub, the Court's decision has been almost universally condemned.2"

The fact remains that American courts would actually be aided in making proper claims for cooperation from those in control of evidence abroad if the courts
adopted a more gracious, indeed more honest, reception of the Convention than
the Supreme Court has accorded it. Both by its substance and its rhetoric, the
Agrospatiale ruling unfortunately misses an important opportunity to promote the
spirit of accommodation essential to the internationalization of law and legal
practice.
Bermann, supra note 195, at 552.
199. The amicus briefs of France, Germany, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom
are reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1475, 1519 (France), 25 I.L.M. 1475, 1539 (Germany), 25
I.L.M. 1475, 1549 (Switzerland), and 25 I.L.M. 1475, 1557 (United Kingdom).
200. Weintraub, supra note 163, at 460. For a sampling of the critical literature,
which is far too voluminous to cite in full, see generally Patricia A. Kuhn, Comment,
Socidtd Nationale Industrielle A~rospatiale: The Supreme Court's Misguided Approach
to the Hague Evidence Convention, 69 B.U. L. REv. 1011 (1989) (discussing
Aerospatiale's unworkable guidelines); James G. Dwyer & Lois A. Yurow, Taking
Evidence Abroad and Breaking Treaties: Adrospatiale and the Need for Common
Sense, 21 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON.' 439 (1988) (explaining the United
States Court's desire to conform the Hauge Convention with the Federal Rules of
Evidence); Bermann, supra note 195, at 539 (stating that " . . [t]he majority's position unnecessarily reduces the Convention to modest legal significance . . . . [Tihe
Court belittles the Convention through what can be described without exaggeration as
ridicule and caricature"). But see J. Albert Garcia, Note, A Look Behind the
Adrospatiale Curtain, or Why the Hague Evidence Convention Had to Be Effectively
Nullified, 23 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 269, 270 (1988) [hereinafter Garcia, Agrospatiale Curtain] (arguing that "despite the Court's unorthodox methods, the result was nonetheless
correct and was reached in perhaps the best possible manner"); Garcia, Adrospatiale
Curtain, supra, at 270 (asserting that the result was "to protect the United States'
basic interest in the fair adjudication of claims in its courts"); Garcia, Arospatiale
Curtain, supra, at 282 (conceding that the Court's decision violated the Hague Evidence Convention).
The Court's decision has also been criticized for its failure to develop workable
guidelines for the lower courts. See, e.g., Bermann, supra note 195, at 542; Joseph P.
Griffin & Mark N. Bravin, Beyond A6rospatiale: A Commentary on Foreign Discovery
Provisions of the Restatement (Third) and the Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 INT'L LAW. 331 (1991); Lori A. Fields, Note, Socigte
Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale v. United States District Court: The Supreme Court
Undermines the Hague Evidence Convention and Confounds the International Discovery Process, 22 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 217 (1988); Owen P. Martikan, Note, The Boundaries of the Hague Evidence Convention: Lower Court Interest Balancing After the
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SUMITOMO SHoJI AMERICA, INC. v. AVIGuANOel

The Sumitomo case, decided by the Supreme Court in 1982, also
dealt with question of the scope of applicability of an international
agreement of the United States: the bilateral Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation (FCN) Treaty of 1953 with Japan.' The specific question
in Sumitomo concerned the applicability of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, which, in part, prohibited discrimination on the basis of
national origin in employmen 3 to a wholly-owned American subsidiary of a Japanese corporation. The defendant corporation contended that
Article VIII of the Treaty allowed it to "engage ... accountants and
other technical experts, executive personnel, attorneys, agents and other
specialists of [its] choice,"' notwithstanding the requirements of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act.
The Court granted certiorari in Sumitomo to decide whether Article
VIII(l) of the United States-Japan FCN Treaty provides a defense to a
Title VII employment discrimination suit against an American subsidiary
of a Japanese company. The Court was most likely influenced in its

Arospatiale Decision, 68 TaX. L. REv. 1003 (1990).
Professor Vagts attributes the decision to the desire of American courts to read
the Hague Evidence Convention and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure together "in
such a way as to minimize the disturbance of the American way of litigating." Vagts,
supra note 28, at 482.
201. 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
202. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United StatesJapan, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 [hereinafter U.S.-Japan FCN Treaty]. The

Sumitomo case is summarized in Lynda Clarizo, International Agreements: Legal Status of Locally-Incorporated Subsidiaries, 23 HARV. INT'L LJ. 381, 431 (1983); Monroe Leigh, Judicial Decisions, 76 Am. J. INT'L L. 847, 853 (1982).
203. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1991)
[hereinafter Title VII].
204. Art. VIII (1) of the U.S.-Japan FCN Treaty reads in full:
1. Nationals and companies of either Party shall be permitted to engage,
within the territories of the other Party, accountants and other technical experts,
executive personnel, attorneys, agents and other specialists of their choice.
Moreover, such nationals and companies shall be permitted to engage accountants and other technical experts regardless of the extent to which they may
have qualified for the practice of a profession within the territories of such
other Party, for the particular purpose of making examinations, audits and technical investigations exclusively for, and rendering reports, to such nationals and
companies in connection with the planning and operation of their enterprises,
and enterprises in which they have a financial interest, within such territories.
U.S.-Japan FCN Treaty, supra note 202, at 2070.
205. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176. 176-77 (1982).
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decision to review the case because of conflicting decisions in the Second and the Fifth Circuits. In Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America),
Inc.,' the Fifth Circuit decided that Article VIII of the Treaty could
be invoked by an American subsidiary of a Japanese corporation, thereby shielding the company from application of the non-discrimination requirements of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. On the other hand, in
Avigliano (sic) v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc.,Y the Second Circuit,
although it agreed with the Spiess court that Article VIII of the Treaty
could be invoked by an American subsidiary of a Japanese corporation,
had read Article VIII of the Treaty narrowly, holding that it did not bar
the application of the non-discrimination requirements of Title VII.
The difficult issue in Sumitomo was the relationship between Article
VIII of the Treaty and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. This question
arguably would have been posed directly if plaintiff's complaint of
employment discrimination on the basis of national origin had been
brought against a Japanese corporation that operated in the United States
without being incorporated in the United States. To resolve that problem, the Court had to read the two provisions as harmonious, or if it
was unable to reconcile them, it had to decide whether to give priority
to the requirements of the treaty or to those of the subsequent statute.
The Court avoided this issue by holding that Sumitomo was not a company of Japan and therefore was not covered by Article VIII of the
Treaty. 8 It was therefore unnecessary for the Court to delimit the
scope of application of the Treaty and to define the substantive requirements of Article VIII, or to grapple with the problem of reconciling a
prior treaty commitment with a subsequent statute. An important issue,
however, remained unresolved." 9 More significantly, the United States-

206. 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'g, 469 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Tex. 1979), vacated and remanded, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982).
207. 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), affg in part and rev'g in part, 473 F. Supp.
506 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
208. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 183 (1982).
209. See G. Darryl Way, Note, Japanese Employers and Title VII: Sumitomo Shoji
America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 653 (1983) (explaining
why the Court never reached the merits of Article VIII application); John B.
Sternlicht, Note, Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano: Does Title VII Trump
the Treaty?, 10 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 515, 530 (1985) (arguing that Article
VIII of the U.S.-Japan FCN Treaty does not shield Japanese employers from Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, since "the Treaty's purpose is to circumvent or
eliminate discriminatory employment laws, not employment discrimination laws, in the
United States"); see also Barbara A. Ritomsky & Robert M. Jarvis, Doing Business in
America: The Unfinished Work of Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 27
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Japanese FCN Treaty was held not to govern a matter that certainly
concerned investment and the conduct of business in the United States
by Japanese nationals.
The precise treaty interpretation issue in Sumitomo was whether the
Sumitomo Shoji America Corporation was a "compan[y] of [Japan]"
within the meaning of Article VIII of the Treaty, and therefore entitled
to engage certain personnel "of [its] choice."2t To answer this question, the Court referred to the definitional section of the Treaty, Article
XXII(3), which provides that:
Companies constituted under the applicable laws and regulations within
the territories of either Party shall be deemed companies thereof and have
their juridical status recognized with the territories of the other Party."'
Because the Sumitomo Corporation was "constituted under the applicable
laws and regulations" of New York, the Court decided that "based on
Article XXII(3), it is a company of the United States, not a company of
Japan. '2 2 In its interpretation of Article XXI(3), the Court accorded
great weight to the statements of both the Japanese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and the United States Department of State that Article VIII
rights do not apply to locally incorporated subsidiaries.2 t3 The Court
further supports its reading of the Treaty by close textual reference2 "
and by its view that the purpose of the Treaty is to establish national
treatment for Japanese businesses in the United States."'

INT'L L. J. 193 (1986); Note, Commercial Treaties and the American Civil
Rights Laws: The Case of Japanese Employers, 31 STAN. L REv. 947 (1979).
HARv.

210.
211.
212.
213.

Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 182 (1982).
U.S.-Japan FCN Treaty, supra note 202, art. XXII(3), at 4.
Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 182.
Id. at 184-85 (citing Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961), for the propo-

sition that "[a]lthough not conclusive, the meaning attached by treaty provisions by
the Government agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to
great weight").
214. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 182-83, n.8.

215. Id. at 185-88. The court added.
The purpose of the [post World War II FCNJ Treaties was not to give foreign
corporations greater rights than domestic companies. but instead to assure them
the right to conduct business on an equal basis without suffering discrimination
based on their alienage .... By treating [foreign] subsidiaries as domestic
companies, the purpose of the Treaty provisions--to assure that corporations of
one Treaty party have the right to conduct business within the territory of the
other party without suffering discrimination as an alien entity-is fully met.

Id. at 187-88.
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The two Circuit Courts, however, agreed that Article VIII of the
Treaty applied to the Sumitomo Corporation. They reasoned that the
overall purpose of the Treaty was, as Judge Mansfield stated, "not to
protect foreign investments made through branches, but rather to protect
foreign investments generally ... regardless of the specific corporate
vehicle employed. ' 216 According to Judge Mansfield, Article XXII(3)
merely "defines a company's nationality for the purpose of recognizing
its status as a legal entity but not for the purpose af restricting substantive rights granted elsewhere in the Treaty. ' 27
Even though both constructions of the Treaty are plausible, based on
their different but equally supportable views of the Treaty's purpose and
on reasonable inferences from the text,"' the better approach was that
taken by the Circuit Courts. That approach imparted importance to the
Treaty in a situation where it was clearly relevant, as the problem presented to the Court arose in the context of Japanese investment and the
conduct of business in the United States. Furthermore, by resolving the

216. Avagliano (sic) v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 638 F.2d 552, 556 (2nd Cir.
1981); Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), Inc., 643 F.2d 353, 358 (5th Cir. 1981)
(citing Avagliano).
217. Avigliano, 638 F.2d at 557; Spiess, 643 F.2d at 356-57.
218. Contrast, for example, the interpretation and rationale of the Second and Fifth
Circuits in Avigliano and Spiess with that of the Supreme Court in Avagliano. See
Cynthia B. Summervill, Recent Developments, Civil Rights-Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation Treaty of 1953 Between the United States and Japan Immunizes Company Incorporated Under the Laws of the United States but Wholly Owned by a
Japanese Corporation from United States Employment Antidiscrimination Laws, 17
TEx. INT'L L.J. 508 (1982) (arguing that the greater interest involved in Sumitomo is
"that of stability in treaty application in the face of inconsistent domestic or foreign
laws"); Ritomsky & Jarvis, supra note 209, at 195 (arguing that "the decision of the
Supreme Court, although not as clear as it might have been, does contain the correct
standards by which the rights granted under FCN treaties should be judged").
The three following articles by Herman Walker, Jr., principal architect and
negotiator of America's post-World War II FCN treaties, are cited frequently in the
Spiess and Avagliano cases and by academic commentators with respect to the purposes of FCN treaties: Herman Walker, Jr., Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 805 (1958); Herman Walker, Jr., Provisions on
Companies in Unites States Commercial Treaties, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 373 (1956);
Herman Walker, Jr., Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment: Present United States Practice, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 229 (1956) (stating that the
principal purpose of FCN treaties was to encourage and facilitate foreign investment
by establishing or confirming a potential host country's policy of promoting equity
and hospitality for foreign investors and indicating that evidence of a friendly disposition was as important a purpose as establishing legal rights).
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applicability question as they did, the Circuit courts reached what should
have been the real heart of the controversy: whether the employment

discrimination requirements of Title VII applied or were rendered inapplicable by Article VIII of the Treaty. Viewing the question in this
light, the Circuit Courts were able to give full consideration to both the
international as well as the domestic policies involved in the controversy. The decision of the Second Circuit, upholding the application of

Title VII to Sumitomo's employment practices as consistent with the
substantive requirements of the Treaty," 9 demonstrates that the result
desired by both the Japanese and American Governments could be
achieved without restricting the sphere of operation of the Treaty.
IV. THE INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
BY NATIONAL COURTS: THE LEGITIMACY OF
RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION
A. NATIONAL COURTS AND INTERNATIONAL
RULES OF INTERPRETATION'

The problem addressed in this Article, the interpretation of international agreements by national courts, could be effectively resolved by
entrusting all questions of treaty interpretation to international judicial or

219. Avigliano, 638 F.2d. at 558.
220. It is surprising that the interpretation of international agreements by domestic
courts has received so little attention from international legal scholars, since the
frequency of application of international agreements by domestic courts far exceeds
their application in international forums. While there is a vast body of scholarly
literature dealing with the interpretation of international agreements, it focuses by and
large on the interpretation by international judicial and arbitral tribunals. Symptomatic
of this lack of attention is the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which
does not address the matter at all. But see ARNOLD D. MCNAIR, THE LAW OF
TREATiEs 345-63 (1961) (citing literature on the interpretation of international
agreements); Schreuer, Interpretation of Treaties, supra note 24 (explaining how
domestic courts rely on the Vienna Convention to provide a framework for application
of international legal principles).
When national legal scholars consider treaty interpretation, they usually limit
their consideration to the particular legal and constitutional system which is the focus
of their interest. They usually deal with rules of interpretation as questions of the
relative competence of different branches of a particular domestic government to
interpret international agreements or analyze domestic treaty-interpretation decisions for
doctrinal consistency. See, e.g., Bederman, supra note 36, at 953; Koplow, supra note
35, at 1353; James C. Wolf, Note, The Jurisprudence of Treaty Interpretation, 21
U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 1023 (1988).
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arbitral tribunals. That would eliminate problems associated with national
courts' according priority to domestic legal, institutional, and political
concerns and minimize the lack of uniformity in the interpretation of
multilateral conventions. There are provisions in many international
agreements which do confer jurisdiction on international tribunals when
questions concerning the "interpretation or application" of the agreement
arise. " For a variety of reasons, however, reference to an international
decision-maker is the exception, rather than the rule. In those cases
where international agreements do contain reference to an international
decision-maker, other problems arise concerning the determination of the
tribunal's jurisdiction in the particular case, which may be even more
problematic than the issues encountered in the interpretation and application of treaties by domestic courts."'
An alternative approach to the interpretation of international agreements by domestic courts is referral of the question of interpretation to
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or other designated international
tribunal, leaving application determinations to the national court. A
similar approach has worked well in the European Union. According to
Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome, "when . . . a question [of the interpretation of this Treaty] is raised before any court or tribunal of a
Member State, that court or tribunal may . . . request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon."' If "such question is raised in a case

221. See I.C.J. 1992-1993 Y.B. 113-31 (1993) (listing 263 treaties and other instruments containing clauses relating to the jurisdiction of the ICJ in contentious proceedings; such clauses generally provide that disputes concerning the application or
interpretation of the instrument may be referred to the Court for decision.) See Fred
L. Morrison, Treaties as a Source of Jurisdiction, Especially in U.S Practice, in THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 58 (Lori F. Damrosch ed.,
1987); Jonathan I. Charney, Compromissory Clauses and the Jurisdictionofthe International Court of Justice, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 855 (1987).
222. See, e.g., South West Africa Cases, 1966 I.C.J. 6; see also Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.CJ. 3 (Feb. 5);
Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.) Second Phase, 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6); Interhandel
Case (Switz. v. U.S.) 1959 I.C.J. 27 (Mar. 21); Anglo-Iranian Oil Case (U.K. v.
Iran), 1951 I.C.J. 89.
223. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957.
298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter EEC TREATY]; see Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli,
Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration, 47 INT'L ORG. 41,
58, 58-72 (1993) (asserting that the Article 177 jurisdiction of the European Court of
Justice was included "[a]lmost as an afterthought . . . " and illustrating the importance of article 177 jurisdiction to the work of the Court and the role that it has
played in political integration in the European Community); see also T. C. HARTLEY,
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pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose
decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or
tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice."" A 1976
United States Department of State study recommended that this "preliminary opinion procedure" be adopted by amending the Statute of the International Court of Justice to allow the ICJ to render such preliminary
opinions on questions of treaty interpretation.' No action has yet been
taken on this recommendation.
of interpretation of international
Procedures'm and principles'

THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 246-82 (Tony Honord & Joseph

Raz eds., 1988).
224. EEC TREATY, supra note 223.
225.

U.S.

DEP'T OF STATE, WIDENING ACCESS To THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF

JuSTicE (1976), reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MArERIAS

187, 204-06 (1977): see

PEACE, U.N. Doc.
S/24111 (June 17, 1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 953, 964-65 (1992) (discussing the
feasibility of the issuance of interpretative opinions by the ICJ). A recent ABA report
containing recommendations regarding the International Court of Justice does not mention the preliminary opinion procedure. American Bar Association Section of Int'l. L
& Practice & the Standing Comm. on World Order Under Law, Report on Improving
the Effectiveness of the United Nations in Advancing the Rule of Law in the World,
reprinted in 29 INT'L LAW. 293, 295-300 (1995).
226. The term "procedures" of interpretation is used here to refer to the particular
procedures utilized by a domestic court to determine the meaning of a treaty provision. Thus, the court may undertake interpretation itself, giving little, some, or conclusive weight to executive branch views; or it may formally refer the question of interpretation to the executive branch, as is the practice of the French Conseil d'Etat.
227. See Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretation, supra note 22, at 53. The author
states:
In a sense the controversy as to the justification of rules of interpretation partakes of some degree of artificiality inasmuch as it tends to exaggerate their
importance. For as a rule they are not the determining cause of judicial decision, but the form in which the judge cloaks a result arrived at by other
means. It is elegant--and it inspires confidence--to give the garb of an established rule of interpretation to a conclusion reached as to the meaning of
a . . .treaty. But it is a fallacy to assume that the existence of these rules is
a secure safeguard against arbitrariness or impartiality. The very choice of any
single rule or of a combination or cumulation of them is the result of a judgment arrived at, independently of any rules of construction, by reference to
considerations of good faith, of justice, and of public policy within the orbit of
the express or implied intention of the parties or of the legislature.
Id; see Jules Basdevant, Le r6le du juge national dons l'interprdtation des traitis
diplomatiques, 38 REVUE CRITIQUE DU DRorr INT'L PRiVt 413, 427 (1949). Judge
Basdevant remarks:
REPORT

OF THE

SECRETARY-GENERAL

ON

AN

AGENDA

FOR
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agreements employed by international tribunals and by national courts
are not necessarily the same; 8 they may also differ significantly between the courts of different nations. 9 This can be expected, because

The interpretation of a treaty, like that of a law or a contract, is a legal work
of art; it thus does not depend solely, or even principally, on preestablished
rules; it depends above all on the unique qualities of the interpreter, qualities
which we normally will find in the judge.
Id. (translated by author). But see MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL., THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: PRINCIPLES OF CONTENT AND
PROCEDURE 8-10 (1967) (rejecting the two extreme views of the value of rules of
interpretation (i.e., that "interpretation [according to established principles] is so easy
as to be almost automatic" on the one hand and that "[principles of interpretation]
often abrogate each other and frequently appear worthless" on the other)).
228. See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 26, §325,
cmt. 8:
Interpretation by United States courts. This section [which follows articles
31(1) and 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties] suggests a
mode of interpretation of international agreements somewhat different from that
ordinarily applied by courts in the United States. Courts in the United States
are more generally willing than those of other states to look outside the instrument to determine its meaning. In most cases, the United States approach
would lead to the same result, but an international tribunal using the approach
called for by this section might find the United States interpretation erroneous
and the United States action pursuant to that interpretation a violation of the
agreement.
ld; see SEN. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 126-29 (103d Cong., 1st
Sess., S. Prt. 103-53, 1993) [hereinafter SEN. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS]; see
also David A. Koplow, supra note 35, at 1380-1412 (distinguishing between international and United States constitutional principles of treaty interpretation and commenting that "United States courts . . . are generally more concerned with the parties'
intentions, and more willing to look outside the four comers of the treaty document
to adduce its meaning"); HENRY J. STEINER & DETLEV F. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL PROBLEMS: MATERIALS AND TEXT 629-30 (3rd ed. 1986) (discussing the inherent divergence in the interpretation of treaties by courts of various nations); J. G.
Merrills, Two Approaches to Treaty Interpretation, 1968-69 AUSTRALIAN Y.B. INT'L
L. 55, 74-79 (1971) (arguing that rules of interpretation fulfill different functions at
the international and national levels, and thus different rules of interpretation may be
desirable). But see Malvina Halberstam, A Treaty Is a Treaty Is a Treaty, 33 VA. J.
INT'L L. 51 (1992) (arguing that a treaty cannot be interpreted to have different
meanings domestically and internationally); Malvina Halberstam, The Use of Legislative History in Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Treaty Approach, 12 CARDOZO L.
REv. 1645 (1991).
229. Schreuer, Interpretation of Treaties, supra note 24, at 290-94; Ignaz SeidlHohenveldern, Internationale Priijudizentscheidungen zur Auslegung Vidlkerrechtlicher
Vertrdge, in FESTSCHRIFr FUR ALFRED VERDROSS 479 (1971); Wilhelm F. Bayer,
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national courts inhabit unique jurisprudential worlds'D far removed
from intemational judicial or arbitral tribunals.' National courts have

Auslegung und Ergdnzung International Vereinheitlichter Normen Durch Staatlichre
Gerichte, 20 ZEnrSCHRiFr FOR AUSLAISC.HES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT
603 (1955). Approaches to treaty interpretation may also differ significantly between
different courts in the same nation. See, e.g., Jacques Benoist, L'Interpriation des
Traits d'aprs la JurisprudenceFranfaise, 6 REVUE HELLtNIQUE DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL 103 (1953); A. M. Donner, National Law and the Case Law of the Court of
Justice of the European Communities, 1 COMMON MKT. L REV. 8. 9 (1963) (illustrating that national judges often "tend to read international conventions through national spectacles .... "). More picturesquely this phenomenon has been expressed by
Professor von Caernmerer, when he speaks of the Heimwdrtsstreben of judges, straining to reach home ground, by which is meant the efforts of judges to find grounds
for applying their own law, a field where they naturally feel more secure. 0. C.
GILES, UNIFORM COiMERCIAL LAW: AN ESSAY ON INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS IN
NATIONAL COURTS 31 (1970); see also Vagts, supra note 28, at 473 (discussing the
interpretation of international agreements in American courts). Vagts writes:
ITrhe true difficulty with the practice of United States courts in treaty interpretation arises not from new theory, but from an old preference for reading treaties as fitting into the familiar landscape of American law, rather than facing
the reality that treaties in fact change national law . . . Few judges have any
substantial experience with foreign relations, few of them have had any significant portion of their legal education abroad and the libraries they use may lack
international materials. They are largely untouched by criticism or other professional pressures from outside the country in which they practice.
Id. at 481-82; see FRIEDRICH V. KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORiS, AND DECISIONS: ON
THE CONDITIONS OF PRACTICAL AND LEGAL REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL RELA-

TIONS AND DomESTc AFFAIRS 255 (1989) [hereinafter Kratochwil. RULES. NORMS.
AND DECISIONS] (commenting on the "partisan nature" and the "lack of international
credibility of domestic decisions").
230. See JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLE OF THE LAW (1968) (providing a fascinating historical description of the German and French judiciaries); see also THO.IAS
M. FRANCK, POLrICAL QUESTIONSIJUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW
APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 107-25 (1992) [hereinafter FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS] (describing the approach of the German judiciary to foreign
affairs questions); Mitchel de S.-O.-I'E. Lasser, Judicial Self-Portraits: Judicial Discourse in the French Legal System, 104 YALE L. J. 1325 (1995) (elaborating on
Dawson's description of the French judiciary).
231. CHRISTINE D. GRAY, JUDICIAL REIEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1987); J.
G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETLENMENT (1984). On international arbitration, see, e.g. J. GHLuS WETrER, THE INTERNATIONAL ARBTRAL PROCESS: PuBuc

AND PRrVATE (5 vols. 1979); KENNETH S. CARLtSTON, THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBrrRATION (1946); Christine Gray & Benedict Kingsbury, Developments in Dispute Settlement: Inter-State Arbitration Since 1945, 63 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 97
(1992). On the International Court of Justice, see GERALD FrnzMAURIcE, THE LAw
AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1986) (describing dis-
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their own institutional and doctrinal histories and stand in particular
relationships to other internal legal institutions (such as the legislature,
the executive, other courts or court systems, and the bureaucracy).232
Even though there may be considerable similarity in the principles and
terminology employed by tribunals at the national and international
levels with regard to the interpretation of international agreements, decisional outcomes may differ significantly, indicating the different application of those principles in specific cases.
While differences in approach are to be expected, national courts
should not allow concerns at the national level or greater familiarity
with domestic legal concepts and methods to obscure the international
objectives sought by the conclusion of an international agreement. This
is true not only from the viewpoint of international law and the other
party or parties to the particular international agreement-the subject of

tinctions between national courts and the ICJ); SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT

(1965) (providing insight into the procedural

and substantive functions of the ICJ).
232. See, e.g., Luzius WILDHABER, TREATY-MAKING POWER AND CONsTITUTION:
AN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATrVE STUDY 234-39 (1971) (stating that the interpretation and application of international agreements in French courts is probably the
most complex of the principal world powers. The decisions of the three highest courts
in France, the Cour de Cassation (for civil and criminal matters), the Conseil d'Etat
(for administrative matters), and the Conseil Constitutionnel (for constitutional questions) indicate considerable disparity in approach and doctrine. Id.; see Administration
des Douanes c. Soci6t( "Caf6s Jacques Vabre," Judgment of May 24, 1975, Cass. ch.
mixte, 1975 Bulletin des Arrets de ]a Cour de cassation, chambres civiles [Bull. Civ.]
IV, No. 4, 1975 D.S. Jur. 497, translated in 16 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 336 (1975);
Klaus Barbie, Judgment of January 26, 1984, Cass. crim., 1975 Bulletin des Arrets de
la Cour de cassation; Syndicat g6n6ral de Fabricants de semoules de France, Judgment
of Mar. 1, 1968, Conseil d'Etat, 1968 Recueil des D6cisions [Lebon] du Conseil
d'Etat 149, 4 REv. TRIM. 388 (1968) [1970] CMLR 395; Raoul Georges Nicolo and
Another, Judgment of Oct. 20, 1989, Conseil d'Etat, 1989 Receuil des D6csions
[Lebon] du Conseil d'Etat 190, 1 CMLR 173 (1990); Boisdet, Judgment of Sept. 24,
1990, Conseil d'Etat, 1990 Recueil des D6cisions [Lebon] du Conseil d'Etat 250, 1
CMLR 3 (1991); Soci&6t Anonyme Rothmans International France-Soci6t6 Anonyme
Philip Morris France, Conseil d'Etat, 199 Receuil des Ddcisions [Lebon] du Conseil
d'Etat 195, 1 CMLR 4 (1991); Interruption volontaire de grossesse, Decision of Jan.
15, 1975, Conseil Constitutionnel, 1975 D.S.Jur. 529, 49 J.C.P. II, No. 18,030 (1975)
(providing examples of the disparity if the French Courts in interpreting international
agreements). See generally Philippe Manin, The Nicolo Case of the Conseil d'Etat:
French Constitutional Law and the Supreme Administrative Court's Acceptance of the
Primacy of Community Law over Subsequent National Statute Law, 28 COMMON MKT.
L. REV. 499 (1991) (discussing attempts by the French courts to establish a consistent
approach to treaty interpretation).
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interpretation in a national court-but also from the domestic political
perspective of the court's own state. Presumably, the particular treaty
serves important national interests of all of its signatories. A national
court can best effectuate the interests of its own state by recognizing
this concept. In most cases, the cooperative legal relationship established
by the treaty will endure well beyond the particular case before the
national court. Therefore, the court should consider the impact of its
interpretation on the future development of that relationship.' These
considerations will be fully explored and systematically analyzed in the
next part of this Article.
A complicating legal factor for the national court, however, is the
dual nature of an international agreement when it is a source of law in
a domestic court.' In the United States, for example, the international
agreement is both a legally binding international obligation of the United
States and the law of the land. A court interpreting and applying law
would appear to be legally obliged to take both domestic and international perspectives into account," such as what occurred in the previously discussed cases. In Sale, Alvarez-Machain, Schlunk, Agrospatiale,
and Sumitomo, however, short-term national interests overrode international cooperation through international agreement. The Supreme Court
in each of those cases applied a restrictive interpretation to the international agreement at issue to exclude or vitiate its application. The
Court's failure to employ the terminology of restrictive interpretation in
each of those cases should not obscure what the Court did. The Court
in effect preserved the freedom of action of domestic decision-makers,
rather than limiting their freedom of action in the interests of the other
party or parties to the international agreement.

233. Multilateral agreements adopted by international conferences, such as the
agreements involved in Sale, Airospatiale, and Schlunk call for even greater deference
to the international purpose of the agreement. See GILES, supra note 229, at 29 (asserting that "judges interpreting convention law must bear in mind that they are interpreting a body of rules decided upon by an international body and not by their own
legislator, although the latter has enacted the law in their country").
234. See STEINER & VAGTS, supra note 228, at 634 (calling attention to "[t]he
evident tension . . . between the concepts of a treaty as 'supreme law' and as an act
pursuing foreign-relations goals" and stating that "problems of interpretation may occa-

sionally shade into 'political questions"').
235. See MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 227, at xi (stating that "in every particular controversy authorized decision-makers who are charged with the task of interpretation must proceed within the frame of reference provided by the basis prescriptions
of all the public order systems to which they are responsible").
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In contrast to the American view that treaties are the law of the land
and may be applied directly by courts, in England, courts may not in
principle apply treaties directly. They may only if the treaty has been
incorporated into English law by legislation. 6 Treaty interpretation in
English courts is therefore a matter of statutory interpretation. 7 Nevertheless, English courts have not hesitated to look past the parliamentary
enactment directly to the treaty itself. 8 Subsequently, they have rejected domestic approaches to interpretation in favor of "broad principles of
general acceptation." 9
This view was described and justified by Lord Denning in James
Buchanan & Co. Ltd. v. Babco Forwarding & Shipping (U.K.) Ltd."
Even though the treaty before the court (the European Convention on
the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods of 1956) had been
incorporated into English law by an act of Parliament (Carriage of
Goods by Road Act of 1965), Lord Denning nevertheless "put on one
side our traditional rules of interpretation."24 ' "We ought, he says, in
interpreting this convention, to adopt the European method."' 42 The
English example indicates that there are no inherent problems, and indeed much benefit, in domestic courts adopting and implementing methods of interpretation that are aimed at achieving international cooperation
within the context of an ongoing treaty regime. The foregoing example
is especially suggestive because the dualist view of the relationship
between national law and international law is an accepted feature of
English jurisprudence. 43

236. Schreuer, Interpretation of Treaties, supra note 24, at 256.
237. Id. at 251.
238. See id. at 257-61 (discussing of English treaty interpretation cases).
239. See, e.g., Philippson v. Imperial Airways, Ltd., I All E.R. 761 (1939); Stag
Line, Ltd. v. Foscolo, Mango & Co., 41 Lloyd's List L. Rep. 165 (1932).
240. 1977 Q.B. 208; see H.P Bulmer Ltd. v. J. Bollinger S.A. [1974] 2 All E.R.
1226 (CA) (adopting broad principles of interpreatation and notions of comity); P. S.
ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,

FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW:

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY, AND LEGAL INSTrrU-

TIONS 100-12 (1987) (distinguishing English and American methods of interpretation);
N. MARSH, INTERPRETATION IN A NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT (1974)
(explaining the predisposition of many national courts to refer to treaties as opposed
to statutory enactments for purposes of interpretation).
241. James Buchanan & Co., 1977 Q.B. at 213.
242. Id; see Macarthys Ltd. Smith, 3 All E.R. 325 (1979) (C.A.) ("assum[ing] that
our Parliament, whenever it passes legislation, intends to fulfil its obligations under
the Treaty [of Rome]").
243. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 152, at 58-60.

1996]

DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT

615

Despite the different legal, institutional, and political contexts in
which they are situated, are domestic courts and international tribunals
bound by the same rules of international law with regard to the interpre-

tation of international agreements? 2" As a general matter, customary
international law is indifferent to the rules of interpretation applied by
domestic courts.245 Customary international law is concerned only with
actual decisional outcomes. A nation, therefore, may be in violation of
an international treaty obligation by virtue of a decision by its court
system-whatever rules of treaty interpretation are applied in reaching
that decision. Similarly, customary international law is equally disinterested in the rules of interpretation applied by domestic courts if treaty
commitments are necessarily honored.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties contains principles of
treaty interpretation which would appear to be binding on the parties to
the Convention. 2 This is the assumption of the drafters of the Third
Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States."n AlWhere a treaty affects private rights or, generally, requires for the implementation of its obligations, a modification of existing law, the necessary changes in
the law must be the subject of action by or under the authority of an Act of
Parliament before an English court can give effect to the changes in the law
called for by the treaty. Even then the court, unless directed otherwise by the
legislation, will apply the law as changed by the legislation rather than as
changed by the terms of the treaty itself. To that extent therefore treaties which
are binding on the United Kingdom in international law do not as such affect
or form part of the law of the land; they may not be invoked directly by individuals as a basis for legal rights or obligations to be asserted before the
courts.
Id.
244.
treaties
on the
245.
246.

There are two principal sources of international rules for the interpretation of
between states: the rules contained in articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention
Law of Treaties, supra note 81; and the rules of customary international law.
Basdevant, supra note 227, at 416, 419.
As of December 31, 1993, there were 74 parties to the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties. MULTATERAL TREATMS DEPOSFTED VITH THE SECRETARYGENERAL, U.N. Doe. ST/LEG/SER.E/12 at 829-830 (1994). The United States is not a
party to the Vienna Convention, although it participated in the Vienna Conference
which adopted the text and is a signatory to the Convention. France is the only country which participated in the Vienna Conference which did not sign the final text, nor
has France subsequently become a party to the Convention. See Olivier Deleau, Les
positions franfaises a la Conference de Vienne sur le droit des traits, 1969
ANNUAIRE FRANrAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 7 (describing the French view of the
Vienna Convention).
247. See RESTATEMNT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 26, §325, cmt. a
(following Articles 31(1) and 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties)

AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

616

[VOL. 11:4

though the United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention and is
not formally bound by its rules of interpretation, United States courts
have generally cited the Convention with approval and followed its
approach when helpful.2"

B.

THE RESTRICTIVE APPROACH TO TREATY INTERPRETATION:
ASCERTAINING THE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES

Whatever rules of interpretation a domestic court applies, there is one
fundamental principle that appears well-accepted: the principal goal of
treaty interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the
parties.249 The theory of restrictive interpretation, as it developed originally at the international level and was applied in national courts, served
the legitimate interests of courts in seeking to effectuate the intentions
of the parties to international agreements. To achieve that end it acted
as a "default" rule, a presumption that the parties had a certain intent
when actual intent could not be readily determined from the document."0 If there is doubt, the principle says, in effect, that the obligor

Customary international law of interpretation. Customary international law
has not developed rules and modes of interpretation having the definiteness and
precision to which this section aspires. Therefore, unless the Vienna Convention
comes into force for the United States, this section does not strictly govern
interpretation by the United States or by courts in the United States. But it
represents generally accepted principles and the United States has also appeared
willing to accept them despite differences of nuance and emphasis.
Id.
248. See generally Frankowska, supra note 81, at 281.
249. See MCNAIR, supra note 220, at 365 (opining that "the main task of any
tribunal which is asked to apply or construe or interpret a treaty . . . can be described as the duty of giving effect to the expressed intention of the parties");
McDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 227, at 10 (asserting that the goal of treaty interpretation is "the closest possible approximation to the shared expectations of the particular
parties to the agreement"); CHARLES DE VISSCHER, PROBLtMES D'INTERPRPTATION
JUDICIAIRE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 10 (1963) (observing that "[ifn the
treaty, the security guaranteed by fidelity to the promise given is the objective of the
contracting parties. The function of interpretation is to give full effect to this fundamental requirement"). But see Gidon Gottlieb, The Conceptual World of the Yale
School of International Law, 21 WORLD POL. 108, 126 (1969) (maintaining that "the
process of interpretation does not primarily serve one dominant goal. It serves a congeries of competing purposes, and the discovery of the shared expectations of the
parties to an agreement is but one of the many functions assigned to the process").
250. See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy
in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 593 (1995) (examining the notion of
"default" rules for interpretation). But see Vagts, supra note 28, at 503 (remarking
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state is free from the legal fetters of the agreement. A presumption
favoring the restrictive interpretation of the agreement was in accord

with positivistic international legal theory and state practice as it developed in the late 18th and 19th centuries and the early 20th century.

According to Vattel,'

the "sole object" of treaty interpretation "is

to discover the intention of the maker or makers of the treaty."'

Thus, "when any obscurity is met with in the treaty we must seek for
the probable intention of the parties to it and interpret it accordingiy°

254

Following this rule... expressions must be taken in their most extended
meaning when it is probable that the speaker meant them to have such
meaning; and, on the other hand, they should be taken in a restricted
sense if it appears that the speaker had that sense in view.'
More specifically, with respect to restrictive interpretation, Vattel asserts:

that "[i]ntemational courts are constrained to concentrate on what is fair (what was
expected and intended) as between the two parties to one discrete transaction. It is
significant that the law of treaties essentially has no default rules"). See DE VIssctEi,
supra note 249, at 35-38 (discussing "presuppositions" and "presumptions" and stating
that "presuppositions" are fundamental "givens" of the international legal order which
express the general structure of current relations between states). "Thus: their sovereignty in a defined territory, their independence and their equality in the exercise of
state functions; inherenent competences and prerogatives, not as it often said flowing
from the nature of states, but from the general conditions of their coexistence." Id.
"Presumptions," on the other hand, are "indirect" means of judicially establishing
facts. Id.See id. at 84-92 (discussing restrictive interpretation).
251. Positivism regards the legal order as a system of norms. See HANs KEIsEN,
GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 113 (Anders Wedberg trans. 1945) (opining
that "[a] norm is a valid legal norm by virtue of the fact that it has been created
according to a definite rule and by virtue thereof only'); H. L A. HART, THE ConcEFr oF LAw 181 (1961) (stating that "it is in no sense a necessary truth that laws
reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality'). The principal implications of legal
positivism for international law are that (1) rules of international law must be found
in pre-existing volitional acts of states (manifested by either explicit or tacit agreement) and (2) natural law is not a valid basis for international law. See also David J.
Bederman, The 1871 London Declaration, Rebus sic Stantibus and a Primitivist View
of the Law of Nations, 82 AM. J.INT'L L. 1 (1988).
252. See Albert de Lapradelle, Introduction to EMERICH DE VATEI, THE LAw
OF NATIONS (James B. Scott ed., 1914, reprint 1964) (commenting on Vattel's significance); FRANcIS STEPHEN RUDDY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE ENL.GHTENN. THE
BACKGROUND OF EmmERICH DE VATTEL'S LE DROrr DES GENs (1975).
253. DE VATrEL, supra note 252, at 201.
254. Id.

255. Il
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.. . if a case should arise which can not at all be brought under the

motive of the law or promise, the case should be excepted from its application, although if the meaning of the terms be alone regarded, the case
would fall under the provisions of the law or promise .

. .

. We resort to

restrictive interpretation in order to avoid falling into absurdities.l 6

It is instructive to note that, as elaborated by Vattel, the restrictive
theory is really nothing more than a tool to be employed by treaty
interpreters in appropriate situations to effectuate the intentions of the
parties. In this sense, it is the counterpart or companion to the "extended" theory of interpretation. Vattel bases both approaches on probability,
stating that:
when certitude can not be had in human affairs we must act on probabilities. It is ordinarily very probable that words have been used in their
customary sense and the presumption to that effect is always very strong
and can7 only be overcome by an even stronger presumption to the contrary.2

Viewed against the background of 19th and early 20th century legal
positivism, in cases of doubt, states most likely intended their treaty
obligations to be interpreted narrowly. In light of post-World War II
developments in the theory and practice of general international law and
the international law of treaties this assumption may no longer be true.
Moreover, considerations of state sovereignty do not figure in Vattel's
presentation and discussion of the restrictive approach to treaty interpretation. Vattel recommends other principles of interpretation which point
in the opposite direction. He states:
There are certain things which equity prefers rather to extend than to
restrict; that is to say, with regard to those things, when the precise intent
of the law or contract can not be ascertained, it is safer, in the interests
of justice, to give a liberal, rather than a strict interpretation to the terms,
to extend the meaning of the terms rather than restrict it.28

256. Id. at 210.
257. Id. at 202; see HuGo GRoTIus, 2 THE LAW OF WAR AND PEAcE 409 (Francis W. Kelsey ed., 1964) (asserting that "[t]he measure of correct interpretation is the
inference of intent from the most probable indications"); B61a VitAnyi, Treaty Interpretation in the Legal Theory of Grotius and Its Influence on Modern Doctrine, 14
NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 41, 48-51 (1983).
258. DE VATrEL, supra note 252, at 264.
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"[W]hatever makes for the common benefit of the contracting parties

and tends to put them on a footing of equality is favorable."
"[W]hatever does not make for the common benefit of the contracting

parties, and tends to destroy the equality of a contract, whatever burdens
only one of the parties, or one more than the other, is objection-

able.,

°

Although Vattel's focus on "equality" and restricting the effect of
"unequal treaties" has been read as supporting the rule of restrictive
interpretation,"5 the example that Vattel gives of "unequal treaties"
points rather in the direction of treaties between weaker and stronger

states, or treaties that lack true mutuality, rather than toward treaty provisions which in their application inhibit the freedom of action of sovereign states.0 2 Nowhere in his discussion of treaty interpretation does
Vattel make the connection between state sovereignty and the restrictive
approach to treaty interpretation.'
The Permanent Court of International Justice cited with apparent
approval the principle of restrictive interpretation in its Wimbledon decision of 1923. That case has foreshadowed later developments in international jurisprudence,' however, because the Court did not actual-

259. Id.
260. Id. at 213-14.
261. See MCNAIR, supra note 220, at 765.
262. De Vattel gives the following example:
In unequal treaties, and especially in unequal alliances, all the unequal clauses,
and particularly those which burden the weaker ally, are objectionable. On this
principle that, in cases of doubt, we should extend what makes for equality and
restrict what destroys it, is based the well-known rule: He who seeks to avoid
a loss has a better cause than he who seeks to obtain an advantage ....
DE VATrEL, supra note 252, at 214.
263. In his Introduction to THE LAW OF NATIONs, De Vattel writes:
The laws of the natural society of Nations are so important to the welfare of
every State that if the habit should prevail of treading them under foot no
Nation could hope to protect its existence or its domestic peace, whatever wise
and just and temperate measures it might take.
Id. at 8. He then specifically includes "the various agreements which Nations may
enter into" as "a division of the Law of Nations." Id. Lord McNair states flatly. "In
general, sovereignty plays no part in the interpretation of treaties." ARNOLD D.
McNAnR, supra note 220, at 765.
264. Wimbledon Case (Gr. Brit., Fr., Italy, Japan, and Pol. v. Germany), 1923
P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 1 (Aug. 17).
265. For a review of the international jurisprudence until 1949, see Lauterpacht,
Restrictive Interpretation, supra note 22, at 61-67. Lauterpacht concludes:
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ly apply the principle, as it regarded the relevant provision of the Treaty
of Versailles as sufficiently clear. Furthermore, it did not give its approval to the restrictive principle as a general matter, but regarded it as
potentially applicable only because Germany characterized the particular
sovereign right at stake as an international servitude (a right of passage
through the territory of another state).
The Lotus Case, which the Permanent Court of International Justice
(PCIJ) decided in 1927, placed the firm imprimatur of international
jurisprudence on the theory of the sources of international law that undergirds the application of the restrictive principle of treaty interpretation. In the Lotus Case, the PCIJ made the following often-quoted statement:
International law governs relations between independent States. The rules
of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as
expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing
principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between
these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the independence of States
cannot therefore be presumed. 2"
The positivistic view of international law, so well and concisely expressed by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Lotus
Case does not, however, ineluctably lead to a theory of treaty interpretation protective of the freedom of action of the state parties to international agreements. In the first place, the principle cuts both ways: solicitude for the freedom of action of one state party necessarily deprives
the other state party or parties of legal rights which are equally attributes of their national sovereignty.'
Turkey's freedom to prosecute

The International Court of Justice has not only refrained, apart from one doubtful exception, from applying in actual practice the rule of restrictive interpretation . . . it has often relied, in a conspicuous manner, on the opposite of that

rule by acting on the principle of effectiveness of treaty obligations and of the
general purpose of the treaty as a whole. Yet the frequency with which it has
conceded the theoretical relevance of the rule of restrictive interpretation has
helped to keep it alive in some arbitral awards, in the pleadings of the parties,
and in the literature of international law.
Id. at 62-63. Note also that articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, supra note 81, which codify present international law with respect to
treaty interpretation, do not refer to the principle of restrictive interpretation. For later
developments, see Schreuer, Interpretation of Treaties, supra note 24.

266. S.S. Lotus Case (Fr. v. Turk.) 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7) at 18.
267. In the words of Lord McNair.
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Lieutenant Demons recognized by the PCU in the Lotus Case necessarily diminished the bundle of (sovereign?) rights possessed by France,

which included those contained in the treaty that was being interpreted
by the PCU.'

Furthermore, as Professor Wildhaber has remarked:

"Treaty obligations do not derogate from the formal sovereignty of the
states parties. Nor do they hamper, except in special cases, material

sovereignty. Auto-limitations are emanations from, not violations of,
sovereignty."'
Another important question with respect to the interpretation of inter-

national agreements is the degree of latitude that the interpreter should
have when it is impossible to extract from an agreement any indication

of the substantive intent of the parties.'

Given that situation, what

was the parties' intent, or their presumed intent, as to how the court
should proceed?"' Did they intend that a tribunal seeking to apply the

It is difficult to defend the rule on the basis of logic. Every treaty obligation
limits the sovereign powers of a State. With rare exceptions a treaty imposes
obligations on both parties ... both parties are ex hypothesi sovereign States;
if a so-called rule of interpretation is applied to restrict the obligation of one
party, a sovereign State, it reduces the reciprocal benefit or "consideration" due
to the other party, also a sovereign State, which seems to me to be absurd. It
is difficult to believe that this could accord with the intention of the contracting parties.
MCNAIR, supra note 220, at 765.
268. The Lotus Case was in fact a treaty interpretation case. In that case the
Permanent Court of International Justice was interpreting Article 15 of the Treaty of
Lausanne of July 24, 1923, which provided that "all questions of jurisdiction shall, as
between Turkey and the other contracting powers, be decided in accordance with the
principles of international law." S.S. Lotus Case, 1927 P.C.I.J. at 16.
269. Luzius Wildhaber, Sovereignty and International Lawv, in THE STRuCTURE
AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 425, 442 (R. St. J. MacDonald & Douglas M.
Sohnston eds., 1983) [hereinafter Wildhaber].
270. Judge Lauterpacht describes five ways in which an absence of an effective
common intention may occur. (1) Although using identical language, the parties did
not intend the same result; (2) One or more of the parties deliberately intended to
benefit from an ambiguity surrounding the expression or provision which it succeeded
in having inserted in the treaty; (3) Being unable to reach an agreed solution, the
parties used an ambiguous or non-committal expression, leaving the divergence of
views to be resolved in the future; (4) The particular problem did not occur to the
parties, although it falls within the purview of the treaty; and (5) Two or more provisions of the treaty are mutually inconsistent. Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretation,
supra note 22, at 70-81.
271. See H. LAUTERpACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL CoMMUNrrY 2-25 (1933) [hereinafter LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCrION OF LAW] (pointing out
that international law immediately confronts the doctrine of sovereignty and must ad-
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treaty in such circumstances should resolve the dispute before it as best
it could based on legal principles available to it? Or did they, on the
other hand, intend that the tribunal regard the dispute as non-judiciable,
because the treaty contained no specific applicable legal standards?
Sir Hersh Lauterpacht traces the view that there are "inherent limitations" in the process of international adjudication to Vattel, who maintained that international law was not applicable if the vital interests of
states were in issue.' Later, in the 19th and early 20th centuries, theorists and statesmen frequently expressed the view that the international
judicial function is necessarily limited because of the incompleteness of
international law as a legal system.' Thus, if there were no specific
rules of international law, customary or conventional, that applied to the
dispute at hand, that dispute was not subject to resolution by an international tribunal. Judge Lauterpacht was perhaps the most tenacious and
effective opponent of this point of view,274 but it is probably safe to
say that Judge Lauterpacht's point of view has not exercised much influence in practice. 5 One may conclude, therefore, that in seeking to de-

dress the inherent conflicts contained within the concept of state sovereignty); see also
Gottlieb, The Conceptual World of the Yale School of International Law, supra note
198, at 122, who makes the following observation:
Parties, especially sovereign states, who enter into agreements expect deference
to their agreement. States, whether we like it or not, are notoriously jealous of
their sovereignty. They genuinely expect in most instances to delegate as little
discretion to interpreters as possible. States generally prefer, therefore, the adoption of guidance devices that leave little discretion to the interpreter . . . . The
important point to notice, however, is that genuine expectations of states exist
also about the role and the discretion of interpreters.
272. LAuTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW, supra note 271, at 7, citing DE
VAT.F., supra note 252, at 222-32. According to Lauterpacht:
The doctrine of the inherent limitations of the judicial process among States is,
first and foremost, the work of international lawyers anxious to give legal expression to the State's claim to be independent of law . . . . The principal
function which the doctrine of the "inherent limitations" has been called upon
to fulfil since its inception, has been to supply a legal cloak for the traditional
claim of the sovereign State to remain the ultimate judge of disputed legal
rights in its controversies with other States.
Id. at 6-7.
273. See LAuTERAcHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW, supra note 271, at 51-56 (commenting on the application of the rule of international law and its "considerable gaps
and deficiencies").
274. See id.; Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretation, supra note 22.
275. But see the response of the International Court of Justice to the arguments of
the United States on the question of admissibility in Military and Paramilitary Activi-
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termine the intent of parties to international agreements in the absence

of a clear expression of intent in the agreement itself, the presumption
that the treaty-makers did not intend to confer on the decision-making

tribunal a competence to fill in gaps in the parties intent with respect to
substantive questions was well justified. "
The foregoing review of the theoretical background to the restrictive

approach to treaty interpretation reveals that at one time it may have
served a useful purpose in orienting treaty interpreters to be sensitive to
the mindsets brought to treaty negotiations by the representatives of
states and to treaty ratification by domestic parliamentarians or executive
branch personnel. In that sense, the restrictive approach was true to the
fundamental purpose of interpretation--to ascertain the intent (substan-

tive as well as procedural) of the parties. That set of assumptions as to
intent, however, is no longer the best reflection of reality, as the next
section will seek to demonstrate.
C. THE RESTRICTIVE APPROACH, STATE SOVEREIGNTY
AND THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Sovereignty is a powerful idea. No matter how hard theorists have
tried to deconstruct or decompose it or to diminish it by treating it as a

relative concept, the ideas and feelings expressed by the term "sovereignty" continue to exercise a strong influence on contemporary political
and legal thinking tm More narrowly, ideas and predispositions derived

ties in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.) 1984 l.CJ. 392, in which the Court
rejects United States contentions that existing rules of customary and conventional
international law are not sufficiently precise to enable the Court to rely on them to
reach a decision. Id at 431-36. The Court in effect rejected the United States invitation to apply the American political question doctrine at the international level by
noting "[t]his argument of the United States as to the powers of the Security Council
and of the Court is an attempt to transfer municipal-law concepts of separation of
powers to the international plane . . . ." Id. at 433. Central to that doctrine in American law is the notion that courts should not adjudicate politically sensitive controversies in the absence of clear, pre-existing rules of decision. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962); see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino. 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (commenting that "if there is not an agreement regarding general standards . . . it would
be unwise for the courts so to determine one").
276. This narrow view of the competence of the international tribunals also finds
expression in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which
provides that the Court shall have the power to decide a case ex aequo et bono only
if the parties agree thereto.
277. Ernst Cassirer highlights the affective character of what he calls "the myth of
the state":
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directly from particular views of sovereignty, whether articulated or not,
like those attitudes expressed by the terms "monism" 8 and "dualism,"2 9 substantially influence judicial thinking and therefore decisions
in particular cases."

Myth does not arise solely from intellectual processes; it sprouts forth from
deep human emotions ....
[In myth man begins to learn a new and strange art: the art of expressing,
and that means of organizing, his most deeply rooted instincts, his hopes and
fears ....

In all critical moments of man's social life, the rational forces that resist the
rise of the old mythical conceptions are no longer sure of themselves. In these
moments the time for myth has come again.
ERNST CASSIRER, THE MYTH OF THE STATE 43, 48, 280 (1946).
278. According to the monist theory, there exists only one normative system of
which international law and domestic law both form parts. Most jurists of the monist
persuasion regard international law as hierarchically superior to domestic law. J. G.
Starke, Monism and Dualism in the Theory of InternationalLaw, 17 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L
L. 66, 74-75 (1936).
279. According to the dualist theory, there exist two completely separate legal
systems: the international legal system, which governs the relations of states and
whose norms derive from the common will of those states; and national legal systems, whose law governs the relations of individuals and whose norms derive from
the will of each state itself. Id. at 70. Most dualists regard domestic law as hierarchically superior to international law. According to Professor Starke:
Reduced to its lowest terms, the doctrine of state primacy is a denial of international law as law, and an affirmation of international anarchy. International
law becomes merely that portion of the law of the state which governs its
relations vis-a-vis other states. The juridical status of other countries in relation
to a particular state is made to turn not on objective norms, but on a basic
norm of that state order recognizing the existence of other states as normative
systems. The thesis of state primacy thus raises fundamental inconsistencies of
principle which in the last resort can only be reconciled by saying that international law as law does not exist.
Id. at 77.
280. Rosalyn Higgins notes that:
[T]he difference in response to a clash of international and domestic law in
various domestic courts is substantially conditioned by whether the country
concerned is monist or dualist in its approach. I say "substantially" conditioned,
because in reality there is usually little explanation or discussion of these large
jurisprudential matters in the domestic court hearing. The response of the court
to the problem is often instinctive rather than explicitly predicated ....
Related to this great jurisprudential debate is a further reality not be
found in the textbooks .
ROSALYN

HIGGINS,

. . . This is the reality of legal culture.
PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND

How WE

USE IT 206 (1994). On the relationship of national sovereignty and international law,
see WERNER LEVI, LAW AND POLrICS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 37-49 (1976).
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The German political theorist, Georg Jellinek, calls sovereignty a
"polemic notion,"' stressing the essentially hortatory character of the
term and thereby implicitly denying its claim to acceptance as settled or
accepted international legal doctrine.' Professor Henkin describes sovereignty as a "mythology"' and as a term "largely unnecessary and
better avoided,"' because "it is often a catchword, a substitute for
thinking and precision."
He recommends that sovereignty be "decomposed" so as to identify the elements that are inherent in the
concept and those which are only metaphors or fictions. Professor

See also James A. Rosenau, Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Toward a
Postinternational Politics for the 1990s, in GLOBAL CHANGES AND THEORETICAL
CHALLENGES: APPROACHES TO WORLD POLrncs FOR THE 1990s. at 1, 1-2 (Ernst-Otto
Czempiel & James Rosenau eds.) [hereinafter Czempiel & Rosenau, GLOBAL CHANGES
AND THEORETICAL CHALLENGES]. Rosenau writes:
Leaders and publics . . . conduct themselves in terms of some notions of why

and how the issues and situations of world politics unfold as they do ....
[ihose in the public arena acquire at least some of their conceptual tools and
competing value systems for assessing world affairs from the insights and ideas
that emerge from the formulations and debates of those for whom the study of
world affairs is a full-time occupation
Id.; see DE VISSCHER, supra note 249, at 13-20.
281. GEORGE JELLINEK, ALLGEamINE STAATSL.EHRE 441 (3d ed. 1914). "Sovereignty is . . . a polemical concept, at first defensive in nature and later offensive." Id;
See id. at 434-89.
282. See Wildhaber, supra note 217, at 425-26; CYNTHIA WEBER SMUtLATING
SOVEREIGNTY: INTERVENTION, THE STATE, AND SYMBOLIC EXCHANGE 3 (1995)
("[S]overeignty marks not the location of the foundational entity of international relations theory but a site of political struggle .. . to fix the meaning of sovereignty in
such a way as to constitute a particular state ... with particular boundaries, competencies and legitimacies available to it"); R.BJ. Walker, Sovereignty, Identity, Community: Reflections on the Horizons of Contemporary Political Practice, in R.B.J. WALKER & SAUL H. MENDLOVrI7, CONTENDING SOVEREIGNTIES: REDEFNING POLTICAL
CohihNrry 159, 164 (1990) [hereinafter WALKER & MENDLOvrrz, CONTENDING
SOVEREIGNTIES]. Walker asks, "What do we understand by political community?
Where are power and authority located? How is power legitimized? All these questions find their conventional resolution in the claims of state. These claims are formalized and encoded in the principle of state sovereignty." Id.; see also R.B.J.
WALKER, INSIDE/OUTSIDE:

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS PoLTICAL THEORY

1-25

(1993) [hereinafter WALKER, INSIDE/OuTsIDE] (making the same point with respect to
international relations theory in general).
283. Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and Functions, 216 REC.
DES COURS 9, 24 (1989).
284. Id.at 26.
285. Id. at 25.

286. Id.at 26.
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Wildhaber expresses the same idea when he says that "sovereignty is a

relative notion, variable in the course of times, adaptable to new situations and exigencies, a discretionary freedom within, and not from,
'
international law."287

On the purely descriptive, non-normative, level, however, it has long
been recognized that states are not free in practice from non-legal restraints on their behavior."8 Thus, military, political, economic, ideological, religious, cultural, and other sorts of constraints arising from
sources external to a state clearly circumscribe the de facto freedom of
that state to act. These constraints produce important effects within that
state regardless of the intentions of domestic decision-makers. This state
of affairs-the conflict between de jure theories of absolute sovereignty
on the one hand and present-day realities of power on the other-confronts international legal theorists with the problem of giving theoretical
expression to the actual configuration of legal competence in the contemporary world.
Contemporary international law only dimly reflects this reality, clinging as it does to the state sovereignty paradigm, despite the many discussions in the literature and in international bodies and conferences
about interdependence, cooperation, and multilateralism. This is nowhere
more clear than in the U.N. Charter, which is premised on the sovereign
equality of states 9 and in the Statute of the International Court of

287. Wildhaber, supra note 269, at 441; see R.BJ. WALKER, INSIDE/OUTsIDE,
supra note 282, at 176-79; DiJuRA NINtit, THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE
CHARTER AND IN THE PRACTICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 9-15 (1970) (discussing the
various approaches to the problems of sovereignty); J. Samuel Barkin & Bruce
Cronin, The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in
International Relations, 48 INT'L ORG. 107, 108 (1994) (arguing that sovereignty is a
social construct, whose rules "are neither fixed nor constant, but rather are subject to
changing interpretations").
288. See WEBER, supra note 282, at 6 (noting that economics, security, and ecology "defy territorial boundaries"); Joseph A. Camilleri, Rethinking Sovereignty in a
Shrinking, Fragmented World, in WALKER & MENDLOVrrz, CONTENDING SOVEREIGNTIES, supra note 282, at 13, 20-38 (1990); James A. Rosenau, Global Changes and
Theoretical Challenges: Toward a Postinternational Politics for the 1990s, in
Czempiel & Rosenau, GLOBAL CHANGES AND THEORETICAL CHALLENGES, supra note
280, at 1, 5; Wolf-Dieter Eberwein, In Favor of Method, or How to Deal with International Interdependence, in Czempiel & Rosenau, GLOBAL CHANGES AND THEORETICAL CHALLENGES, supra note 280, at 75-98.
289. U.N. cHARTER art. 2, $ 1 (stating, "The [United Nations] Organization is
based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members"). "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in mat-
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Justice, which conditions jurisdiction on the consent of the states concemed.' In addition, customary international law is, in practice, not
binding on states who have not participated or acquiesced in the formation of the particular rule.
Without a doubt, great material and intellectual changes have occurred
in the world since the development and elaboration of the concept of
sovereignty. m The concept itself has changed over time and has been
employed in a number of different contexts and for different ends."

ters which are essentially with the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.. . ." Id.
art. 2,
7. See generally NINtIt, supra note 287 (noting that a scrutiny of all elements of the United Nations Charter is necessary in order to determine the true
meaning of the concept of sovereign equality); BERNARD GILSON, THE CONCEPTUAL
SYSTEM OF SOVEREIGN EQUALrrY (1984); P. H. KOOUMANS, THE DOCRmNE OF THE
LEGAL EQUALITY OF STATES: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL

LAw (1964) (commenting that the United Nations Organization inherently clashes

with the principle of equality); JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., THE EQUALITY OF STATES: A
STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF LAw (1923) (asserting that the doctrine of equality of
states in international law is of considerable importance to the development of a
coherent body law for international relationships); EDWIN DTVrrr DICKINSON, THE
EQUALITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

(1920) (positing that the creation of

true supernational authority capable of enforcing its decisions in participating states is
obviously a limitation on equality); R. P. Anand, Sovereign Equality of States in
International Law, 197 REC. DES COURS 9 (1986).
290. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36.
291. See Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.CJ. 266 (holding that asylum
may not be granted unilaterally but requires the participation or consideration of both
party-states involved); Ted L Stein, The Approach of a Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in International Law, 26 HARV. INT'L L J. 457
(1985); Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J.
INT'L L. 413 (1983). But see Jonathan I. Chamey, Universal International Law, 87
AM. J. INT'L L. 529 (1993); Jonathan I. Chamey, The Persistent Objector Rule and
the Development of Customary International Law, [19851 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L 1
(noting that while modem theories of international law do not require a state to consent expressly to a rule in order to be bound by it, express rejection of the rule may
exempt the party from being bound).
292. On the development of the idea of sovereignty, see HAROLD J. LASKI, THE
FOUNDATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 1-29 (1921). See generally JOHN
N. FIGGIS, POLITICAL THOUGHT FROM GERSON TO GROTIUS: 1414-1625 (1907). On

the implications of post-structuralism and critical legal theory for the idea of sovereignty, see Richard Devetak, The Project of Modernity and International Relations
Theory, 24 MILLENNIM 27, 35-46 (1995); Andrew Linklater, The Question of the
Next Stage in International Relations Theory: A Critical-TheoreticalPoint of View, 21
M.LEnmi

77 (1992).

293. See generally F. H. HINSLEY, SOVEREIGNTY (2d. ed. 1986) (noting that the
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Despite this evolution in the concept of sovereignty, the fundamental
conceptual orientation furnished by the notion of sovereignty continues
to play an important, if not determinative, role in contemporary international legal and political thinking.
Over a generation ago, C. Wilfred Jenks described the task confronting international law in terms which still are valid today:
The task which now confronts us in the field of international law is twofold. One element in that task is to achieve an intellectual revolution,
corresponding to the political and social changes which have taken place
and to the contemporary changes of outlook in other branches of knowledge, which will give us a legal system with sufficiently broad and deep
foundations to command the allegiance of a world community with a
fundamentally changed composition and distribution of influence. A second and equally important element in that task is to achieve this result by
a sufficiently evolutionary process to avoid impairing the authority of
well-established law ....294
Elaborating on the intellectual revolution he was calling for, Jenks focuses on the concept of sovereignty. "The primary preoccupation of
progressive thought in the field of international law since 1919 has been
to subdue the claims of sovereignty in the interest of the rule of
law.""29 In a later work, Sovereignty Within the Law, written in collaboration with Arthur Larson and other contributors, Jenks characterizes
the question "of the relationship to each other of law and sovereignty"
as:
not a problem for the cloister or the study. It is a practical problem
which confronts statesmen, diplomats, international civil servants and legal
practitioners every day. The manner in which it is resolved will decide

idea of sovereignty must be reformulated as relations between community and state

change);

BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL, SOVEREIGNTY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE POLITICAL
GOOD 169-215 (J. F. Huntington trans., 1957) (exploring the "extraordinary progress

and emancipation of the Sovereign Will in the course of European history");
JOHANNES MATrERN,

CONCEPTS OF STATE, SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW,

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE JURISTIC CONCErION OF THE STATE

(1928) (exam-

ining the emergence of the concept of sovereignty in an attempt to create a definition

broad enough to apply to every state); George H. Sabine & Walter J. Shepard,
Translators' Introduction, in H. KRABBE, THE MODERN IDEA OF THE STATE XV-XXX
(1927); C.E. MERRIAM, HISTORY OF THE THEORY OF SOVEREIGNTY SINCE ROUSSEAU,
12 STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW 355-586 (Faculty of Political

Science, Columbia Univ. ed. 1900).
294. C. WILFRED JENKS, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND 87 (1958).

295. Id. at 123.
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the issue between world order and international anarchy and determine the
answers to countless everyday problems.'

International legal scholars certainly attempted to develop and articulate a vision of the international community and international law that
transcends traditional notions of state sovereignty.
These efforts,
while perhaps resonating within the academic world, appear to have had
little, if any, broader impact. Sir Hersh Lauterpacht and Alejandro

296. ARTHUR LARSON Er AL, SOVEREIGNTY WITHIN Tm LAW 1 (1965).
297. See, e.g., PHILIP ALLOTr, EUNoMIA: A NEW ORDER FOR A Nw WORLD
(1990) (proposing ways of dealing with perennial problems which human society faces
on an international level); PHLP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAw (1956) (dealing
with the problems of defining and empowering a single system of international law);
ALEjANDRO ALVAREZ, LE DROrT INTERNATIONAL

NOUVEAU

DANS SES RAPPORTS

AVEC LA VIE ACTUELLE DES PEUPLES (1959); see also MCDOUGAL Er AL, supra
note 227 (sampling, surveying, and explaining international agreements to provide
insights about world public order); RIcHARD FALK, THE PROMI]SE OF WORLD ORDER:
ESSAYS IN NORMATIVE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1987) (analyzing and interpreting

modem trends in international relations); RICHARD A. FALK, A STUDY OF FtlRE
WORLDS (1975) (laying out a broad "transnational movement for global reform" designed to influence and inspire discourse); INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONTmrPORARY
PERsPECrIvE (Richard Falk et al. eds., 1985) (compiling a collection of works exploring new perspectives on international law). But see Janice E. Thomson & Stephen D.
Krasner, Global Transactions and the Consolidation of Sovereignty, in Czempiel &
Rosenau, GLOBAL CHANGES AND THEORETICAL CHALLENGES, supra note 280, at 195,
198 (arguing that "the commonplace notion that there is an inherent conflict between
sovereignty and economic transactions is fundamentally misplaced. The consolidation
of sovereignty-that is, the establishment of a set of institutions exercising final authority over a defined territory-was a necessary condition for more international
economic transactions"); Erich Weede, Collective Goods in an Interdependent World:
Authority and Order as Determinants of Peace and Prosperity, in Czempiel &
Rosenau, GLOBAL CHANGES AND THEORETICAL CHALLENGES, supra note 280, at 242,
(elaborating on Thomson and Krasner's argument by stressing the need for "property
rights, authority, and order" and concluding that "[h]istorically, the fragmented and
pluralistic character of Western societies has served us well").
298. See, e.g., LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW, supra note 271 (examining
persistent problems in international philosophy and the principal issues surrounding the
philosophy of international law); H. Lauterpacht, The International Community and the
Universality of International Law, in 1 INTERNATIONAL LAw: THE COLLECTED PAPERS
OF HERSH LAuTERPACHT 261-75 (E.Lauterpacht ed., 1970). See also individual opinions of Judge Lauterpacht: Concerning the Application of the Convention of 1902
Governing the Guardianship of Infants (Neth. v. Swed.), 1958 I.CJ. 55, 79 (Nov. 28)
(concurring and discussing the relationship between a nation's domestic statutory laws
and that nation's responsibilities under treaties); Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v.
Nor.), 1957 LCJ. 9, 34 (July 6) (concurring that the court was incompetent to decide
the merits of the present case, but basing that conclusion on different grounds--no

630

AM. U. J. INTL L. & POL'Y

[VOL. 11:4

Alvarez,2" however, as judges on the International Court of Justice,

appropriate pleadings existed upon which to base jurisdiction); Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa, 1956 I.C.J. 23, 35 (June
1) (elaborating on certain questions not addressed in the court's opinion, mainly,
whether the court was required to limit its opinion to general "academic" issues or
should more appropriately have considered the specific circumstances of the present
case); South-West Africa-Voting Procedure, 1955 I.CJ. 67, 90 (June 7) (concurring
in the court's unanimous opinion, and examining the fundamental role of the court
and the nature of its judicial pronouncements); Interhandel, 1959 I.CJ. 6, 95 (Mar.
21) (Lanterpacht, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the judgment on grounds that the
court could not properly assume jurisdiction over the case).
299. See the individual opinions of Judge Alvarez in: Corfu Channel (U.K. v.
Alb.) 1949 I.CJ. 4, 40 (Apr. 9) (arguing that "in consequence of profound changes
that had taken place in international relations, a new international law had arisen; it
is founded on social interdependence") (emphasis added). In another opinion, Judge
Alvarez writes:
This law of social interdependence has certain characteristics of which the following are the most essential: (a) it is concerned not only with the delimitation
of the rights of States, but also with harmonizing them; (b) in every question it
takes into account all its various aspects; (c) it takes the general interest fully
into account; (d) it emphasizes the notion of the duties of States, not only
toward each other but also towards the international society; (e) it condemns
the abuse of right; (f) it adjusts itself to the necessities of international life and
evolves together with it; accordingly, it is in harmony with policy; (g) to the
rights conferred by strictly juridical law it adds that which States possess to
belong to the international organization which is being set up.
Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United
Nations, 1948 I.CJ. 57, 69-70 (May 8); see Fisheries, 1951 I.C.J. 116, 146 (Dec. 18,
1951) (advocating and employing a different judicial method, one based on the characteristics of the new international law of social interdependence enumerated in the
Admissions case, for "[t]he adaptation of the law of nations to the new conditions of
international life"); see also Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the U.N.
Administrative Tribunal, 1954 I.CJ. 47, 67 (July 13) (Alvarez, J., dissenting) (contrasting the approach of classical international law and the new international law to
the resolution of a legal problem concerning the effect to be given by the General
Assembly to an award made by the U.N. Administrative Tribunal); Anglo-Iranian Oil
Co. 1952 I.CJ. 93, 124 (July 22) (Alvarez, J., dissenting) (stressing the importance of
the concept of abuse of rights in the new international law); Reservations to the
Convention on Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 49 (May 28) (Alvarez, J., dissenting) (applying the principles of the new international law to the interpretation of a multilateral
convention); Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.CJ. 266, 290 (Nov. 20) (Alvarez, J.,
dissenting). In one dissent, Alvarez argues:
The community of States, which had hitherto remained anarchical, has become
in fact an organized international society. This transformation is a fact which
does not require the consecration of an international agreement . . . . It has an
existence and a personality distinct from those of its members. It has its own
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sought to move beyond classical international legal analysis. Their individual and dissenting opinions offer illuminating examples of how such
analysis might work in practice. International relations theorists, too,
sought new models with which to approach their discipline, and a number of useful perspectives emerged,' although, once again, the impact
of these theories has been limited to scholarly circles."'
American legal and political theorists have by and large not been
given to systematic analysis and synthesis of high-level abstractions, like
"sovereignty" or "the state."' There is no real analog in American

purposes);
International Status of South-West Africa, 1950 I.CJ. 128, 175 (July 11) (Alvarez, J.,
dissenting); see Competence of the Assembly Regarding Admission to the United Nations, 1950 LCJ. 4, 12 (Mar. 3) (dissenting, and discussing the remarkable forces
shaping the modem era of international law); ALVAREZ, supra note 297.
300. See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1993) (tracing the develop-

ment of modem international law and international relations theory since World War
II, and discussing contemporary efforts to improve the design of international organizations along interdisciplinary lines); Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335

(1989) (describing in detail the major elements of modem international relations theory, and suggesting its relevance to the study of international law).
301. Slaughter Burley, supra note 300. But see the following remarks of the Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Dugko Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since
1991, Oct. 2, 1995, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32 (1996):
Dating back to a period when sovereignty stood as a sacrosanct and unassailable attribute of statehood, recently this concept has suffered progressive erosion at the hands of the more liberal forces at work in the democratic societies,
particularly in the field of human rights . .

.

. Whatever the situation in do-

mestic litigation, the traditional doctrine [that only States, and not individuals,
have the right to challenge a violation of the sovereignty of a State] upheld
and acted upon by the Trial Chamber is not reconcilable, in this International
Tribunal, with the view that an accused, being entitled to a full defence, cannot
be deprived of a plea so intimately connected with, and grounded in,international law as a defence based on violation of State sovereignty.
35 LL.M. at 50.
302. Stephen R. Graubard, Preface, What Future for the State?, to 124 DAEDALUS
V, XXI (No. 2, Spring 1995). Graubard states:
[I]t is not the widely-acknowledged incompetence of democratic politicians that
create our problems so much as the absence of thought and understanding about
the nature of the late twentieth-century state, democratic society, and mass
culture .... Indeed, it may be the contemporary absence of inventiveness, in
ideas no less than in institutions, that best defines the condition that needs to

632

AM. U. J. INTL L. & POL'Y

[VOL. 11:4

scholarship to the vast continental literature dealing with the concept of
sovereignty." 3 There are no American Bodins, Hobbes, Rousseaus, or

Hegels. American legal and political theory tends to focus more on
practical analysis and problem solving rather than on descriptive system
building. Systematic thinking, the sort of thinking that gives coherence
and expression to deeply-shared sentiments and aspirations of people,
however, serves an important social and political purpose.
National judges, particularly federal judges of the United States, are
strategically positioned to articulate and further develop the new embryonic conceptions of international law and international community,
which emphasize interdependence, multilateralism, and cooperation.3"
Courts are institutions which draw practical conclusions from ideas and
principles and give deeper meaning and operational form to the ideas
and principles on which they rely. Courts thus play a significant role in
contributing to the development of that "critical mass" of opinion which
may then be given systematic expression by scholars and publicists and
eventually emerge as the new way of conceptualizing social and legal
realities.
Since 1945, there have been significant changes in the power relationships in the world.3 5 Most notable as a long-term trend is the vast de-

concern men and women in this fin de siecle.
Id.
303. See WALKER, INSIDE/OUTSIDE, supra note 282, at 162-69.
304. HIGGINS, supra note 280, at 218 ("[Ilmportant opportunities do remain for
national courts to contribute to international law. In a decentralized legal order it is
important that they do so.
...
); see RICHARD A. FALK, THE ROLE OF DoMEsTIc
COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 170 (1964). Falk states:
A domestic court operates at that peculiarly sensitive point where national and
international authority intersect. The character of this intersection is closely connected with the role that can be given to law in world politics ....
The relationship between national and international authority . . . is not
conceived of as a problem calling for doctrinal reconciliation. It [should] instead
[be] approached as a matter of social and political dynamics-as a search for a
conception of domestic jurisdiction that is broad enough both to acknowledge
the national setting and to explain the duty of upholding international law.
Id.
305. For provocative comments on recent developments, see Samuel P. Huntington,
The Clash of Civilizations?, FOREIGN A_ .,Summer 1993, at 22 (hypothesizing that
the source of conflict in the "new world" will not be ideology or economics, but
culture); Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Cold War and Its Aftermath, FOREIGN AFF., Fall
1992, at 31 (discussing the state of international relations in the post cold war era).
See also David Strang, Global Patterns of Decolonization, 1500-1987, 35 INT'L STUD.
Q. 429, 443 (1991) (arguing that the rate of decolonization is dependent primarily on
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centralization of political power, starting with post-war decolonization,
and continuing with the division of Pakistan, the breakup of Soviet
empire, and the fragmentation of other states (e.g., Yugoslavia and
Czechoslovakia). Also, even in states that are probably in no danger of
fragmentation, one can observe strong tendencies toward decentralization
(e.g., France,
the United States,3 the United Kingdom," and
Spain)
or separatism (e.g., India," ° Italy,3" Canada," 2 and Tur-

changes in the larger world economic and political system).
306. See VIViEN A. SCHMIDT, DEMOCRATIZING FRANCE:

THE PoLInCAL AND ADM NSTRATIE HISToRY OF DECENTRALIZATION (1990); MICHAEL KEATING & PAUL
HAiNSWORTH, DECENTRALISATION AND CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY FRANCE

(1986).

307. The strong resurgence of localism in the United States may in part be related

to the end of the Cold War and its centralizing forces. According to Professor Steel,
"[t]he Cold War ... reorganized the structure of our society. It transformed a highly
decentralized nation into an increasingly centralized one. Whereas major economic and
political decisions were once made in scores of state capitals and major cities, they
are now being made in Washington." RONALD STEEL, TEMPTATIONS OF A SUPERPOWER28 (1995). Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry make the following perceptive
observation:
The permanence and pervasiveness of international conflict, beginning in the
1940's, made it necessary and possible for the United States to build a strong
state, manage an industrial economy, reduce social inequalities, and foster national cohesion ....
The end of the Cold War threatens to unravel those accomplishments and
return the United States to the impasses of the 1920's and 1930's.
Daniel Deudney & G. John Ikenberry, After the Long War, FOREIGN POL'Y, Spring
1994, at 21, 23; see James 0. Goldsborough, California's Foreign Policy, FOREIGN

AFF., Spring 1993, at 88, 89 (arguing that "California is so big, and its problems so
immense, that it needs its own foreign policy"); Michael H. Shuman, Dateline Main
Street: Courts v. Local Foreign Policies, FOREIGN POL'Y, Spring 1992, at 158 (arguing that courts should not exclude cities and towns from the foreign policy arena
unless the particular local action conflicts with a specific law or provision of the
Constitution); Chadwick F. Alger, The World Relations of Cities: Closing the Gap
Between Social Science Paradigms and Everyday Human Experience, 34 INT'L STUD.
Q. 493 (1990) (exploring issues related to cities trying to deal directly with global

matters).
308. See Michael Keating, Devolution and the State, 1969.1989, in BRrmsH REGIONALISM 1900-2000, at 158-72 (Patricia L. Garside & Michael Hebbert eds., 1989);
see also THE NEW CENTRALSM: BRITAIN OUT OF STEP [N EuROPE? (Colin Crouch &
David Marquand eds., 1989).
309. See VICTOR M. PAREZ-DiAz, THE RETJRN OF CrvIL SocmrY: THE
EMERGENCE OF DEMOCRATIC SPAIN 184-235 (1993) (discussing the emergence of a
new democratic tradition in modem Spain, and the complexities faced by Spanish
culture as it becomes more interrelated with the rest of Europe); EDWARD MOXONBROWNE, POLIcAL CHANGE IN SPAIN 40-66 (1989); PETER J. DONAGHY & MICHAEL
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key).313 Tribal conflict dominates many African nations." 4 There appears to be a trend toward smaller political units, with less power residing at the traditional nation-state level. Increasingly, the principal threats

to peace and security today lie in internal conflicts, for which contemporary international law does not even provide an adequate framework for
discussion, let alone effective action.3 5 Perhaps the time is ripe for the

T. NEWTON, SPAIN: A GUIDE TO POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 98-118

(1987).
310. See ATUL KOHLI, DEMOCRACY AND DISCONTENT: INDIA'S GROWING CRISIS
OF GOVERNABILITY (1990); Sudipta Kaviraj, Crisis of the Nation-state in India, 42
POL. STUD. 115 (1994).
311.
DITIONS

See generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRAIN MODERN ITALY 18-62 (1993) (exploring the origins of effective govern-

ment, and relating them to the recent trends toward decentralization in Italy).
312. See Conrad Black, Canada's Continuing Identity Crisis, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.Apr. 1995, at 99; Jacques Parizeau, The Case for a Sovereign Quebec, FOREIGN
POL'Y, 1995, at 69.
313. See MICHAEL M. GUNTER, THE KURDS IN TURKEY: A POLITICAL DILEMMA
(1990). There exists the potential for significant political realignments in other states,
too, such as China, for example:
Despite the novelties imposed by industrialization, the communist-party state,
and modem communications technology, the overall pattem-a growing imbalance between increased population and increasingly exhausted arable land-has
been repeated several times in China's long imperial history. Each time, the
result has been the overburdening of the administrative capacity of the state and
a constellation of political conflicts-between regions, between the capital and
the provinces, and between different elite and popular groups - leading to the
collapse of the central government.
Jack A. Goldstone, The Coming Chinese Collapse, FOREIGN POL'Y, Summer 1995, at
35, 37.
314. For an analysis of contemporary tribal conflict, which some term "ethnic
fragmentation" and "ethnopolitical conflict," see Ted R. Gurr, Peoples Against States:
Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System, 38 INT'L STUD. Q. 347
(1994) (arguing that "[t]he most protracted and deadly ethnopolitical conflicts are
likely to occur in poor, weak, heterogeneous states like those of Africa").
315. The case of the former Yugoslavia exemplifies both the practical and conceptual difficulties in confronting and even talking about an important international problem. See Marc Weller, The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 569, 577-78 (1992) (pointing out
that Yugoslavia had to agree to the initial convening of the Security Council to deal
with the crisis and also to the Counsel-imposed arms embargo because of perceived
problems with article 2(7)); see also Gidon Gottleib, Nations Without States, FOREIGN
AFF., May-June 1994, at 100 (recommending that "Ithe principle of self-determination
must be supplemented by a new scheme that is less territorial in character and more
regional in scope"); Amitai Etzioni, The Evils of Self-Determination, FOREIGN POL'Y,
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reception of new theories of political power and of the meaning of law
in the international community. 6
Concurrently, the link of national power and political stability to
economic strength has become well-accepted, t 7 as has the notion that
Winter 1992-93, at 21, 34 (arguing that since "excessive" self-determination is incompatible with democracy, "[s]elf-detennination should not be treated as an absolute
value.. .

.").

Alden and Schurmann comment

The politics of the future will be defined by the twin challenges of empowering people to shape their lives within communities (ethnic, religious, territorial), while preserving a peaceful world by bringing states together on a regional or global scale when problems demand collective action ....
Local issues and global politics are already acquiring an importance in
people's lives that the nation-state is losing.
Edward Alden & Franz Schurmann, Neo-Nationalist Fallacies, FOREIGN POL'Y, Summer 1992, at 105, 121.
316. See Barkin & Cronin, supra note 287, at 125-28 (asserting that the end of
the cold war encouraged a change in the nature of discourse about foreign affairs and
in the conduct of foreign affairs). Rethinking sovereignty seems to be a recurrent
preoccupation of scholars in the aftermath of cataclysmic international conflict and its
resolution. See, e.g., 1 RAYMOND CARRA DE MALBERG, CONTRIBUTION A LA THORIE
GENERALE DE L'ETAT v-xx (2 vols. 1920-1922); ALVAREZ, supra note 297; CASSIRER,
supra note 277. The legal thought of Car de Malberg has been compared to that of
Kelsen. Olivier Beaud, La souveraineti dans la "Contribution d la thforie gefnrale
de I'Etat" de Carrg de Malberg, REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 1251, 1253 (SepL-OcL
1994). Professor Kratochwil observes that "[f]rom Grotius to Vattel to Triepel, treatises on international law were always inquiries about law in general, and they concerned a wide variety of historical, political, and philosophical issues." KRATOCHWin,
RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS, supra note 229, at 5. He continues:
The revival of this kind of philosophic inquiry seems timely since the classic
international lawyer writing and teaching public international law is more and
more superseded by several specialists. This trend has serious implications for
our understanding of international reality. While the lawyer-bureaucrat, attached
to the policy-making machinery, may influence the creation of legal norms
through (state-) practice by proposing accepting new "standard solutions," such
impact is no longer mediated through the development of a conceptual framework which is in tune with the changes in international reality.
Id; see MATHEW HORSMAN & ANDREW

MARSHALL, AF-ERTHE

NAnON-STATE: Crn-

(1994).
317. See generally C. Fred Bergsten, The Primacy of Economics, FOREIGN POL'Y,
Summer 1992, at 3 (arguing that, in the post-Cold War world, economic issues take
preeminence over traditional security concerns, and discussing the implications of
economic primacy for the foreign policy of the United States). The exact nature of
the link between national security and economic policy, however, may differ significantly from situation to situation. Kal J.Hosti, Politics in Command: Foreign Trade
as National Security Policy, 40 INT'L ORG. 643 (1986); see THEODORE H. MORAN,
AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURrTY (1993); JOHN M. STOPPoRD
ZENS, TRiBALSM AND THE NEW WORLD DISORDER
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open markets and free trade are preconditions to economic strength." 8
Also, environmental concerns which transcend the frontiers of states are
beginning to be seen as having important economic and even strategic
aspects.32 9 There has been renewed interest in the ideas, interdependence, and reciprocity of international relations and these concepts have
been subjected to deep and incisive analysis.32
At the international level,321 state sovereignty theories amount essen-

& SUSAN STRANGE, RrVAL STATES, RIVAL FIRMS: COMPETITION FOR WORLD MARKET

SHARES (1991); ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

(1987) (examining the relationship between international economics and interna-

tional politics); HAROLD G.

VATrER,

THE U.S. ECONOMY IN WORLD WAR II (1985).

318. Ohmae states:
The nation state has become an unnatural, even dysfunctional, unit for organizing human activity and managing economic endeavor in a borderless world. It
represents no genuine, shared community of economic interests; it defines no
meaningful flows of economic activity. In fact, it overlooks the true linkages
and synergies that exist among often disparate populations by combining important measure of human activity at the wrong level of analysis.
Kenichi Ohmae, The Rise of the Region State, FOREIGN AFF., Spring 1993, at 78, 78.
319. See, e.g., Paul Wapner, Politics Beyond the State: Environmental Activism and

World Civic Politics, 47 WORLD POL. 311 (1995) (arguing that "activist organizations"
such as Greenpeace and Amnesty International are political actors); Jessica T.
Mathews, Redefining Security, FOREIGN AFF., Spring 1989, at 162 (asserting that
nations can no longer separate foreign from domestic affairs, and must deal with
issues, that were already extremely complex in the domestic arena, such as the environment, in international forums); Norman Myers, Environment and Security, FOREIGN
POL'Y, Spring 1989, at 23 (arguing that there are significant connections between
environmental problems and political instability).
320. See Joseph A. Kroll, The Complexity of Interdependence, 37 INT'L STUD. Q.
321 (1993) (providing a general structure for resolving the conflicts over the meaning
of "interdependence" in international politics); Robert 0. Keohane, Reciprocity in
InternationalRelations, 40 INT'L ORG. 1 (1986) (arguing that the concept of reciproc-

ity is ambiguous, and would be best divided into two separate types: specific and
diffuse); see also ELISABETH ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES: AN ANALYSIS OF COUNTERMEASURES 14-27 (1984) (exploring the relationship between coercion

and international law).
321. While the focus of this section is on sovereignty in the external relations of
states, it is important to note that the concept of sovereignty developed originally to
express claims to exclusive power within territorial units. See JEAN BODIN, SIX
LIVRES DE LA RIPUBLIQUE (1576); see also JEAN-JACQUES CHEVALLIER, LES GRANDES
OEUVRES POLITIQUES DE MACHIAVEL A NOS JOURS 38-51 (1960). In this sense, the
concept played a progressive role in attempts to reduce disorder and violence within
those units. Although xenophobes and absolutists later, on occasion, employed the
theories of Machiavelli, Bodin, Hobbes, Rousseau, and others, their origins reside in

attempts to solve pressing contemporary problems in ways conducive to the peace,
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tially to claims of freedom by domestic decision-makers from all external legal restraints on domestic decision-making-no matter whether the

decision in question has only domestic effects or has effects on other
nations as well. 31 Thus, the notion of state sovereignty is linked inextricably with the "territorial home"" of the state, and expresses at

both intellectual and affective levels the attachment that people have for
a particular territorial unit. Therefore, in seeking to understand the at-

traction of the concept of sovereignty, it is necessary to inquire into the
32 and why it is that people are
"political aims in organizing space""

attached to particular territorial units. Foremost among the reasons for
territorial divisions and identifications is security. In the words of Professor Gottmann, "[slecurity must be organized against outsiders first,
and within the community itself afterwards." 3" Territorial exclusivity,
then, and the theory of sovereignty which is its political and legal ex-

pression, are based in large part on the instinctual human drive for
physical survival and on the fear of threats from persons outside the

particular community.3"

order, and well-being of the nations or peoples to which they were addressed.
322. Brownlie writes:
The competence of states in respect of their territory is usually described in
terms of sovereignty and jurisdiction .... The normal complement of states'

rights, the typical case of legal competence, is described commonly as "sovereignty": particular rights, or accumulation of rights quantitatively less than the
norm, are referred to as "jurisdiction". In brief, "sovereignty" is legal shorthand
for legal personality of a certain kind, that of statehood ....
IAN BROWNLE, PRiNcIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 108 (4th ed. 1990); at
287-97. For a non-legal, descriptive definition of "sovereignty," see John G. Ruggie,
Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis, in
NEOREALISM AND ITS CRMCs 143 (Robert 0. Keohane ed., 1986) (stating that sovereignty is "the institutionalization of public authority within mutually exclusive jurisdictional domains").
323. See CHARLES DE VisscHER, THEORY AND REALTY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAw 204 (P. E. Corbett trans., 3rd ed. 1968) (describing international law as a normative order, not simply a record of practice, and discussing strengths and weaknesses
of various theories of international law); See also id. at 204-15 (discussing the significance of territory in international law).
324. JEAN GOTriANN, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TERRITORY 7 (1973).

325. Id.
326. Professor Gottmann also calls attention to the economic function of territorial
organization. From this perspective, the territorial unit is also "a springboard for opportunity." Id. at 14. Gottmann writes:
Sovereignty has been interpreted too often as a function of the regulation
of power, and especially political power. In the administration of territory, how-
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Professor Gottmann describes modem trends as "result[ing] largely
from a shift toward universal concerns of a decisive character."3 He
reminds us that "the concept of territory has steadily evolved through
the centuries,""3 and he points out that "several fundamental functions

ever, sovereignty had to deal with economic resources and services, with the
management of ways of life, and with improvement and development as well as
with regulation, limitation, and prevention. The sovereign's duties had been
essentially political, religious, and military until the sixteenth century ....
With an expanding world opening up before a rising number of sovereign
states, new purposes of government were coming to the fore in the economic
realm. The characteristics of territory and their use were acquiring a new significance.
Id. at 52. With another view on territoriality, Sack writes:
Territoriality in humans is best understood as a spatial strategy to affect, influence, or control resources and people, by controlling area; and, as a strategy,
territoriality can be turned on and off ....
Territoriality in humans is best
thought of not as biologically motivated, but rather as socially and geographically rooted . . . . For humans, territoriality is not an instinct or drive, but
rather a complex strategy to affect, influence, and control access to people,
things, and relationships . . . . Territories are socially constructed forms of
spatial relations and their effects depends on who is controlling whom and for
what purposes.
ROBERT DAVID SACK, HUMAN TERRITORIALITY: ITS THEORY AND HISTORY 1-2, 216
(1986) [hereinafter SACK, HUMAN TERRITORIALITY]; see BENEDICr ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNms: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGINS AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 19

(1983). Anderson observes that
in Western Europe the eighteenth century marks not only the dawn of the age
of nationalism but the dusk of religious modes of thought . . . . Nationalism
has to be understood by aligning it, not with self-consciously held political
ideologies, but with the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of
which-as well as against which-it came into being.
Id.
327. GOTrMANN, supra note 324, at 155; see JESSUP, supra note 297, at 1-34
(describing "the universality of human problems").
328. GOTrMANN, supra note 324, at 123. Professor Gottmann traces developments
in the history of thinking about territory and sovereignty. Id. at 123-27. He concludes:
The movement toward statehood and national sovereignty, begun in the
sixteenth century, seems to have achieved its apogee . . . . The sovereign state,
based on exclusive territorial jurisdiction, may have been the evolution's purpose from the sixteenth to the mid-twentieth century. By 1970 sovereignty has
been by-passed, and a new fluidity has infiltrated the recently shaped map of
multiple national states.
Id. at 126-27; see SACK, HUMAN TERRITORIALITY, supra note 326, at 52-91; Hendrik
Spruyt, Institutional Selection in International Relations: State Anarchy as Order, 48
INT'L ORG. 527 (1994) (arguing that the sovereign territorial state prevailed over other
forms of political organization for economic reasons, "because it proved more effec-
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of territorial sovereignty have been recently challenged and may hardly
'
be held to operate any longer with the same results as in the past."Y
Most importantly, the function of territory as providing protection, or
security, is now seriously questioned."' Physical frontiers no longer
offer adequate protection against threats which nuclear, chemical, or
biological warfare pose.
There have already been significant developments with regard to
particular international law doctrines which are premised on recognizing
the new reality: for example, the individual as subject of international
law,33' the relativity of the concept of "domestic jurisdiction,"' the
international law of human rights,333 and the law with respect to the
five [than its rivals] at preventing defection by its members, reducing internal transaction costs, and making creditable commitments to other units"); John G. Ruggie,
Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations, 47
INT'L ORG. 139 (1993) (analyzing the transition from medieval political forms to the
modem system of states in order to develop an approach to the study of the emergence of postmodem international political forms).
329. Gottman, supra note 324, at 277.
330. Id.; see also id. at 130.
331. "International law is no longer . . . concerned solely with states. Many of its
rules are directly concerned with regulating the position and activities of individuals;
and many more indirectly affect them." OPPENHEII'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 152, at 846. Ian Brownlie, however, maintains that "to classify the individual as
a 'subject' of the law is unhelpful, since this may seem to imply the existence of
capacities which do not exist and does not avoid the task of distinguishing between
the individual and other types of subject." BROWNLIE, supra note 322, at 67; see
International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) Judgment and Sentences, 41 A. J. INr'L
L. 172, 221 (1946) ('That international law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as well as upon States has long been recognized"); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that deliberate tortre perpetrated under color of
official authority violates universally accepted norms of international law of human
rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties, and thus, whenever an alleged torturer is found and served with process by an alien within the borders of the United
States, the Alien Tort Statute provides federal jurisdiction).
332. Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter states that "[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter . . . ." According to the
Permanent Court of International Justice, "[t]he question whether a certain matter is or
is not... within the jurisdiction of a State is an essentially relative question; it
depends upon the development of international relations." Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees Case, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser.B) No.4, at 24; see BROINLIE, supra note 322,
at 291-97, 553-59 (discussing how international law, by progressively limiting the
scope of the domestic jurisdiction of states, brought more and more matters within its
sphere of concern and regulation).
333. See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 322, at 553-94 (discussing the vast ex-
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right of intervention.334 Significant changes have occurred in the prac-

tice of international diplomac

35

and in the international law of trea-

ties... to reflect those practices. States modify or interpret national

constitutions to mandate a more international approach to questions
arising in the context of the relationship of international agreements and
of customary international law to domestic law.337 These developments

pansion in the scope of application and the substantive law of human rights since
1945). Certain developments in the human rights area have required fundamental
reconceptualizations of some well-accepted principles of international law, such as
whether the individual is a subject of international law, and the appropriate sphere of
application of international law vis-a-vis domestic law. See supra note 331; supra note
332.
334. Although contemporary international law would appear to prohibit intervention,
by force or threat of force, by one state in the domestic affairs of another, U.N.
CHARTER art. 2,
4, in the absence of U.N. authorization, U.N. CHARTER art. 39, or
if not undertaken in self-defense, U.N. CHARTER art. 51, claims have been advanced
that intervention to further accepted purposes of the community of states is permissible including, inter alia, intervention to protect or promote democracy and humanitarian intervention. See generally LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER
(Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds., 1991) (noting that the end of the
Cold War has focused new attention on international law especially in areas that
previously seemed to elude legal control). See also WEBER, supra note 282 (investigating the relationship between sovereignty and its supposed conceptual opposite-intervention-because, she argues, the sovereignty/intervention boundary is the
very location of the state).
335. The hallmarks of present day negotiations are continuity and interrelatedness.
Conference diplomacy and standing preparatory bodies, like the International Law
Commission, are becoming increasingly important. Rather than each negotiation being
a unique event to deal with a particular, discrete problem, length, complexity, continuity, and inclusiveness characterize modem day negotiations. Martin A. Rogoff, The
Obligation to Negotiate in International Law: Rules and Realities, 16 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 141, 183 (1994); see infra notes 339-46 and accompanying text; James K.
Sebenius, Challenging Conventional Explanations of International Cooperation: Negotiation Analysis and the Case of Epistemic Communities, 46 INT'L ORG. 323, 364
(1992) (suggesting a new approach to the analysis of international cooperation which
eschews the binary win-lose scheme and directs attention to "the key issues of distribution, integrative potential, and the possibility of suboptimal cooperation"); Gidon
Gottlieb, Global Bargaining: The Legal and Diplomatic Framework, in LAW-MAKING
IN THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY 109 (Nicholas G. Onuf ed., 1982) (declaring that a new
world order shaped more by bargains, compromises, and necessity than by grand
architectual designs is underway).
336. See generally SHABTAi ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES,
1945-86 (1989); G.J.H. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 117-30 (1983); KAYE HOLLOWAY, MODERN TRENDS IN TREATY LAW (1967).
337. See the constitutional provisions cited infra note 368, and the decisions of
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at the level of legal doctrine are partial and disparate recognition of the
new underlying social, economic, and psychological reality of international life.
With regard to the specific question of interpretation of international
agreements, contemporary statesmen and parliamentarians now approach
treaty negotiation and ratification with a different mindset, one that
partakes more of the multilateral, cooperative, collaborative model, rather
than the bilateral, zero-sum game model.3" Provisions in agreements
calling for further negotiations or establishing forums for further negotiations are evidence of this trend and are increasingly common. Recent
examples are numerous: arms control,339 confidence building,' envi-

French and German courts, cited respectively in supra note 232, and infra note 379.
338. See ARTHUR A. STEIN, WHY NATIONS COOPERATE: CIRCUMSTANCE AND
CHOICE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1990) (discussing reasons for the attractiveness
of political cooperation among nations); ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984) (tracing the evolution of cooperation as a tool to enhance treaty
negotiation); JAMS N. ROSENAU, THE STUDY OF GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE: ESSAYS
ON THE TRANSNATIONALIZATION OF WORLD AFFAIRS (1980) (noting that the essays
contained in the work focus on change in world affairs, how to study that change
and the transnationalization of world affairs); Terrence Hoppman, Two Paradigms of
Negotiation: Bargaining and Problem Solving, 542 THE ANNALS OF THE AMRICAN
ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 24 (1995) (arguing that most research
tends to reveal that problem solving produces greater flexibility and more frequent,
efficient, equitable, and durable agreements than bargaining does); Otomar J. Bartos,
Modeling Distributive and Integrative Negotiations, 542 THE ANNALS OF THE A, IERICAN ACADEMY OF POLrICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 48 (suggesting modalities for
increasing flexibility in both distributive, or bargaining-type, and integrative, or problem-solving type, negotiations). Regime theory has recently had a major influence on
thinking about international relations. See also ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEEMONY: COOPEATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLmCAL ECONOIY (1984) (hereinafter KEoHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY]; INTERNATIONAL REGMES (Stephen D. Krasner
ed., 1983) [hereinafter Krasner, INTERNATIONAL REGwIMs]; Friedrich Kratochwil &
John G. Ruggie, International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the
State, 40 INT'L ORG. 753 (1986) [hereinafter Kratochwil & Ruggie, International
Organization] (examining the shifting focus of the study of international organizations); infra notes 346-49 and accompanying text.
339. See, e.g., Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26,
1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435 [hereinafter ABM Treaty] (regarding control of
ABMs); Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms, May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3462 [hereinafter
Interim Agreement] (regarding temporary arms control agreement between the United
States and the U.S.S.R.). Both agreements contain provisions for the continuation of
active negotiations for the limitation of offensive strategic arms. ABM Treaty, supra,
art X; Interim Agreement, supra, arts. VII and VIII(2); see Treaty on the Limitation
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international telecommunications, 342 cooperation in trans-

national litigation 343 and extradition, 3" and economic cooperation.34
of Offensive Arms and Protocol Thereto (SALT II Treaty), art. XIV, June 18, 1979,
U.S.-U.S.S.R., S. Exec. Doc. Y, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 37 (1979) (providing for the
limitation of offensive strategic weapons of mass destruction). Even when the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan prevented the United States from ratifying the SALT II agreement, both sides continued to abide by the terms of the agreement; see also Emanuel
Adler, The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of Nuclear Arms Control, 46 INT'L ORG. 101 (1992) (analyzing
how the ABM Treaty incorporated the ideas of an epistemic community).
340. See, e.g., The CSCE experience. Final Act of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, Aug. 1, 1975, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE PUB. No. 8826, GEN.
FOREIGN POL'Y SERIES 298 (1975), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975) [Helsinki
Accords] (promoting better relations among European states and ensuring conditions in
which people can live in true and lasting peace free from any threat to or attempt
against their security); Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Charter of
Paris for a New Europe and Supplementary Document to Give Effect to Certain Provisions of the Charter, Nov. 21, 1990, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 190 (1991) (marking
the beginning of a new era of democracy, peace and unity and covering human
rights, military security, economic, environmental, and scientific cooperation, and setting up new institutional arrangements for the CSCE); Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe, Budapest Summit Declaration on Genuine Partnership in a
New Era, reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 764 (1995) (changing the CSCE's name to Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), noting social and economic
instability and the threat of terrorism, and explaining that OSCE's primary purpose
will be early warning, conflict resolution and crisis management, use of peacekeeping
operations and missions, and strengthening OSCE political, consultative and decisionmaking bodies); EMMANUEL DECAUX, S9CURrrt Er COOP-RATION EN EUROPE (1992);
VOrECH MASTNY, THE HELSINKI PROCESS AND THE REINTEGRATION OF EUROPE:
ANALYSIS AND DOCUMENTATION (1992) (analyzing the Helsinki process as a force for
change and concluding that the issue of human rights has become an increasingly
important element in the evolving definition of European Security).
341. See ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: NEW CHALLENGES
AND DIMENSIONS (E. Brown Weiss ed., 1992) (noting that global change is causing
independent states to realize they are locked together in sharing the common global
environment). See also MJ. Peterson, Whalers, Cetologists, Environmentalists, and the
International Management of Whaling, 46 INT'L ORG. 147 (1992) (describing the
impact of environmentalists on the management of the whaling industry); Peter M.
Haas, Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect Stratospheric Ozone, 46 INT'L ORG. 187 (1992) (exploring community efforts to protect the
ozone by banning chlorofluorocarbons); Richard Falk, Evasions of Sovereignty, in
WALKER & MENDLOVITZ, CONTENDING SOVEREIGNTIES, supra note 282, at 64-65 (discussing the intergovernmental reaction to the harmful effects of ozone depletion).
342. See Peter F. Cowhey, The International Telecommunications Regime: The
Political Roots of Regimes for High Technology, 44 INT'L ORG. 169 (1990) (describing the evolution of the international regulation of telecommunications).
343. See the work of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, under
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whose auspices a number of important international conventions, dealing with both
substantive and procedural matters, have been negotiated. The Hague Conference was
established in 1893, and was made a permanent intergovernmental organization in
1951. Statute of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, Oct. 31, 1951,
220 U.N.T.S. 121; see Peter H. Pfund, The Hague Conference Celebrates Its 100th
Anniversary, 28 TEXAS INT'L L. J.531, 532 (1993); see also Symposium: The Hague
Conference on Private International Law, 57 L. & CONTP. PROB. No. 3, 1-331
(1994) (celebrating the centennial of the Hague Conference on Private International
Law and publishing papers addressing the efforts of the Conference to facilitate civil
litigation accross international boundaries); Information Concerning the Hague Com'entions on Private International Law, supra note 135 (providing historical and procedural information about the Hague Conference on Private International Law); Willis L
M. Reese, The Hague Conference on Private International Law: Some Observations,
19 INT'L LAw. 881 (1985) (providing an overview of the mission and organization of
the Hague Conference on Private International Law and the role of the United States).
344. The United States and its treaty partners modernized several extradition treaties recently to deal with new problems or concerns. See, e.g., U.S.-U.K. Supplementary Treaty Concerning the Extradition Treaty, done June 25, 1985, entered into force
Dec. 23, 1986, 24 LL.M. 1105 (1985) (identifying a number of offenses which are
not regarded as political offenses such as murder, manslaughter and kidnapping, and
amending several articles of the Extradition Treaty); U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty,
entered into force Sept. 24, 1984, T.I.A.S. No. 10,837 (updating and amending several
articles of the extradition treaty). International conventions, too, have addressed extradition in the context of needs of the nations of the world to deal effectively with
matters like: (1) Hostage-taking, see, e.g., International Convention Against the Taking
of Hostages, art. 8, G.A. Res. 34/146, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., U.N. Dc.
A/C.G13412.23 (1979), reprinted in 18 LL.M. 1456 (1979) (agreeing that the state in
which an alleged hostage-taker is found shall either extradite the hostage-taker or be
obligated to submit the case to its competent authorities for prosecution); and (2)
Aircraft hijacking, see, e.g., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft (Hijacking), art. 4, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.ILA.S. No. 7192, reprinted in 10 I.L.M.
133 (1971) (committing each contracting state to take necessary measures to establish
jurisdiction over the offense of unlawful seizure of aircraft and any other act of violence against passengers or crew committed by the alleged offender).
345. See the recent GATT revisions, which establish the NVorld Trade Organization. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Agreement Establishing the Multilateral
Trade Organization [hereinafter World Trade Organization], GATT Doc. MTIFA, pt.
II, art. EI(2) (Dec. 15, 1993), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 13, 16 (1994), which provides:
The [WTO] shall provide the forum for negotiations among its Members conceming their multilateral trade relations in matters dealt with under the agreement in the annexes to this Agreement. The [,VTO] may also provide a forum
for further negotiations among its Members concerning their multilateral rade
relations, and a framework for the implementation of the results of such negoti-

ations

....

See G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis
of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L. J.829, 833 (1995) (arguing that "the
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Contemporary international relations theory reflects these developments in its focus on international regimes. Regime theory developed in
order to explain cooperative behavior in international relations.3 46 Regimes may be broadly defined as "governing arrangements constructed
by states to coordinate their expectations and organize aspects of international behavior in various issue-areas." 7 An international regime is
commonly understood to consist of four elements "around which actor
expectations converge in a given issue-area[:]" (1) Principles ("beliefs of
fact, causation, and rectitude"); (2) Norms ("standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations"); (3) Rules ("specific prescriptions and proscriptions for action"); and (4) Decision-making procedures
("prevailing practices for making and implementing collective
choice")."4 International regimes are not simply "one-shot" arrangenew WTO system represents a stunning victory for international trade 'legalists'
their running debate with trade 'pragmatists'. . . ."); see also General Agreement
Tariffs and Trade, General Agreement on Trade in Services, GATT Doc. MTN,
IV, art. XIX, Annex 1B and Add. I (Dec. 15, 1993), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 44,
(1994). These sections provide:
1. In pursuance of the objectives of this Agreement, Members shall enter into
successive rounds of negotiations . . . with a view to achieving a progressively
higher level of liberalization ....

in
on
pt.
61

4. The process of progressive liberalization shall be advanced in each such
round through bilateral, plurilateral or multilateral negotiations directed towards
increasing the general level of specific commitments undertaken by Members
under this Agreement.
Id.
Other recent examples of continuing cooperation in the economic area, including the strengthening or creation of international decision-making or administrative
organs are the Treaty on European Union (Treaty of Maastricht) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFFA).
Regime theory, see infra notes 346-50 and accompanying text, has dealt extensively with cooperation in the area of international economic relations. Regime theory
studies of various aspects of economic cooperation highlight the continuity and interrelatedness in this area. See the contributions of John Gerard Ruggie, Charles Lipson,
and Jock A. Finlayson and Mark W. Zacher to Krasner, INTERNATIONAL REGIMES,
supra note 338, at 195-231, 233-71, 273-314. The epistemic community approach. See
infra notes 441-44 and accompanying text, illustrates the same phenomena; see also
William J. Drake & Kalypso Nicolaldis, Ideas, Interests, and Institutionalization:
"Trade in Services" and the Uruguay Round, 46 INT'L ORG. 37 (1992) (describing
the epistemic community approach toward various aspects of international economic
cooperation).
346. KEoHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 338, at 49.
347. Kratochwil & Ruggie, International Organization, supra note 338, at 759.
348. Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as
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ments, but rather imply "a form of cooperation that is more than the
'
following of short-run self-interest."349
Thus, while an international

agreement entered into to deal with a discrete, temporally-limited matter
would probably not qualify as a regime, the types of agreements which
come before United States courts for interpretation routinely would.

These agreements, such as agreements to facilitate international cooperation in civil and criminal matters, aviation, international trade, and environmental protection, establish substantive rules and decision-making
procedures (whether created specifically by the agreement or, in effect,
relying on domestic decision-making forums), and contemplate the estab-

lishment and maintenance of ongoing cooperative arrangements. The
relevance of regime theory to treaty interpretation is that it articulates
and highlights the long-term interests that states have not only in particular decisions, but also in the maintenance and the constructive evolution of the regime itself.35 Because regime theory and the social reality it represents are now part of the discourse and frame of reference of
those involved in the management of international relations, judges

should take this into account in the search for intent in interpreting international agreements.35'

Intervening Variables, in Krasner, INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 338, at 1, 12; see Kratochwil & Ruggie, International Organization, supra note 338, at 769-71
(suggesting that students of international organization have shifted their focus systematically away from international institutions toward broader forms of organized international behavior).
349. Robert Jervis, Security Regimes, in Krasner, INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra
note 338, at 173.
350. See Oran R. Young, Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International
Regimes, in Krasner, INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 338, at 93-113.
351. Regime theory is certainly open to criticism, as the following comment by
Susan Strange indicates. The important point here, however, is that contemporary
regime theory expresses a cooperative attitude that currently exists on the part of
those who negotiate international agreements:
[F]irst . .. the study of regimes is, for the most part, a fad, one of those
shifts of fashion not too difficult to explain as a temporary reaction to events
in the real world but making little in the way of a long-term contribution to
knowledge. Second, it is imprecise and woolly. Third, it is value-biased, as
dangerous as loaded dice. Fourth, it distorts by overemphasizing the static and
underemphasizing the dynamic element of change in world politics. And fifth, it
is narrowminded, rooted in a state-centric paradigm that limits vision of a wider
reality.
Susan Strange, Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis, in Krasner, INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 338, at 337.
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On a more general level, the cooperative behavior of states and regime theory which attempts to understand and explain it result from

what one cultural anthropologist described as the rapidly increasing
"density of interaction" between states and among peoples 352 which
suggests the emergence of a "global civilization."353 Professor Falk
elaborated on this concept:
In effect, a global ethos is emerging that suggests a shared destiny for the
human species and a fundamental unity across space and through time,
built around the bioethical impulse of all human groups to survive and
flourish. Such an ethos has implications for the assessment of problems,
the provision of solutions, and the overall orientation of action and actors.
For most people and leaders, this shared sense of destiny does not displace a persisting primary attachment to the state as a vehicle for aspiration and as an absolute, unconditional bastion of security.""
Because sovereignty is not a concept with an indelibly fixed political or
legal content, it is not necessarily incompatible with the global ethos
described by Professor Falk. National decision-makers then, even though
seeking to promote the national interest through the negotiation, conclusion, and approval of international agreements, also have broader identifications and an interest in the cooperative management and solution of
common problems. This too is part of the mindset of the parties to
international agreements and is legitimately taken into account in their
interpretation.

352. Mary C. Bateson, Beyond Sovereignty: An Emerging Global Civilization, in
WALKER & MENDLOVrrz, CONTENDING SOVEREIGNTIES, supra note 230, at 145.
353. Id. Bateson writes:
Unlike the notion of world government, the notion of an emerging global civili-

zation suggests a loosely integrated form of world order that might have the
following characteristics: it would develop gradually, and may indeed already be
in the process of development; it could coexist with rich cultural and political

diversity; it would not rely on the centralization of power characteristic of the
modem states; and it might make a virtue of ambiguity ....
...The question of global civilization is a question of shared meanings uniting a multiplicity of communities, rather than a single community.
Id. at 145-46; see ANTHONY GIDDENS, MODERNrTY AND SELF-IDENTITY: SELF AND
SOCIETY IN THE LATE MODERN AGE (1991) (discussing the emergence of new ways
of defining the self and their relation to social identity).
354. Richard Falk, Evasions of Sovereignty, in WALKER & MENDLOVIrZ, CONTENDING SOVEREIGNTIES, supra note 282, at 63.
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D. ANALOGIES TO RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Recent developments in at least two areas of the law (American conffict of laws theory and the law of the European Union) demonstrate
that legal "paradigms" 3" can and do change, and that courts can and
do play a significant role in that process. It is beyond the scope of this
article to consider these developments in detail, but some comparative
consideration is suggestive with respect to the impact judges can have
not only on doctrinal improvement of the law but also on the progressive articulation of fundamental jurisprudential premises that are responsive to changing political, economic, social, and psychological realities.
1. American Conflict of Laws Theory
It may be instructive in considering the state sovereignty paradigm in
international law to examine the American experience over the past three
or four decades in the fields of choice of law" and the jurisdiction of
courts.3 In these areas, thinking in the United States, judicial as well
as academic, evolved from a state sovereignty paradigm, with an analytical focus on power and territoriality, to a focus on fairness to litigants
and on the optimal implementation of governmental policy in situations
where the policies of more than one governmental unit may be relevant.
To be sure, state sovereignty in the American constitutional context is
far removed from state sovereignty in the international community. Nevertheless, doctrinal developments in the area of the jurisdiction of courts
from cases like Pennoyer v. Neff" 8 to International Shoe 59 and
355. THoMiAs S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTnIC REvoLuTno.s (2d ed.
1970) (using the term "paradigm"). For Kuhn, paradigms are "universally recognized
scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a
community of practitioners." Id. at viii. "A paradigm is an accepted model or pattem." Id. at 23. A field enters into a state of crisis when there develops "a growing
sense . . . that an existing paradigm has ceased to function adequately in the exploration of an aspect of nature which that paradigm itself had previously led the way."
Id. at 92; see THOM.S S. KUHN, THE COPERNICAN REVOLUTION (1958) (setting forth
his classic case study of a paradigm shift).
356.

See EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 4-41 (2d ed.

1992) (providing an excellent historical summary of the American experience).
357. See JACK H. FRmDENTHAL Er AL., Civi. PRoCEDuRE 97-123 (1985) (outlining the historical development of jurisdictional doctrine); see also FLF_ NG JA?.ES, JR.
& GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE 108-14 (3d ed. 1985) (outlining

special problems attendant with pleading where domestic law is not judicially noticeable).
358. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
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Shaffer v. Heitner ° and in the area of choice of law from cases like
Slater36 and Dodge362 to Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,363 manifest the replacement of a territorialist paradigm with a paradigm based
on function and fairness.

The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent . . But, except as restrained and limited by [the Constitution], they
possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of
public law . . . are applicable to them. One of these principles is that every
State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property
within its territory.
Id. at 722.
359. International Shoe Company v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
360. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
361. Slater v. Mexican National Railroad Co., 194 U.S. 120 (1904). According to
Justice Holmes:
But when such a liability is enforced in a jurisdiction foreign to the place of
the wrongful act, obviously that does not mean that the act in any degree is
subject to the lex fori, with regard to either its quality or its consequences. On
the other hand, it equally little means that the law of the place of the act is
operative outside its own territory. The theory of the foreign suit is that, although the act complained of was subject to no law having force in the forum,
it gave rise to an obligation, an obligatio, which like other obligations, follows
the person, and may be enforced wherever the person may be found.
.. . But as the only source of this obligation is the law of the place of the
act, it follows that that law determines not merely the existence of the obligation . . . but equally determines its extent.
Id. at 126. The leading academic proponent of the territorialist-vested rights paradigm
was Professor Beale of the Harvard Law School. See JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

at 107 (1935) (stating that "[a] right having been created

by appropriate law, the recognition of its existence should follow everywhere. Thus an
act valid where done cannot be called into question anywhere"); RESTATEMENr
(FIRST) OF CoNFuCr OF LAWS § 384, 912 (1934) (stating that "[i]f no cause of
action is created at the place of wrong, no recovery in tort can be had in any other
state"); see also BEALE, supra, at 115-27 (presenting Beale's views on the relationship
between sovereignty and jurisdiction and his view of international law).
362. New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918) (presenting a
due process analysis resulting in the constitutional requirement of strict application of
the place of contracting rule in spite of significant contacts with forum state); see
Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930) (holding that the individual state
may not validly affect contracts which are neither made nor are to be performed in
that state).
363. 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (stating that "for a State's substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact
or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its
law is neither arbitrary or fundamentally unfair"); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988).

1996]

DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT

649

Why did this paradigm shift come about? Obviously, the state-power
basis for allocating jurisdictional (legislative or judicial) competence was
no longer reflective of political reality or social and economic needs in
the United States. Decisions grounded in territorialist thinking proved
more and more unsatisfactory when viewed from the emerging perspectives of fairness to litigants and optimal effectuation and reconciliation
of conflicting state polities in a society that was becoming more mobile
and interdependent. With respect to choice of law, for example, courts
strove mightily to reach appropriate results within the context of the
traditional territorial model, often employing rather transparent techniques, which came to be called "escape devices," to avoid the logical

consequences of prevalent theory"'
The paradigm shift in conflict of laws premises and analysis was
initiated by legal scholars raising questions about traditional territorialist
thinking.' State court judges, relying in large part on this scholarly
analysis, began to articulate a new conflicts theory which justified their
asking the questions that they felt were relevant to fair and enlightened
decision-making.3 Today, when territorial factors are deemed impor-

364. See LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS 124-89
(4th ed. 1995) (discussing escape devices including characterization of the cause of
action, such as tort, contract, or personal status; characterization of particular issues,
such as substance versus procedure; application of the public policy doctrine, and the
use of the renvoi device).
365. Prominent early academic critics of the territoriality-vested rights theory included Walter Wheeler Cook, Ernest G. Lorenzen, and Hessel E. Yntema. See. e.g.,
Walter W. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L
J. 457 (1924) (offering a critique of the territoriality-vested rights theory); Walter W.
Cook, The Jurisdiction of Sovereign States and the Conflict of Lnvs, 31 COLUNM. L.
REv. 368 (1931) (questioning traditional territorialist notions); Ernest G. Lorenzen,
Territoriality, Public Policy, and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L. J. 736 (1924)
(stressing the inadequacies of relying on the territorialist theroy alone); Hessel E.
Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37 YALE L. J. 468 (1928))
(criticizing elements of the territoriality-vested theory). Prominent among the later
critics was Brainerd Currie. See, e.g., BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECFED ESSAYS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963) (analyzing the disadvantages of the territoriality-vested
theory); ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1967) (addressing
issues of territorialist theory within the context of private international law).
366. See opinions by Judge Fuld of the New York Court of Appeals: Neumeier v.
Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454 (1972) (supporting the principle that to ignore the laws of
the domicile of an accident victim does not further the substantive law of the state in
which the accident occurred); Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963) (discarding
territorialist choice of law in favor of a contract-based doctrine); Haag v. Barnes, 175
N.E.2d 441 (1961) (applying Illinois law where not in conflict with the New York
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tant over and above their value in establishing state interests or contacts,
it is principally for the policy reasons of practicality and predictability,
rather than for solicitude for state prerogatives and vested rights.367
2. The Law of the European Union
Developments in the law of the European Union and its member
states during the past few decades also provide a good illustration of the
articulation and acceptance of a new legal paradigm to meet changing
social, economic, and political needs. At the legal level, the integration
of sovereign states into a supranational organization called for significant
rethinking of traditional approaches to the relationship between national
law and the law of the supranational organization. A significant start to
this process was begun in the post-World War II constitutions of many
European states." Later, the European Court of Justice developed and

public policy). See also opinions by Judge Traynor of the California Supreme Court:
Bernkrant v. Fowler, 360 P.2d 906 (1961) (giving effect to the common policy behind
the laws of both states where there is no conflict); Grant v. McAuliffe, 264 P.2d 944
(1953) (concluding that the law of the forum should govern the survival of causes of
action); Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205 (N.H., 1966).
367. See, e.g., Paul v. National Life, 352 S.E.2d 550 (W. Va. 1986).
368. See, e.g., ITALY CONST. art. 10 (Dec. 27, 1947), reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 501 (Amos J. Peaslee ed., 1968) ("Italy's legal system conforms
with the generally recognized principles of international law"); GREECE CONST. art.
28, § 1 (June 7, 1975), reprinted in 7 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD, 26 (Albert P. Blaustein et al. eds., 1988) ("[Tlhe generally acknowledged
rules of international law . . . shall be an integral part of domestic Greek law and
shall prevail over any contrary provision of the law"); SPAIN CONST. art. 96, § I
(Dec. 29, 1978), reprinted in 18 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD
63 (Albert P. Blaustein et al. eds., 1991) ("Validly concluded international treaties
once officially published in Spain shall constitute part of the internal [legal] order.
Their provisions may only be abolished, modified or suspended in the manner provided for in the treaties themselves or in accord with general norms of international
law.
...); FR. CONST. (Oct. 4, 1958), reprinted in 7 CONSTrrUTIoNS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 53 (Albert P. Blaustein et al. eds., 1988) (incorporating
by reference the following provision from the preamble to the French Constitution of
the 1946: "The French Republic, faithful to its tradition, abides by the rules of international law"); F.R.G. art. 25 (May 23, 1949), reprinted in 7 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 117 (Albert P. Blaustein et al. eds., 1994) ("The general
rules of public international law shall be an integral part of federal law"); NMTH.
CONST., art. 90 (1987), reprinted in 13 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD 23 (Albert P. Blaustein et al. eds., 1990) ("The Government shall promote
the development of the international rule of law"). See generally A. Cassese, Modern
Constitutions and International Law, 192 REC. DES COURS 331 (1985) (advocating
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articulated a coherent and compelling view of the relationship between
community law and national law,3 which has been accepted by some
member states, but not by others, who have developed their own approaches. 7 In all cases, however, the traditional state sovereignty paradigm has been replaced with new thinldng to reflect the growing sense
of legal interdependency of EU members. This new legal paradigm has
now been accepted by European society generally.' The creative and
catalytic role of the European Court of Justice in this development,'
as well as the contributions of courts of member states,'m has been

broader adoption of international law).
369. See infra notes 375-78 and accompanying text.
370. Compare Judgment of May 24, 1975 (Administration des Douanes v. Socitit
Caf6s Jacques Vabre & J. Weigel et Cie Sarl) Cass. ch. mix, 1975, 6 Cour de Cessation 1975 CMLR 336 (according primacy to community law on the basis of article
55 of the French Constitution) with Judgment of May 21, 1971 (Ministre des Affaires
Economiques v. SA Fromagerie Franc-Suisse "Le Ski") Pasicrisie Beige, 1971, 886
Cour de Cessation, 1972 CMLR 330 (according primacy to community law based
upon the European Court of Justice theory that "the treaties which have created Community law have instituted a new legal system .... ").
371.

See Craig A. Whitney, France Starts New Conservative Era as Chirac Is

Sworn In, N.Y. TIEs, May 18, 1995, at A3 (reporting that in assuming office as
President of France, Jacques Chirac said that he hoped his fellow citizens would be
"more patriotic and at the same time more European").
372. See generally CLARENCE J. MANN, THE FUNCTION OF JUDICIAL DECISION iN
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (1972) (describing the role of the European Court
of Justice in expanding European interdependence); Burley & Mattli, supra note 223
(examining the legal foundation of the European Community with regard to political
and economic integration and the unexpected impact of the European Court of Justice); J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L. J. 2403 (1991)
(supporting the importance of legal infrastructure to European integration); Eric Stein,
Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT'L L
1 (1981) (outlining the constitutional framework for a federalist structure in Europe
with respect to the European Court of Justice); see also J. G. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HuMAN RIGHTS

(1988) (showing how the European Court of Human Rights has had a dramatic effect
on domestic law and practice of member states).

373. See supra note 232 (regarding French decisions); supra note 370 (regarding
Belgian decision); infra note 379 (regarding German decisions); see also Judgment of

Dec. 27, 1973, (Frontini v. Ministero delle Finanze) Foro It. 1 314, No. 183, 1974, 2
CMLR 372 (Italian Constitutional Court) (ruling that the Italian Constitutional Court
has jurisdiction over implementing Community regulations in accordance with section
2 of EEC Treaty Ratification Act 1957 (No. 1203)); Judgment of June 8. 1984 (SpA
Granital v. Administrazione delle Finanze dello Stato) Foro It. I 2062, No. 170184,
1984, 29 Giur It. 1098, No. 170, 21 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 756 (Italian Constitutional Court) (deciding that the Italian court has authority to enforce Community law);
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notable. In this regard, one may compare the role of the European Court
of Justice to that of the United States Supreme Court during the first
few decades of the 19th century in promoting political and legal integration by forging new theories of state relations.374
More specifically, the European Court of Justice, relying on rather
imprecise and inconclusive provisions of the Treaty of Rome, decided
that community law has a "direct effect" within member states and that
community law is "supreme" and must be accorded priority by domestic
authorities over their own national law. In the landmark case, Van Gend
en Loos, the Court articulated its legal vision of the community:
[T]he Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for
the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit
within limited fields, and the subject of which comprise not only Member
States but also their nationals. Independently of the legislation of Member
States, Community law therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become part
of their legal heritage." 5

Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport ex pare Factortame Ltd., [1991] All ER
70, [1990] 3 CMLR 375 (House of Lords, Oct. 11, 1990) (holding it as a duty of
the national court to override any national law that is in conflict with any directly
applicable Community law).
374. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824) (holding that a New York
law granting exclusive navigation of its waters is violative of the Commerce Clause
of the United States Constitution); McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819)
(finding a Maryland act imposing tax on all banks in Maryland not chartered by state
legislature to be in violation of the United States Constitution); Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, I Wheat. 304 (1816) (stating that the federal government alone has treatymaking power over which the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction, even in
matters involving citizens of another country); see Werner J. Feld & Elliot E.
Slotnick, "Marshalling" the European Community Court: A Comparative Study in
Judicial Integration, 25 EMORY L. J. 317 (1976) (comparing the judicial infrastructure
of the European Community with that of the United States); CHARLES WARREN, THE
SUPREME COURT AND SOVEREIGN STATES (1924) (providing the American background
for legal integration); Paul R. Dubinsky, The Essential Function of Federal Courts:
The European Union and the United States Compared, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 295
(1994) (comparing the relationship between European Court of Justice and national
courts of member states to the relationship between federal and state courts of the
United States); Trevor C. Hartley. Federalism, Courts and Legal Systems: The Emerging Constitution of the European Community, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 229 (1986) (discussing the different aspects of federalism).
375. Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen,
1963 ECR 1, 12.

1996]

DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT

It is not only the Treaty of Rome itself that may produce direct effects
within member states, but also the legislative products of community
institutions. Furthermore, if community law conflicts with national law,
it is community law which must be accorded priority. According to the
European Court of Justice:
The integration into the laws of each Member State of provisions which
derive from the Community ... make it impossible for the States, as a
corollary, to accord precedence to a unilateral and subsequent measure
over a legal system accepted by them on a basis of reciprocity. Such a
measure cannot therefore be inconsistent with that legal system. The executive force of Community law cannot vary from one State to another in
deference to subsequent domestic laws, without jeopardizing the attain-

ment of the objectives of the Treaty

....

376

In adopting these bold interpretations of the Treaty of Rome, which
in effect seriously undercut the national sovereignty of member states,
the Court was careful to articulate its legal vision of the community in
"nominally apolitical" terms, focusing narrowly on the "economic, social,
and technical" issues presented to it for resolution.'m According to
Professors Burley and Mattli, because "integration is most likely to
occur within a domain shielded from the interplay of direct political
interests . . . actors are best able to circumvent and overcome political
obstacles by acting as nonpolitically as possible." m
National decision-makers by and large were receptive to the broad
jurisdictional claims of the European Community Court and to the
Court's theory that a new legal order had been brought into existence
by the Treaty of Rome, which allowed supranational (i.e., community)
organs to exercise legislative authority over nationals of member states
and asserted the supremacy of supranational (i.e., community) law. By
and large, national courts accepted these results.'m

376. Case 6/64 Costa v. Ente Nazionale per rEnergia Elettrica (ENEL). 1964 ECR

585, 586.
377. Burley & Mattli, supra note 223, at 56.

378. Id at 57.
379. One particularly sensitive issue, however, the supremacy of community law
over national constitutional provisions has produced an ongoing dialogue between the
European Court of Justice and national courts, as the judges in supranational and
national court systems have sought to accommodate each others' legitimate interests
and concerns. See, e.g. Intemationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und
Vorratsstelle fdr Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 ECR 1125 (holding that German national law will not override Community law and that only Community law may rule
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3. The Law of International Organizations
The examples given above of the role of courts in the development
and articulation of new legal and political paradigms have two important
legal elements in common: (1) a constitutive document (the United
States Constitution and the Treaty of Rome), and (2) a court empowered
to interpret that document (the United States Supreme Court and the
European Court of Justice). Do we find an analogy in the contemporary
international legal order, with the U.N. Charter as constitutive document
and the International Court of Justice as interpreter of that document?
While not articulating his vision in exactly the same terms, one writer
seems to think so. In his book, The Problem of Sovereignty in the
Charter and in the Practice of the United Nations, Djura Nin~id argues
that the Charter "not only reaffirms sovereignty ... but also, and as
part of the same process, determines its scope. The Charter tends, in a
38 He continues:
sense, to restrict sovereignty.""
The evolution of the United Nations and of the concept of sovereignty
are thus a reflection and a part of general progressive advance in the
social, political and international field. This advance tends to overcome
the discrepancies, whether apparent or real, between the United Nations
and sovereignty which themselves result from the basic contradictions

on validity of measures adopted by Community institutions); Internationale
Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle filr Getreide und Futtermittel
(Solange 1), 37 BVerfGE 271, 1974 CMLR 540 (explaining that Community law is
an independent system of law from national legal systems to which German Constitution may entrust certain sovereign rights); Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, 1979 ECR
3727 (ruling that the Council regulation prohibiting new planting of vines for limited
period of time does not violate property rights); In Re Application of Wtlnsche
Handelsgesellschaft (Solange II), 73 BVerfGE 339, 1987, 3 CMLR 225, 1987 (determining that national and Community procedures do not require an additional recourse
to domestic German courts of appeal where the treaty gives European Court of Justice jurisdiction); Case 2134/92 Brunner v. The European Union Treaty (Solange III),
1 CMLR 57, 1994 (approving European Community authority of certain Bundesbank
functions and over shared human rights protection efforts); see also Kevin D.
Makowski, Solange III: The German Federal Constitutional Court's Decision on Accession to the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 155
(1995) (analyzing effects of the German Court's decision to ratify the Treaty of European Union on future European Union development); E. R. Lanier, Solange, Farewell:
The Federal German Constitutional Court and the Recognition of the Court of Justice
of the European Communities as Lawful Judge, 11 B.C. INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 1
(1988) (discussing the German Court's response to the democratic powers of the European Court of Justice and its development in the area of human rights).
380. NiNtIc, supra note 287, at 336.

1996]

DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT

655

between independence and interdependence in our day. The obvious instrumentality for solving these contradictions, is the United Nations, which
is designed to promote both independence and interdependence, and establish a system of international relations based on peaceful and active coexistence which is alone in accordance with the international realities of our
time. Through this process and within such a system of international
relations, sovereignty, far from being alienated, is brought to fulfillment
even when it appears to be restricted. 3
Whatever the ultimate prospects for the development of an integrative
international jurisprudence on the basis of the United Nations Charter, to
date little movement in this direction has taken place. The International
Court of Justice does not possess a jurisdictional competence that is at
all analogous to that of the United States Supreme Court or the European Court of Justice. Moreover, the U.N. Charter is through and through
a political document. To the extent that it articulates rules or principles
of general application, it does so at such a high level of abstraction that
considerable discretion (one could say, discretion tantamount to choosing
between competing political, social, or economic policies) would be
accorded to judges seeking to apply it. This is a far cry from the highly
technical Treaty of Rome or even the United States Constitution. The
recent history of the International Court of Justice indicates that the
more its decisions move toward the political end of the spectrum, the
weaker is its authority and its ability to attract litigants.3m It is unlikely, therefore, that the international community can look to the Court, at
least for the foreseeable future, to articulate a new paradigm of law in
the international community.

ld. at 343. But see WALTER

381.
KIND:

A

CRITICAL ANALYsIS

SCHIFFER, THE LEGAL

COMMUNITY OF MAN-

OF THE MODERN CONCEPT OF WORLD ORGANIZATION

(1954) (arguing that a world organization based on an association of independent
states is doomed to failure because it is based on a premise that is self-contradictory).
382. See, e.g., Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr. and N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 L.CJ. 253, 457
(considering the permissibility of nuclear testing in light of political pressures and
indicating that political considerations have a significant impact on the Court's decision); Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activites In and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.CJ. 392. The greatest contributions of the court have come in
the settlement of international boundary disputes.
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V. LAW AND POLITICS IN THE INTERPRETATION
OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS BY COURTS
OF THE UNITED STATES
A.

CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW

The previous section analyzed certain legal and political conceptions
that influence or at least precondition judicial attitudes in the interpretation of international agreements. Principally it considered the idea of
sovereignty, which expresses a certain view of international relations and
international law, grounded in interpretations of international politics and
international society as well as in the advocacy of certain preferred
arrangements with respect to the allocation of power. The appeal of the
idea of sovereignty ultimately relates to its ability to express and advocate a view of international political life which serves the political interests of people in positions of power. In order to critique effectively the
concept of sovereignty, therefore, it is necessary to demonstrate that the
doctrine, at least in its absolute form, no longer expresses the real political interests of nations or of their leaders. This critique of the doctrine
of sovereignty, focusing on the political interests and perceptions of
national decision-makers, is at least as important, if not more so, than a
critique of sovereignty at the doctrinal level (e.g., by demonstrating
logical inconsistencies) or at the descriptive level (e.g., by demonstrating
that in fact the peoples of the world are interdependent and that power
processes are necessarily interrelated and interpenetrating). It is not the
intention of this section to deal comprehensively with the idea of sovereignty in international law, but rather to limit analysis to the political
utility vel non of the idea of sovereignty as it bears on the interpretation
of international agreements by courts of the United States.
McDougal, Lasswell and Miller pose the question which is at the
heart of trying to understand the process of interpretation and the relation of legal rules and extrinsic factors (such as political considerations)
to that process: "precisely what is involved in an act of interpreta'
tion."383
In other words, what are courts in fact doing when they engage in an act of interpretation of an international agreement? What
policies are they seeking to effectuate? To what forces are they responding? How do they actually go about resolving the question before them
when there is an agreed-upon treaty text that addresses or possibly addresses the matter?

383. MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 227, at 11.
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To limit the analysis and evaluation of decisions by domestic courts
interpreting international agreements to purely legal factors is both unrealistic and unwise-unrealistic because through the act of interpretation

the court necessarily exercises political judgment; and unwise, because a
critique limited to legal factors fails to account for and to evaluate what
very well may be the principal determinants of decision.' Further-

more, political factors bear importantly on the approach of domestic
courts to the interpretation of international agreements, and in fact, on
their willingness to interpret such agreements in the first place. To the
extent that political factors are given expression in authoritative legal
rules or principles, of course, those factors cease to be political and
enter the realm of law. Ideally, law should seek to give expression to
the greatest extent possible to all those factors which determine decision,
including those which originate in the political realm. By seeking to
understand what those factors are and whether, and to what extent, they

can be given legal form, domestic courts can contribute to widening the
scope of the legal sphere.
At the outset, it is important to understand that all acts of interpretation take place in a political context, involve judgments which are at
least to some extent political, and in turn have a political impact."

384. Virally states:
If the object of legal science is the complete [understanding of a legal phenomenon], it must not limit itself to the exigetical or logical-conceptual analysis of
legal norms. Since . . . a legal phenomenon is not only normative, but also
socio-historic (which is what confers concreteness [positivitfl on the legal order), the science of law must also seek to understand it by taking this aspect
into account. This will enable it to free itself from a strictly formalistic and
static perspective, in order to envision the legal order in evolution, in formation, and in action in a real society.
Michel Virally, Le phfnomne juridique, 82 REVUE DOuDROrr PUBuc 5, 64 (1966).
385. Georg Schwarzenberger, Myths and Realities of Treaty Interpretation: Articles
27-29 of the Vienna Draft Convention on the Law of Treaies, 9 VA J. INT'L L 1,
15-17 (1968). Professor Schwarzenberger uses the term "sociological" to describe the
various factors bearing on the interpretation of international agreements. Thus, he
recommends the use of "the typology of laws of reciprocity, co-ordination and power"
as a means of understanding the process of interpretation. For him, "reciprocity"
means the mutual interest of parties in performing consensual obligation; "co-ordination" means the cooperation of the parties in the furtherance of community aspirations
resulting from the congenial atmosphere of the closely knit community; and "power"
means the dominant position of one party tending to encourage legal interpretation in
favor of the stronger side. Id.
Judge Lauterpacht takes a broader view of the juridical character of the judicial
function. For him, a dispute is within the realm of law if it is 'capable of reasonable
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The political element may be more or less significant in a particular act
of interpretation, but it is present nevertheless.386 If a decision were
fully determined by legal factors, there would be no need for interpretation. 87 Professor Sur characterized interpretation as a "hinge concept"
("une notion charnire")between law and politics. He writes:
Interpretation in international law constitutes the obligatory point of passage between fact and law, between law and politics; it falls within the
domain of the law as well as within that of politics; it places [these two
domains] in contact with each other without doing away with either. It
constitutes therefore a mixed concept. It is [interpretation] which allows
legal officials to take into consideration or not [the principle] of effectiveness, in all its diverse meanings and in its multiple role. 88
... [I]nterpretation cannot be defined as a strictly juridical activity,
confined within its own domain, reserved to a given organ, relating to a
particular function, subject to certain methods or associated with a specific principle, or having a generic value . .

.

. It is necessary therefore to

adjustment by reference to accepted principles of international law."' LAUTERPACHT,
supra note 271, at 245 (quoting Hyde, vol. 2, at 112, emphasis added by
Lauterpacht). Moreover, once "[sltates recognize the authority of obligatory judicial
settlement," id. at 77, any act of reasonable interpretation presumably falls within the
domain of law. See id. at 60-104.
386. SUR, supra note 39, at 99. Sur notes:
The more this activity [interpretation] is regulated, and the more that this regulation depends on general characteristics of the established legal order, the less
important is the role of interpretation, insofar as the restrictions on its freedom
allow it only a weak influence on the legal order. On the other hand, an unfettered freedom, a nonexistent or imprecise regulation, a concurrence of legal
factors confer on it a determinant role, which goes to the limit of consistency
of the legal order if it allows contradictory interpretations of equal validity. In
the first case, where it is considered narrowly, interpretation appears only as a
residual, limited, regulated, and enclosed legal category. In its broader sense in
the second case, it is fundamental for the functioning of the legal order.
Id; see MARTIN M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLMCS IN THE SUPREME COURT: NEW APPROACHES TO POLITICAL JURISPRUDENCE 1-49 (1964).
387. In the sense used in this article, law is a normative system, or, as explained
by Professor Sur, "a system of division of competencies, a coordinated and harmonious system of norms, a logical and artificial mechanism, crystallizing and integrating
an ideology .... " SUR, supra note 39, at 21. Legal decisions are those that may be
said to follow logically from the application of a particular norm or norms. Political
decisions, on the other hand, are those that are not fully determined by norms but by
the decision-maker's application of his own policy preferences (either substantive or
his decision to defer to another's policy preferences).
388.

Id.

DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT

1996]

659

reject a specifically juristic characterization in order to fully account for
this activity ....

This section will explore the political context, both international and
domestic, in which the interpretation of international agreements by

national courts takes place, and the political impact of decisions interpreting international agreements, with specific reference to law, politics,
and practice in the United States.
B. Focus OF ANALYSIS

In order to ascertain and describe with specificity the political context, both domestic and international, in which international agreements
come before courts of the United States for interpretation, it is first
necessary to understand (1) exactly what sort of agreements we are
talking about, and (2) what are the precise legal characteristics of such
agreements. This section will describe and characterize the international
agreements that have come before courts of the United States for interpretation during the past decade. The next section will discuss the legal
characteristics of those agreements.
An examination of the international agreements that the United States
Supreme Court interpreted over the past decade indicate that overwhelm-

389. Id. at 81. Compare Maarten Bos, Theory and Practice of Treaty Interpretation, 27 Nm. INT'L L. REV. 3, 34 (1980) with StUR, supra note 39. at 84. Bos

writes:
[T]he present writer's limited conception of interpretation makes him unable to
agree with Professor Sur's description of interpretation as a concept charnidre,
the "hinge" between politics and law, the locus where politics is transformed
into law ....

For law is above all the continuation of politics by more limit-

ed means, viz., means limited by the general concept of law, and which will
still further be limited in the event of an interpreter being subject himself to
functional limitations, such as a judge.
Sur, however, does not say that interpretation is purely a political act. He specifically rejects that position, which he attributes to MacDougal:
The intervention of the political element must not lead to the denial of
the juridical character of the process of interpretation, to the rejection of [legal]
regulation of [that process], as MacDougal's position, which entirely subordinates interpretation to the realization of objectives external to if not contrary to
law, would tend to do, and which, from this point of view, criticizes objective
recourse to the text as a fundamental element in the interpretation of treaties ....

As a hinge concept (concept charnigre), interpretation belongs to the

domain of politics as well as to the domain of positive law.
StR, supra note 39, at 84.
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ingly these agreements are "treaties" both in the international sense3
and in the American constitutional sense.39 A review of recent lower
federal court decisions involving the interpretation of international agreements indicates the same thing,2 as does a review of recent state
court decisions interpreting international agreements. 3" Furthermore, the
treaties which federal and state courts construed during the period under
review are overwhelmingly of the cooperative, rule-making sort. Thus,
approximately twenty percent of all recent federal treaty interpretation
cases involve applications of the Warsaw Convention.394 Another twen-

390. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 81, art. 2(l)(a) (defining a "treaty" as "an international agreement concluded between States in written
form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or
in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation"); see Kelvin Widdows, What is an Agreement in International Law?, 50 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
117 (1979); J.E.S. Fawcett, The Legal Character of International Agreements, 30
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 381 (1953).
391. A treaty in the American constitutional sense is an international agreement
that has been ratified by the President after he has received the "advice and consent"
of the Senate to do so. U.S. CONST. art. II, sec. 2; see GLENNON, supra note 33, at
123-63; HENKIN, supra note 33, at 129-71. Although equally obligatory at the international level, a treaty in the American constitutional sense differs significantly, politically as well as legally, from other types of international legal undertakings of the
United States (such as executive agreements and congressional-executive agreements).
See GLENNON, supra note 33, at 164-91; HENKIN, supra note 33, at 173-88; see also
SEN. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 228 (emphasizing the difference
between United States and international treaty interpretation); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional
Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1221 (1995) (challenging the free-form method of
constitutional analysis and suggesting more constrained modes of constitutional argument).
392. See treaties cited infra notes 395-405 (involving lower federal court interpretations of international agreements).
393. See cases cited infra note 405 (addressing international criminal and extradition agreements).
394. In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie Scotland on Dec. 12, 1988, 37 F.3d 804 (2d
Cir. 1994); Maritime Ins. Co. v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 983 F.2d 437 (2d Cir.
1993); Distribuidora Dimsa v. Linea Aerea del Cobre, 976 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1992);
Onyeanusi v. PAN AM World Airways, Inc., 952 F.2d 788 (3d. Cir. 1992); Sulewski
v. Federal Express Corp., 933 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1991); Floyd v. Eastern Airlines,
Inc., 872 F.2d 1462 (11 th Cir. 1989); Serio v. Members of a La. State Bd., 821 F.2d
1112 (5th Cir. 1987); Saks v. Air France, 724 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1984); McCarthy
v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 17 (D. Mass. 1994); Abu Hamdeh v. American Airlines, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 243 (E.D. Mo. 1994); Sopcak v. Northern Mountain
Helicopter Serv., 859 F. Supp. 1270 (D. Alaska 1992); Jack v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 854 F.Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Beaudet v. British Airways, PLC, 853 F.
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ty percent deal with aspects of international cooperation in the area of
criminal justice
(e.g., extradition, criminal cooperation, and prisoner
395
exchange).

Supp. 1062 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Luna v. Compania Panamena de Aviacion, S.A.. 851 F.
Supp. 826 (S.D. Tex. 1994); Curley v. American Airlines, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 280
(S.D.N.Y. 1994); Romero v. Aerolineas Argentinas, 834 F. Supp. 673 (D.N.J. 1993);
In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 798 F. Supp. 750 (D.D.C. 1992);
Clark v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 778 F. Supp 1209 (S.D. Fla. 1991); Gutierrez v.
Avianca, 774 F. Supp. 732 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); see also Airline Pilots Ass'n v. TACA
International Airlines, S.A., 748 F.2d 965 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing United States-El
Salvador Air Transportation Agreement of 1982 and affirming injunction prohibiting
certain substantive changes to pilot employment terms); Lemnitzer v. Philippine Airways, 783 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (citing United States-Philippines Air Transport Agreement of 1981 and granting the foreign defendant partial summary judgment
in wrongful termination dispute based on rights outlined in the bilateral agreement).
395. In re Erato, 2 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1993) (United States-Netherlands Treaty on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters of June 12, 1981); In re Extradition of
Howard, 996 F.2d 1320 (lst Cir. 1993) (United States-U.K. Supplementary Extradition
Treaty of June 25, 1985); Lara v. United States Parole Comm'n. 990 F.2d 839 (5th
Cir. 1993) (United States-Mexico Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences of Nov.
26, 1976); Cannon v. Parole Comm'n, 973 F.2d 1190 (5th Cir. 1992) (United StatesMexico Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences of Nov. 26. 1976); Bagguley v.
Bush, 953 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (United States-U.K. Convention on the Transfer
of Sentenced Persons of July 1, 1985); United States v. Sturman, 951 F.2d 1466 (6th
Cir. 1991) (United States-Switzerland Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
of May 25, 1973); Hogan v. Koenig, 920 F.2d 6 (9th Cir. 1990) (United States-Canada Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences of Mar. 2, 1977): United States v.
Fontanez, 869 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1989) (United States-Canada Treaty on the Execution
of Penal Sentences of Mar. 2, 1977); Herrmann v. Meese. 849 F.2d 101 (3d Cir.
1988) (European Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons of 1983);
Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985) (United States-Israel Convention on Extradition of Dec. 10, 1962); Cardenas v. Smith, 733 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (United States-Switzerland Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters of
May 25, 1973); In re the Extradition of Hamilton-Byrne, 831 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) (United States-Australia Extradition Treaty of 1976); Castro Bobadilla v. Reno,
826 F. Supp. 1428 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (United States-Honduras Extradition Treaty of
Jan. 15, 1909); In re the Requested Extradition of Smyth, 820 F. Supp. 498 (N.D.
Cal. 1993) (United States-U.K. Supplementary Extradition Treaty of June 25, 1985);
Gouveia v. Vokes, 800 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (United States-Portugal Extradition Treaty of May 7, 1908); Heilbronn v. Kendall, 775 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Mich.
1991) (United States-Israel Convention on Extradition of Dec. 10, 1962); Government
of Jamaica v. United States, 770 F. Supp. 627 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (United States-U.K.
Extradition Treaty of Dec. 22, 1931); In re Request from the Swiss Fed. Dep't of
Justice and Police, 731 F. Supp. 490 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (United States-Switzerland
Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters of May 25. 1973).
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Another twenty percent involve cooperation in international civil litigation and arbitration (e.g., procedural matters, the enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards, and domestic relations matters).3 Other significant
categories of treaties that federal courts recently interpreted include
Friendship Commerce and Navigation (FCN) agreements, 3 97 tax
' and diplomatic
treaties,... treaties dealing with maritime matters,3 99

396. Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp, S.A. de C.V., 22 F.3d 634 (5th Cir. 1994)
(Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory of Jan. 30, 1975); Sphere Drake Ins.
PLC v. Marine Towing, Inc., 16 F.3d 666 (5th Cir. 1994) (Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958); Cargill Int'l
S.A. v. M/T Pavel Dybenko, 991 F.2d 1012 (2d Cir. 1993); Friedreich v. Friedrich,
983 F.2d 1396 (6th Cir. 1993) (Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction); Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953
(10th Cir. 1992) (Foreign Arbitral Awards Convention); Sembawang Shipyard, Ltd. v.
Charger, Inc., 955 F.2d 983 (5th Cir. 1992); In re Anschuetz & Co., 838 F.2d 1362
(5th Cir. 1988) (Hague Evidence Convention); Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830
(2d Cir. 1986) (Hague Service Convention); In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602
(5th Cir. 1985) (Hague Evidence Convention); Feder v. Evans-Feder, 866 F. Supp.
860 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (Hague Child Abduction Convention); Japan Sun Oil Co. v. MIV
Maasdijk, 864 F. Supp. 561 (E.D. La. 1994) (Foreign Arbitral Awards Convention);
Acme Brick Co. v. Agrupacion Exportadora de Maquinaria Ceramica, 855 F. Supp.
163 (N.D. Tex. 1994); In re Prevot, 855 F. Supp. 915 (W.D. Tenn. 1994) (Hague
Child Abduction Convention); Wanninger v. Wanninger, 850 F. Supp. 78 (D. Mass.
1994); Currier v. Currier, 845 F. Supp. 916 (D.N.H. 1994); Slagenweit v. Slagenweit,
841 F. Supp. 264 (N.D. Iowa 1993); In re Application of Ponath, 829 F. Supp. 363
(D. Utah 1993); Klam v. Klam, 797 F. Supp. 202 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Gallagher v.
Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 781 F. Supp. 1079 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (Hague Service Convention); Sen Mar, Inc. v. Tiger Petroleum Corp., 774 F. Supp. 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(Foreign Arbitral Awards Convention); Meredith v. Meredith, 759 F. Supp. 1432 (D.
Ariz. 1991) (Hague Child Abduction Convention); Tennessee Imports, Inc. v. Filippi,
745 F. Supp. 1314 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (Foreign Arbitral Awards Convention).
397. Vagenas v. Continental Gin Co., 988 F.2d 104 (lth Cir. 1993) (FCN treaty
between the United States and Greece); MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d
1135 (3rd Cir. 1988) (United States and Korea); Wickes v. Olympic Airways, 745 F.
2d 363 (6th Cir. 1984) (United States and Greece); Papaila v. Uniden America Corp.,
840 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (United States and Japan); Goyette v. DCA Advertising Inc., 830 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (United States and Japan); Adames
v. Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd., 751 F. Supp. 1548 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (United States and
Japan); National Iranian Oil Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 268 (S.D. Miss.
1989) (United States and Iran).
398. Xerox Corp. v. United States, 41 F.3d 647 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (United StatesU.K. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains of Dec. 31, 1975, as
amended); Barquero v. United States, 18 F.3d 1311 (5th Cir. 1994) (United StatesMexico Tax Information Exchange Agreement of 1989); Stuart v. United States, 813
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and consular agreements.'
It is rare that a sole executive agreement
or an agreement dealing with sensitive defense,

F.2d 243 (9th Cir. 1987) (United States-Canada Convention regarding Double Taxation
of Mar. 4, 1942, as amended); EMI Ltd. v. Bennett 738 F.2d 994 (1984) (United
States-U.K. Income Tax Convention of June 26, 1946).
399. Banco de Credito Industrial, S.A. v. Tesoreria General. 990 F.2d 827 (5th
Cir. 1993) (International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
Maritime Liens and Mortgages of 1926); Continental Grain Co. v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth., 972 F.2d 426 (1st Cir. 1992) (International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea of June 17, 1960); Kyoei Kaun Kaisha, Ltd. v. M/V Bering Trader, 795 F. Supp. 1046 (W.D. Wash. 1991) (International Convention on Tonnage
Measurement of Ships of 1969).
400. Gerritsen v. De La Madrid Hurtado, 819 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1987) (Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations of Apr. 24, 1963); Foxworth v. Permanent Mission
of Uganda to the U.N., 796 F. Supp. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations of Apr. 18, 1961; Convention on the Privileges and Immunities
of the United Nations of Feb. 13, 1946); 767 Third Ave. Ass'n. v. Permanent Mission of Zaire to the U.N., 787 F. Supp. 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations); Von Dardel v. U.S.S.R., 736 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1990) (Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations); United States v. Cole, 717 F. Supp. 309 (E.D.
Pa. 1989) (U.S.-Serbia Convention Defining the Rights, Privileges and Immunities of
Consular Officers of Oct. 14, 1881).
401. But see Islamic Republic of Iran v. Boeing Co., 771 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir.
1985) (U.S.-Iran Agreement on the Release of American Hostages Held in Iran, questioning Iran's amenability to permissive counterclaims in a suit commenced prior to
the hostages crisis); Price v. United States, 707 F. Supp. 1465 (S.D.Tex. 1989) (Yalta
Conference Settlement Agreement, suit by German nationals against the United States
for the return of watercolors painted by Hitler and photographic archives).
402. While federal courts recently considered a number of defense-related treaties,
as a rule, the questions for decision dealt with non-sensitive, routine, administrativetype issues. See, e.g., More v. Intelcom Support Servs., Inc., 960 F.2d 466 (5th Cir.
1992) (pertaining to a breach of contract suit by Filipino workers against a defense
contractor under the United States-Philippines Agreement Relating to the Recruitment
and Employment of Philippine Citizens by the United States Military and Civilian
Agencies of the United States Government in Certain Areas of the Pacific and Southeast Asia); Robins Island Preservation Fund v. Southold Dev. Corp., 959 F.2d 409
(2d Cir. 1992) (questioning the title to Robins Island in the Peconic Bay of Long
Island between domestic claimants under the United States-Great Britain Provisional
Treaty of Peace of Nov. 30, 1782, the Definitive Treaty of Peace of Sept. 3, 1783,
and the Jay Treaty of Nov. 19, 1794); Rainbow Navig. Inc. v. Dep't of Navy, 911
F.2d 797 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (questioning the United States Navy's implementation of
the United States-Iceland Treaty to Facilitate Their Defense Relationship regarding the
allocation of military cargo trade between companies of the two countries); A & E
Pac. Constr. Co. v. Saipan Stevedore Co., Inc., 888 F.2d 68 (9th Cir. 1989) (concerning a private antitrust action in regard to the United States-Northern Mariana Islands
Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political
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issues must be interpreted by a fed-

Union with the United States); United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d
638 (9th Cir. 1986) (questioning the title to the Santa Barbara Islands between domestic claimants in relation to the United States-Mexico Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
of Feb. 2, 1848); Heller v. United States, 776 F.2d 92 (3d Cir. 1985) (involving a
jurisdictional question regarding the application of the Federal Tort Claims Act in
connection with the United States-Philippines Agreement Concerning Military Bases of
1947); Morris v. United States, 768 F.2d 1240 (lth Cir. 1985) (relating to a United
States federal income tax question about the United States-Panama Panama Canal
Treaty of Sept. 17, 1977); Robinson v. Harbert Int'l, Inc., 743 F. Supp. 797 (N.D.
Ala. 1989) (regarding a question of application of the Fair Labor Standards Act in
suit by workers for unpaid wages for work done on Kwajalein Atoll under the U.S.U.N. Trusteeship Agreement for Former Japanese Mandated Islands of July 18, 1947
and the United States-Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of
Micronesia Compact of Free Association of 1985); American Baptist Churches in the
United States v. Meese, 712 F. Supp. 756 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (questioning whether the
Geneva Convention affords Salvadoran and Guatemalan aliens a temporary haven in
the United States under the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War of Aug. 12, 1949).
403. See, e.g., Babbitt Elecs., Inc. v. Dynascan Corp., 38 F.3d 1161 (11th Cir.
1994) (considering trademark infringement question under the Inter-American Convention for Trademark and Commercial Protection of 1929); Alliance of Descendants of
Texas Land Grants v. United States, 37 F.3d 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (involving a
claim for compensation for a United States land appropriation in southern Texas and
the United States-Mexico Convention Providing for the Final Adjustment and Settlement of Certain Unsettled Claims of Nov. 19, 1941); Mississippi Poultry Ass'n, Inc.
v. Madigan, 992 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1993) (questioning the Secretary of Agriculture's
interpretation of a provision in the Poultry Products Inspection Act with respect to
imported poultry and the GATT); Wood v. United States, 961 F.2d 195 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (questioning whether suit was properly brought in United States District Court
or should have been brought in the United States Court of Claims under the United
States-Brazil Treaty [on] Certificates of Airworthiness for Imported Aircraft Products
and Components of June 16, 1976).
404. See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 991 F.2d 1493 (9th Cir. 1993) (considering
whether the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, which prohibits
the importation of rose-breasted cockatoos, also prohibits the importation of rosebreasted cockatoo eggs); United States v. Bresette, 761 F. Supp. 658 (D. Minn. 1991)
(determining whether it is unlawful for Chippewa Indians to sell migratory bird feathers under the United States-Great Britain Migratory Bird Treaty of Dec. 8, 1916);
Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749 (D. Haw. 1990) (involving the Basel
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
Their Disposal of Mar. 22, 1989, and the London Convention on the Prevention of
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matters of 1972 in an action by
environmental groups for a preliminary injunction to prohibit the movement of chemical munitions from the Federal Republic of Germany to Johnston Atoll for destruction).
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eral court. The experience of the state courts is similar.'

405. A survey of treaty interpretation cases in state courts from 1985 to the present indicates that these cases involve treaties for cooperation in civil matters (approximately 40%), the Warsaw Convention (about 25%), treaties for cooperation in criminal
matters (about 15%), and treaties involving other routine matters, such as diplomatic
and consular relations and FCN treaties (about 20%). For a sampling of recent state
court cases involving the interpretation of international agreements, see David B. v.
Helen 0., 625 N.Y.S.2d 436 (N.Y. Faro. Ct. 1995) (Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction); State v. Doering-Sachs, 652 So.2d 420
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (Vienna Convention on Consular Relations); Cortes v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc., 638 So.2d 108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (Warsaw Convention);
Compania Panamena de Aviacion, S.A. v. Gerstein, 645 So.2d 55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994) (,arsaw Convention); Matter of Estate of Wright, 637 A.2d 106 (Me. 1994)
(United States-Switzerland Convention of Friendship, Reciprocal Establishments, Commerce and for the Surrender of Fugitive Criminals of Nov. 25, 1850); Loos v.
Manuel, 651 A.2d 1077 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994) (Hague Child Abduction
Convention); Sneed v. State, 872 S.W.2d 930 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (U.S.-Mexico
Extradition Treaty); People v. Bustamante-Payan, 856 P.2d 42 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993)
(United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty); In re Union Bank of Switzerland, 601
N.Y.S.2d 253 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (United States-Switzerland Convention on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters of May 25, 1973); Lear v. New York Helicopter
Corp., 597 N.Y.S.2d 411 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (Warsaw Convention); In re Cohen,
602 N.Y.S.2d 994 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (Hague Child Abduction Convention);
Downes v. Ryobi Am. Corp., 1993 WL 78611 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1993) (No. 311959)
(Hague Service Convention); Roszkowski v. Roszkowski, 644 A.2d 1150 (NJ. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1993) (Hague Child Abduction Convention); Reuters, Ltd. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 623 N.E.2d 1145 (1993) (United States-U.K. Convention for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation of Dec. 31, 1975); Viragh v. Foldes, 612 N.E.2d 241
(Mass. 1993) (Hague Child Abduction Convention); Tahan v. Duquette, 613 A.2d 486
(NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (Hague Child Abduction Convention); The Limited
Stores, Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 600 N.E.2d 1027 (Ohio 1992) (Warsaw
Convention); Stovall v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 595 N.E.2d 330 (Mass. App. Ct.
1992) (Warsaw Convention); Gapanovich v. Komori Corp.. 605 A.2d 1120 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (Hague Service Convention); Honda Motor Co. Ltd. v. Superior Court 12 Cal. Rptr.2d 861 (Cal. Ct. App. 6th Dist. 1992) (Hague Service Convention); Knight v. Ford Motor Co., 615 A.2d 297 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1992) (Hague
Evidence Convention); In re Stephanie M., 14 Cal. Rptr.2d 104 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)
(Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the United States-Mexico Consular
Convention of Aug. 12, 1942); De Torres v. Arocena, 587 N.Y.S.2d 495 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1992) (Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory of 1975); Van Der Pog
Schroen v. Daison, 608 So. 2d 1080 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (Hague Service Convention); In re Marriage of leronimakis, 831 P.2d 172 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (Hague
Child Abduction Convention).
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C. THE LEGAL CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
1. At the International Level
It is useful to begin with the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties' definition of "treaty" as "an international agreement concluded
between States in written form and governed by international
law . . . ."' There are two important aspects of this definition: (1) a
treaty is an agreement between states; and (2) international law governs
a treaty. This is the class of international agreements with which we are
concerned.
Considered broadly, the legal effects of treaties between states are the
following: (1) the rule pacta sunt servanda4 applies; (2) the treaty
binds the state; and (3) treaty obligations have priority over domestic
law. 8 Thus, as a consequence of entering into a treaty, domestic treaty-makers indisputably undertake certain clearly understood legal obligations for a period that the agreement determines.' There are altematives to the treaty that domestic treaty-makers know how to employ
when they want to produce other sorts of effects, such as the undertaking of political or moral obligations, without legal consequences."'
2. In the United States Legal System
The international agreements which are the subjects of interpretation
in United States courts are almost always "treaties" in the constitutional
sense, that is the President ratifies them after receiving the advice and
consent of the Senate.4 ' In some cases, the international agreements

406. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 81, art. 2; see K.I.
Igweike, The Definition of "Treaty" Under International Law, 28 INDIAN J. INT'L L.
249 (1988).
407. See Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 13-27 (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter
HENKIN, NATIONS]; BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
12 (2d ed. 1995).
408. See SUZANNE BASTID, LES TRAITS DANS LA VIE INTERNATIONALE: CONCLUSION ET EFFETS 116-20 (1985).
409. But see infra notes 424-27 and accompanying text (indicating that in spite of
treaty commitments and obligations, states often do not complete undertakings).
410. See, e.g., Helsinki Accords, supra note 340; Yalta Conference, Agreement
Regarding Entry of the Soviet Union into the War Against Japan, Feb. 11, 1945, 59
STAT. 1823; Oscar Schachter, The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International
Agreements, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 296 (1977).
411. See CARTER & TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 407, at 165-69.
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involved are so-called congressional-executive agreements, those agreements which the Executive branch entered into with the prior authorization of Congress or which Congress subsequently approved."' Only
rarely do sole executive agreements come before the courts for interpretation and application.

The principal legal effect of treaties at the domestic level is that
treaties are the law of the land and have a legal status equal to that of

laws."' This reflects the fact that there has been congressional approval of the undertaking of the international obligations contained in the
treaty. Both state and federal courts may apply treaties, provided that the
treaties are self-executing."" Thus, one may describe virtually all international agreements which come before United States courts for inter-

pretation as legislative equivalents. As such, they contain mandatory
rules which are sufficiently specific to allow courts to apply them in a

way similar to the application by courts of domestic legislation." 5
D. THE POLITICAL USES OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

1. At the International Level

States have entered into international agreements since time immemorial,416 in spite of the often-voiced skepticism regarding their utili-

412. See id. at 165.
413. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (stating that "This Constitution, and the Laws of
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land.
...).
414. See supra note 34.
415. According to United States law, whether a treaty, or certain provisions of a
treaty, are self-executing or not depends on the intention of the parties to the treaty
as determined from the text of the treaty. Foster v. Neilson, 26 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253
(1828); United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833); Asakura v. Seattle,
265 U.S. 332 (1924). An important factor in determining whether or not a treaty is
self-executing in case of doubt regarding the intent of the parties is whether the treaty contains provisions which are of a character and specificity to indicate that judicial
application was intended. Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 621 (1952) (holding that
certain provisions of the U.N. Charter were not self-executing because the language
employed in the particular provisions was not "definite" and did not "prescribel] in
detail the rules governing rights and obligations of individuals . .
").
416. ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 1-5 (rev.
ed. 1962); see also PETER (PANAYIOTIS) KARAVITES. PROMISE-GIVING AND TREATY-

MAKING: HOMER AND THE NEAR EAST (1992); Theodor Meron. Authority to Make
Treaties in the Late Middle Ages, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1995) (illustrating that trea-
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ty. 417 It is clear then that international agreements play an important
Principally, international
role in the political relations of states.
agreements provide a certain degree of predictability and stability in international relations." 9 There is no doubt that states take treaties seriously. 2 The principal domestic political authorities usually negotiate
and approve the treaties and conclude them with great publicity and
formality.421 Compliance is the norm rather than the exception. 2 One

ties were viable legal instruments even in the middle ages, and discussing the relationship between medieval treaties and their modem counterparts); Allen Z. Hertz,
Medieval Treaty Obligation, 6 CONN. J. INT'L L. 425 (1991) (comparing medieval
treaty jurisprudence with international legal obligations of today).
417. See, e.g., Y. M. GOBLET, THE TWILIGHT OF TREATIES (1936) (discussing the
demise of the treaty); Geoffrey R. Watson, The Death of Treaty, 55 OHIO ST. L.J.
781 (1994) (questioning the value of the treaty as an international legal instrument);
Philip Allott, Mare Nostrum: A New International Law of the Sea, 86 AM. J. INT'L
L. 764, 781 (1992) (explaining that the reliance by the international community on
treaties and other forms of agreements is "a clear sign of the impoverishment of the
international system as a political system, and of its rudimentary nature as a democracy"); Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AM.
J. INT'L L. 259, 259 (1992) (indicating that the current processes of making international environmental law are "slow, cumbersome, expensive, uncoordinated and
uncertain").
418.

RICHARD B. BILDER, MANAGING THE RISK OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT 3-

11 (1981); see Thomas M. Franck, Taking Treaties Seriously, supra note 40, at 67
(1988) (stating that "[tlreaties are the bones and sinew of the global body politic,
making it possible for state to move from talk through compromise to solemn commitment. They are also its moral fiber, the evidence that governments and peoples
have pledged their 'full faith and credit' to one another").
419. MORTON A. KAPLAN & NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 236 (1961).

420. See generally Franck, Taking Treaties Seriously, supra note 40 (discussing the
importance states assign to the treaties into which they enter).
421. There are of course secret agreements entered into by states, but these agreements rarely, if ever, come before courts for interpretation and application. See LOCH
K. JOHNSON, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS:

CONGRESS CONFRONTS

THE EXECUTIVE 3-30 (1984) (describing and analyzing the types of agreements entered

into by the United States between January 1, 1946 and December 31, 1972, categorized by content and by form); see also COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note
228, at 203-37 (discussing trends in major categories of United States treaties from
1983-92).
422. See HENKIN, NATIONS supra note 407, at 39-87 (2d ed. 1979) (arguing that
nations usually comply with international obligations); Abram Chayes & Antonia H.
Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT'L ORG. 175, 177-87 (1993) (discussing the levels of
and problems with compliance by nations with international agreements); See generally
Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Compliance Without Enforcement: State Behav-
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must expect this, as domestic political elites often invest considerable
political capital in negotiating and obtaining domestic approval of particular agreements and thus have important stakes in their continued observance.' The recent NAFTA4 4 and GATT" debates and approval
processes in the United States exemplify this, as do the various middle
eastern peace agreements," along with the Maastricht Treaty.'
Sometimes domestic proponents of a particular treaty do not succeed in
their efforts to bring into force a treaty which they negotiated because
of insurmountable domestic opposition. This is a further indication that
states do not undertake international legal commitments lightly.'
ior Under Regulatory Treaties, 7 NEG. J. 311 (1991) [hereinafter Chayes & Chayes,
Compliance Without Enforcement] (discussing compliance with treaties generally);
Abram Chayes, An Enquiry into the Workings of Arms Control Agreements, 85 HARV.
L. REV. 905 (1972) (using arms control agreements to illustrate how nations comply
with their treaty responsibilities); see also ORAN R. YOUNG. COMPLIANCE AND PUBLIC
AUTHORrIY: A THEORY wrH INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS (1979) (discussing the
role of authority in ensuring treaty compliance in the international arena); ABRAM
CHAYES & ANTONIA H. CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE VITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995) (elaborating a theory of compliance and
a strategy for managing compliance with international agreements.
423. See generally Chayes & Chayes, Compliance Without Enforcement, supra note
422 (considering how vested interests in treaty compliance leads to self-regulation).
424. See William A. Orme, Jr., The NAFTA Debate: Myths versus Facts, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 2 (No. 5, Nov.-Dec. 1993) (highlighting the exaggerated claims that obscure NAFTA); Paul Krugman, The NAFTA Debate: The Uncomfortable Truth about
NAFTA, 77 FOREIGN Aim. 13 (No. 5. Nov.-Dec. 1993) (pointing out the positive aspects of NAFTA); David S. Cloud, Sound and Fury Over NAFTA Overshadows the
Debate, 51 CONG. Q. WKLY REP. 2791 (Oct. 16, 1993) (discussing the NAFTA debate in detail with regard to parties' investments in the negotiations); David S. Cloud.
NAFTA Crucible: "Undecideds" Are Final Target In Battle Over Trade Pact, 51
CONG. Q. WKLY REP. 3011 (Nov. 6, 1993) (highlighting political capital involved in
NAFTA negotiations); David S. Cloud, Decisive Vote Brings Down Trade Walls With
Mexico, 51 CONG. Q. WKLY REP. 3174 (Nov. 20, 1993) (discussing extent of dealings involved in the final approval of NAFTA).
425. See Andrew Taylor, GATT: Easier Ride Expected After Tough NAFTA Battle,
51 CONG. Q. WKLY REP. 3463 (Dec. 18, 1993) (comparing approval procedures involved in negotiating NAFTA and the GATT including the "fast track" method).
426. See generally MELVIN A. FRIEDLANDER, SADAT AND BEGIN: THE DOMESiC
POLrTcs OF PEACEMAKING (1983).
427. See Walter Goldstein, Europe After Maastricht, 71 FOREIGN AP:. 117 (No. 5.
Winter 1992193); Matthew J. Eshelman, Comment, The Maastricht Train: Slowing
Down for Sharp Curves, 11 DICK. J. INT'L L. 605 (1993).
428. See SALT II Treaty, supra note 287; Canadian Amencan Northeast Fisheries
Agreement, Agreement on East Coast Fishery Resources, Mar. 29, 1979, United
States-Canada, reprinted in MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
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One must distinguish the political uses and international legal effects
of treaties from other types of international agreements that are not
intended to create binding legal obligations. While this latter class of
agreements certainly plays an important role in international relations,
treaties are something different and may have certain particular political
functions. Because there are so may different types of treaties, whether
characterized by subject matter, number of parties, ongoing institutional
structures or lack of them, it is difficult to make any definitive list of
the precise political functions that international agreements may serve. It
would be helpful at the outset, however, to distinguish and highlight
certain aspects of international agreements. Treaties are formal instruments, which states carefully negotiate, and give rise to legal claims that
may be enforceable in international or national judicial tribunals. 29
Treaties are accompanied with detailed bodies of law (both international
and domestic) laying out legal consequences. If states did not want these
legal consequences to flow from their agreements, they would undertake
an alternative form of accord, such as a non-binding agreement, an
agreement to agree later, or an agreement to establish a procedure for
reaching agreement.
Professor Baxter has distinguished between different types of "treaties" on the basis of the relativity of the intent of the parties to accord
them legally binding force. 3' In spite of the broad mandate of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which defines all agreements
between states in written form as treaties and then attaches to them the
obligation of good faith performance, Professor Baxter argues that this is
not in fact expressive of the reality of interstate consensual relations. 3 '

TRANSMITTING

A PROPOSED AGREEMENT ON EAST COAST FISHERY RESOURCES WITH

S. Exec. Doc. V, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1979). See generally CHRISTIAN
L. WIKTOR, UNPERFECTED TREATIES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1776-1976
(8 vols. 1976).
429. See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 26, § 901 (discussing remedies for legal claims under international law).
430. See R.R. Baxter, International Law in "Her Infinite Variety," 29 INT'I &
COMP. L. Q. 549 (1980) [hereinafter Infinite Variety].
431. Id. at 549. See generally RAYMOND COHEN, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: THE
RULES OF THE GAME (1981); Charles Lipson, Why are Some International Agreements
Informal?, 45 INT'L ORG. 495, 512-13 (1991) (explaining that although all treaties are
treated equally, it is understood that certain types of agreements, such as declarations
of alliances, establishments of neutral territories, and announcements of policy guidelines are more likely to be violated than others); Anthony Aust, The Theory and
Practice of Informal International Instruments, 35 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 791 (1986)
(discussing dispute settlement, termination, and amendment of treaties); Schachter, The
CANADA,
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For example, he characterizes agreements of alliance and military cooperation, agreements for the neutralization of a given area, and agreements which lay out agreed policies for the future (like the Atlantic
Charter and the Yalta Agreement) as "political treaties" and describes
them as "legally fragile." 32 He also discusses the "vast mass of agreements, commitments, and correspondence between governments, between
the ministries of different governments, and between officials of different governments in which undertakings of one sort or the other are
made"433 and opines that in spite of the Vienna Convention, "it is
probably fair to say that States have no intention of 'enforcing' most of
these undertakings . . "' The relations of states within the context
of established treaty regimes are clearly political, as Professor Baxter's
description of the relativity of the legal character of agreements which
the Vienna Convention would clearly regard as treaties implicitly recognizes.435 We have already mentioned stability and predictability and the
reference of certain categories of disputes to resolution according to preexisting rules applied in judicial forums in accord with a body of law
regulating such application. The ultimate political purpose served at the
international level by the type of treaties which come before courts of
the United States for interpretation, then, may be to remove certain
categories of disputes from the political arena-to depoliticize the issues
involved. Rather than resolve certain matters through negotiation based
on power, influence, and other such factors, the parties manifested their
intent to remove such factors from consideration.
2. In the United States Legal System
International agreements also play a political role at the national level.
One important political function of treaties and other types of international agreements at the domestic level is to enable proponents of certain interests to impose them on the domestic society as a whole (for
example, economic arrangements like NAFTA and the recent GAT"

Twilight Existence, supra note 410.
432. Baxter, Infinite Variety, supra note 430, at 550-51 (stating, "Other treaties
like the Nuclear Test ban treaty of 1963, dealing with sensitive matters of national
security, provide for an easy way out and thus create 'obligations' of such a fragility
that legal enforcement may be difficult or even impossible").
433. Id. at 55.
434. Id. at 556.
435. See generally id. (discussing the political character of international agree-

ments).
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revisions, agreements with important national security implications like
the Panama Canal Treaty and arms control treaties, arrangements for
environmental protection, etc.). Domestic society is not monolithic. Different persons and groups have different, often sharply conflicting, economic, political, moral and ethical interests (civil rights, women's rights,
etc.).436 When the United States becomes party to a treaty or to a congressional-executive agreement, certain domestic interests win and certain
lose.437 The results are either embodied in domestic law by statute or
have the force of law by virtue of being self-executing international
agreements.438 In either case, the negotiated outcome has the legal
force of domestic legislation.439
A second important domestic political function of international agreements is to establish rules and procedures of an administrative or technical nature to facilitate cooperation between an interested domestic constituency and its foreign counterparts. This function of international
agreements is to facilitate the work of domestic governmental agencies

436. See generally Bruce Andrews, The Domestic Content of International Desire,
38 INT'L ORG. 321 (1984) (arguing that classical and neorealist theories of international relations do not sufficiently take into account domestic politics in their definition of the national interest). See DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter DoUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY] (discussing domestic influences on the content of international
agreements). See generally JOHN SPANIER & ERIC M. USLANER, AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY MAKING AND THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMAS (4th ed. 1985); Robert D. Putnam,
Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427
(1988) (discussing the entanglement of diplomacy and politics in negotiations of international agreements); Peter Trubowitz, Sectionalism and American Foreign Policy: The
Political Geography of Consensus and Conflict, 36 INT'L STUD. Q. 173 (1992) (analyzing various aspects of conflict within United States foreign policymaking); John A.
Vasquez, Domestic Contention on Critical Foreign-Policy Issues: The Case of the
United States, 39 INT'L ORG. 643 (1985) (describing how the ebb and flow of public
versus congressional participation affects American foreign policy); Peter Gourevitch,
The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics, 32 INT'L
ORG. 881 (1978).
437. Peter B. Evans, Building an Integrative Approach to International and Domestic Politics, in DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY, supra note 436, at 397 (stating, "Intemational bargains are not simply about relations between nations. They are also
about the distribution of costs and benefits among domestic groups and about domestic opinion divided on the best way of relating to the external environment").
438. See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 26, § Ill (discussing embodiment of treaty provisions in the domestic law of the United States).
439. See id. at cmt. d (discussing the domestic legal force of international agreements).
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and provide legal predictability for private parties. For example, treaties
for cooperation in civil and criminal matters operate to establish known,
convenient, and mutually-acceptable procedures for domestic courts,
administrative agencies, and litigants.
These conclusions have important implications for the interpretation of
international agreements by courts of the United States. Thus, giving full
effect to the agreement in light of its objects and purposes, just like
domestic courts would do in interpreting a domestic statute, is in accord
with the internal political function of the agreement, which the court
must not overlook in interpreting the agreement. In effect, allowing
courts that are interpreting international agreements to give broad effect
to the agreement in light of its object and purpose, best furthers the
domestic political purposes of choosing among competing policies or of
establishing rules for international cooperation. For example, a narrow
reading of an international agreement, ostensibly to enhance freedom of
action by the United States vis-A-vis the other parties to the agreement,
may result in an interpretation contrary to the interests of those national
constituencies who were successful in the domestic political process in
having the United States enter into that particular agreement or in having certain specific provisions included in the agreement. Essentially,
there are significant domestic political reasons for courts of the United
States to approach the interpretation of treaties just as they would approach the interpretation of federal statutes.'
While the goal of interpretation should be the same, the court must
define the object and purpose of the agreement by reference not only to
the domestic purpose of the agreement, but also to its international
purpose. Thus, while the ultimate goal of interpretation of an international agreement is the same as that for the interpretation of a domestic
statute, courts must proceed somewhat differently by enlarging the scope
of their analysis.

440.

On statutory

interpretation

by

United States

courts,

see

W.UAPm

N.

ESKRIDE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 48 (1994) (critiquing
intentionalism, purposivism, and textualism, and arguing that "statutory interpretation is

multifaceted and evolutive rather than single-faceted and static, involves policy choices
and discretion by the interpreter over time as she applies the statute to specific problems, and is responsive to the current as well as the historic political culture").
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In determining how to factor in the international element, recent work
by political scientists on "epistemic communities""4 is suggestive. An
"epistemic community" has been described as:
[A] network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in
a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain ... [who] have (1) a shared set of normative
and principled beliefs ... (2) shared causal beliefs ... (3) shared notions of validity ... and (4) a common policy enterprise . ...'

Although the impact of epistemic community members is certainly "conditioned and bounded by international and national structural realities," 443 analysis has demonstrated that "epistemic agreement [is] possible . . . in those areas removed from the political whirl."'
National judges, when they interpret international agreements, especially the typical international agreements that come before national
courts for interpretation and application, ' 5 may profitably be thought
of as members of an epistemic community. From this point of view,
they should be cognizant of the perspectives of their foreign counterparts
and seek to implement policy that advances the common enterprise of
the community.'

441.

The term epistemic communities

...designates those knowledge-oriented work communities in which cultural
standards and social arrangements interpenetrate around a primary commitment
to epistemic criteria in knowledge production and application .... Any special

way of knowing, whose development and elaboration requires the establishment
of an autonomous social space, will tend toward the structure of an epistemic
community ....

The establishment of a common frame of reference with shared epistemic
criteria provides all members of such a community access to a consensually
validated perspective for the construction of reality.
H. MARX, KNOWLEDGE APPLICATION: THE KNOWLEDGE
108-09 (1979).
Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy

BURKART HOLZNER & JOHN
SYSTEM IN SOCIETY

442.

Coordination, 46 INT'L ORG. 1, 3 (1992).
443. Id. at 7.
444. Id. at 5 (relying on analysis of G. John Ikenberry, A World Economy Restored: Expert Consensus and the Anglo-American Postwar Settlement, 46 INT'L ORG.

289 (1992)). Professor Kratochwil observes that "[flunctional regimes depend on the
explicit agreement of actors to 'depoliticize' and issue area .....
Kratochwil, supra
note 229, at 83.
445. See notes 390-405 supra and accompanying text (stating that the overwhelming majority of these agreements are cooperative and rulemaking treaties).
446. The notion of "epistemic community" as it applies to national judicial offi-
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The international epistemic community of domestic judges appears
presently, however, to be inchoate at best. Although the elements exist

for domestic judges to identify with their foreign counterparts, especially
in those nations where judicial independence and the rule of law are

realities, it is probably safe to say that this has not yet occurred in fact.
Opinions like those of Lord Denning' and the South African Supreme Court in the Ebrahim" case are rare. This does not mean to

say, however, that the formation of an epistemic community of national
judges is not possible; simply that it has not yet occurred. Such a development is highly desirable, and national judges, particularly judges on
their nations' highest courts, have the ability to bring it into existence.
All that is required is an openness to the interpretative goals and methodologies of their foreign counterparts.
E. THE POLMCS OF INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS BY UNITED STATES AuTHORITIES

It is not only national courts that interpret international agreements. 9 In fact, interpretation of international agreements goes on
continuously in executive branch departments and to a lesser extent in
national legislatures.45 It is important to distinguish the political func-

tions which interpretation serve when different organs of government undertake it in order to focus clearly on the political function of interpretation when courts perform it.

cials may perhaps be regarded as a modem version, and refinement, of Georges
Scelle's notion of dedoublement fonctionnel. See Georges Scelle, Thiorie et Pratique
de la Fonction Executive en Droit International, 55 REC. DES COURS 87, 93-96
(1936); DE VisscHER, supra note 323, at 142 (remarking, "[lit is hardly law, for such
regulations, in constant flux, are entirely ineffective as soon as the balance of forces
to which they correspond begins to waiver").
447. See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying texL
448. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying texL
449. Reisman states:
The President and the Senate and the House and the courts must, in the discharge of certain of their assigned duties, make independent and sometimes
continuous interpretations of treaties. Because of checks and balances and separation of powers, each branch, in performing its functions, must often consider,
take account of, appraise and sometimes reach its own conclusion as to, in
light of the case or context, the proper interpretation of agreements.
W. Michael Reisman, Necessary and Proper: Executive Competence to Interpret Treaties, 15 YALE J. INT'L L. 316, 317 (1990).
450. Id.
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National executive agencies at all levels must interpret international
agreements to apply them administratively in the myriads of routine
cases that present themselves on a daily basis. Also, executive authorities must interpret international agreements in those situations where
they contemplate some sort of governmental action which may possibly
violate an international obligation.45 Senate interpretation occurs when
the President transmits the treaty for the Senate's advice and consent to
ratification. Legislative interpretation as a whole occurs most prominently when the legislature must conform domestic law to the requirements

of an international

agreement. Courts must interpret international

agreements in adjudicating the cases which come before them.452
It is important to realize that the political context in which the interpretation of international agreements takes place may very well be different depending on the branch of government that faces the problem of
interpretation.453 For instance, the executive branch often acts as an advocate for the national interest or the interests of a specific national constituency in a particular situation. It may be responding to short-term
political pressures or goals, or possibly to certain long-term objectives.454 The Executive branch may also be concerned with preserving

451. See generally Johnstone, supra note 35 (discussing nonjudicial interpretation
of international agreements).
452. See Harold H. Koh, The President Versus the Senate in Treaty Interpretation:
What's All the Fuss About?, 15 YALE J. INT'L L. 331, 332-33 (1990) (discussing the
role of the President, the Senate, and the courts in treaty interpretation).
453. See generally DAVID P. FORSYTHE, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY RECONSIDERED 1-9, 141-55 (1990) (discussing the relationship
between international law and policy choice and proposing that international law
should be viewed within a political context).
454. See BILDER, supra note 418, at 10. Bilder states:
[Glovemment officials probably look at questions of treaty obligation and
breach more flexibly and in a broader context than traditional legal analysis
assumes. For them, an agreement will often not be simply an instrument for
creating legal rights and obligations, but a multipurpose foreign policy tool,
constituting only one element in the more complex pattern of their nation's
overall foreign policy.
Id.; see Richard B. Bilder, Breach of Treaty and Response Thereto, Address for Panel
on Some Contemporary Problems in Treaty Law Suggested by the Draft Articles on
the Law of Treaties of the International Law Commission (Apr. 8, 1967), 61 PROc.
AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. Apr. 27-29, 1967, at 193 (examining the different roles of the
concept of treaty breach in international and domestic contexts, addressing the possible
implications, and advocating empirical research). For a discussion of interpretation by
national officials of international agreements of a "political" character (i.e., those that
are unlikely to the submitted to impartial tribunals), see Johnstone, supra note 35.
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its lead role in the conduct of the foreign relations of the United States.
The legislative branch also approaches treaty interpretation in a political
context."5 Thus, it may be concerned with harmonizing the international undertakings of the United States with national legislative policies.
The Legislative branch is also subject to short-term political pressures;
and it may be concerned with preserving its institutional role or particular foreign policy preference when confronted with executive action.
The judiciary approaches treaty interpretation from a markedly different perspective.45 First and foremost, it is concerned with deciding the
particular case that is before it. More broadly, it is concerned with the
rule of law and with its own proper institutional role. Also, because
treaty interpretation involves the foreign relations of the United States,
courts are concerned with effectuating the policies of those parts of the
government which are charged with primary responsibility in that area.4' While this may require the serious consideration of the views of
the executive branch, nevertheless the courts remain the final arbiters of
the meaning of the agreement.5 '
The application of these general political concerns in particular cases,
however, necessarily depends upon the nature of the agreement that is
before the court for interpretation. At one extreme, a court might characterize a question of interpretation as a political question, and, in effect,

455. See supra note 452 and accompanying text.

456. For a discussion of adjudicative interpretation, see Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity
and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739 (1982).

457. See Koh, supra note 452, at 334 (stating that the foreign affairs power and
the power of treaty interpretation are allocated among the three branches of government).
458. Koh states:
Article III of the Constitution (not to mention Marbury v. Madison) settled that
the courts, not the President or the Senate, bear the final authority to decide
cases and controversies arising under treaties made by the United States. Once
the Supreme Court has ruled on a matter of treaty interpretation, its ruling is
authoritative as United States law and binds the political branches of the federal
government, as well as all lower courts and the states.
Koh, supra note 452, at 333; see Vagts, supra note 28, at 482-83 (stating that the
courts of the United States assert ultimate authority over treaty interpretation although
they place "great" or "decisive" weight on executive branch determinations); REsTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWY § 326, supra note 26, § 326 (stating, "Courts in

the United States have final authority to interpret an international agreement for purposes of applying it as law in the United States, but will give great weight to an
interpretation made by the Executive branch"); Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean
Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 229 (1986) (holding that a question of treaty interpretation is
not a political question).
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defer completely to an executive determination.459 Although this possibility presently appears to be contrary to current Supreme Court practice,' it is not unthinkable that the Court would invoke the doctrine
in a particularly sensitive situation. As already noted, however, those
treaties which come before United States courts for interpretation in
specific cases deal, for the most part, with matters which are "legislative" in nature. Because the political function which such agreements
perform is to remove the matter under consideration from the political
process and to subject it to resolution according to legal rules and procedures, courts should defer little, if at all, to executive preferences for
interpretation./'

459. See generally, FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONSIJUDICIAL ANSWERS, supra note
230 (arguing that the political-question doctrine is entirely incompatible with the
American Constitution and that courts should stop abdicating in foreign affairs cases).
460. See Japan Whaling Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 229 (holding that a question of treaty
interpretation is not a political question); see also David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REV. 953, 955-63 (1994) (discussing
recent treaty jurisprudence in the United States Supreme Court).
461. Interpretation by the courts, even of sensitive international agreements in
delicate situations, may be politically useful to the executive. See ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 113-14 (1962) (quoting a letter dated July 18, 1793, from Secretary of State
Jefferson to Chief Justice Jay and his Associate Justices). The letter reads in part:
Gentlemen:
The war which has taken place among the powers of Europe produces
frequent transactions within our ports and limits, on which questions arise of
considerable difficulty, and of greater importance to the peace of the United
States. These questions depend for their solution on the construction of our
treaties, on the laws of nature and nations, and on the laws of the land, and
are often presented under circumstances which do not give a cognizance of
them to the tribunals of the country. Yet, their decision is so little analogous to
the ordinary functions of the Executive, as to occasion much embarrassment and
difficulty to them. The President therefore would be much relieved if he found
himself free to refer questions of this description to the opinions of the judges
of the Supreme Court of the United States, whose knowledge of the subject
would secure us against errors dangerous to the peace of the United States, and
their authority insure the respect of all parties.
Id. The Justices, by a letter to the President, dated August 8, 1793, declined to answer such questions submitted to them on the grounds that the Court's function was
to decide actual controversies. Id. at 114; see Kratochwil, The Role of Domestic
Courts as Agencies of the International Legal Order, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 236, supra note 297, at 240-41 (discussing the
unvariability of judicial remedy when the issue involves foreign relations).
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Furthermore, assuming that one should interpret a particular agreement
to further United States interests, the judiciary is clearly the branch of

government best equipped to determine the long-term interests of the
United States in the interpretation of a particular international agreement.

This is because the judiciary is not subject to the intense political pressures, deriving from both domestic and international sources, as are the
political branches of government. Courts can thus give full consideration
to the matters which the agreement addresses in the "depoliticized"
context which the parties intended to establish by entering into the

agreement in the first place.
Developments in the law of sovereign immunity of the United States
provide a useful lesson in the advantages of the "depoliticization" of
decision-making in the foreign affairs area. ' These developments provide convincing evidence that removing foreign affairs matters, in appro-

priate cases, from the political realm to judicial resolution, actually
reduces political tensions and occasions for political confrontation, to the
benefit of the United States and the other states involved. As the legislative history of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 clearly

indicates, this was the actual intention of the Department of State in
sponsoring the legislation.'

An analogous process operates in technical spheres, where policy decisions are
increasingly made by experts, thereby removing such decisions from the political
process. See also Haas, supra note 442, at 8 (quoting Harvey Brooks, Scientific Concepts and Cultural Change, DAEDALUS, Winter 1965, at 68: "Much of the history of
social progress in the Twentieth Century can be described in terms of the transfer of
wider and wider areas of public policy from politics to expertise").
462. See, e.g., infra note 463 and accompanying text.
463. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Hearings on HR. 3493 Before the Subcomm. on Claims and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on

the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 14, 26-27 (1973) (testimony of the Honorable
Charles N. Brower, Legal Advisor, State Department).
The Congress finds that the determination by United States courts of the claims
of foreign states to immunity from the jurisdiction of such courts would serve
the interests of justice and would protect the rights of both foreign states and
litigants in United States courts.
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1602; see also Mark B.
Feldman, The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 in Perspective:

A Founder's View, 35 INT'L & CoMP. L. Q. 302, 303-06 (1986) (discussing the history and statutory scheme of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).
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F. LEGAL RULES AND PRINCIPLES FOR THE INTERPRETATION
OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS BY UNITED STATES
COURTS: SALE AND ALVAREZ-MACHAIN REVISITED

Almost all treaties that come before United States courts for interpretation are legislative in character: they establish general legal regimes for
the regulation of particular problems.'
In almost all cases, these
agreements do not raise sensitive national security issues. 5 They tend
rather to involve rules concerning ordinary governmental operations,
albeit in a transnational setting.'
The treaties involved in Sale,
Alvarez-Machain, Schlunk, Arospatiale, and Sumitomo provide excellent
examples.' 7 With the possible exception of the Refugee Convention
involved in the Sale case, the other treaties clearly fit this pattern. As
such, their political function is to remove the particular matters under
consideration from the political realm and to subject them to the rule of
law. By performing this function, these treaties allow, and mandate,
interpretation and application in such manner so as to effectuate the
long-term interests of the United States, as dispassionate judicial analysis
determines those interests, eschewing concern for what might appear at
the time to be important political interests and judgments."
After the decision in Alvarez-Machain, Dr. Alvarez-Machain was
promptly acquitted of the criminal charges against him and allowed to
return to Mexico. 9 It is hard to discern any damage to the interests

464. See supra notes 394-400 and accompanying text.
465. See supra notes 401-04 and accompanying text.
466. See supra notes 394-405 and accompanying text.
467. See supra notes 1-3, 12-20 and accompanying text.
468. On the basis of several case studies, Professor Forsythe remarks that
Finally, it cannot be stressed too much that there is a profound difference between what is frequently perceived in Washington as necessary for the U.S.
national interest in the short term, and what turns out to be necessary for improved international order in the long term.
FORSYTHE, supra note 453, at 154; see FRANCIS A. BOYLE, WORLD POLITICS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1985) (arguing that adherence to the rules of international law,
which develop through the agreements of states indicating how to resolve particular
matters, will best serve the interests of the United States); KRATOCHWiL, supra note
178, at 11, 48 ("Norms are . . . not only 'guidance devices,' but also the means
which allow people to pursue goals, share meanings, communicate with each other,
criticize assertions, and justify actions . . . it is the function of norms to fortify socially optimal solutions against the temptations of individually rational defections").
469. Seth Mydans, Judge Clears Mexican in Agent's Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,
1992, at A20.
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of the United States by that decision, and whether there would have
been any real damage to the political interests of the United States had
the Supreme Court allowed him to return to Mexico even without being
tried. In fact, by turning the matter of extradition over to the courts, as
the treaty does, the executive branch absolves itself of the domestic
political cost which it may have incurred by repatriating Dr. AlvarezMachain on its own.
The aftermath of Sale is somewhat more complicated. In October
1994, the United States, with the approval of the United Nations,'
intervened in Haiti to restore the Aristide government.' Although undertaken by 15,000 American troops, the intervention took place pursuant to a negotiated agreement ' with Haitian leaders and with minimal
violence and few casualties.' Regardless of the legality or advisability
of undertaking this action,474 intervention proved to be a viable option
in dealing with the Haitian refugee problem and can be added to the
other possible courses of action discussed earlier in this Article." In

short, there turned out to be no real need for the United States Supreme
Court to uphold the government policy of interdicting Haitians on the
high seas. The Administration itself ultimately found that policy unsatisfactory as a means of dealing with the constellation of problems produced by the situation in Haiti. Sale, then, like Alvarez-Machain, stands

470. S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., at 2-4. U.N. Doc. S/Res1940 (1994).
471. See Lori F. Damnrosch, The Constitutional Responsibility of Congress for
Military Engagements, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 58 (1995) (recounting the events leading
up to the United States intervention in Haiti).
472. Former President Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and General Colin Powell negotiated the agreement with General C&ras, the leader of the Haitian junta. See Text of
Haiti Agreement, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 19, 1994, at Al. A9.
473. Lori F. Damrosch, The Constitutional Responsibility of Congress for Military
Engagements, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 58 (1995).
474. See generally id. (discussing the legality and advisability of United States
intervention in Haiti); Michael J. Glennon at 70; Monroe Leigh at 74; Theodor Meron
at 78; W. Michael Reisman at 82; and Phillip R. Trimble at 84.
475. See supra note 105. Another possible response to large-scale migrations is
temporary refuge. See Joan Fitzpatrick, Flight from Asylum: Trends Toward Temporary
"Refuge" and Local Responses to Forced Migrations, 35 VA. J. INT'L L 13 (1994).
But see Louis Henkin, An Agenda for the Next Century: The Myth and Mantra of
State Sovereignty, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 115 ("bristl[ing] . . . at the invocation of state
sovereignty as an axiom, even as a kind of mantra . . . [expressing dismay of] the
'exclusive power of the state' over . . . 'entry into and presence in its territory' . . .
[and] find[ing] no comfort in the invocation of a 'competing humanitarian impulse,'
with its ring of Victorian charity").
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as an example of the Court's responding to short-term political interests
with a decision that weakens the treaty relations of the United States, as
well as the international rule of law, for no tangible gains of any sort. It
would have been far better, in both situations, for the Court to have
interpreted the international agreements involved in those cases in a
straight-forward, reasonable manner, in accordance with international and
national legal standards and principles. Government officials of the United States would then have had to work with these legal "givens" as
they proceeded to make decisions and to develop policies. In both cases,
ultimate outcomes would probably have been the same.
This discussion of the real international interests of the United States
concludes with some remarks of a more general nature. Although Susan
Strange is addressing international economic matters, her following comments regarding long-term United States interests have broader relevance:
[A]lthough there is disorder in the world economy and some disintegration of "regimes" so-called, the reason for this is not to be found in the
decline of U.S. power. Rather, the explanation lies in the misuse of
American hegemonic power in a unilateralist manner and in pursuit of national interests far too narrowly and shortsightedly conceived. Asymmetric
structural power has allowed the United States to break the rules with
impunity and to pass the consequent risks and pains of adjustment on to
others. This idea has damaged the stability and prosperity of the whole
world economy and476has not been in the long-term best interests of the
United States itself.
Fundamental to Strange's analysis of the long-term interests of the United States is her view that the power of the United States ultimately rests
on its "structural power . . . [-] the ability . . . to determine the way
in which certain basic social needs are provided. ' '4' Thus, it is the
United States that determines the framework within which decisions are
made and sanctions applied. "For the target or object of structural power, the price of resistance is determined more by the system than by any
other political authority."478 From this point of view, enhancing the
rule of law in the international community will best achieve the longterm interests of the United States, because when taken collectively, to

476. Susan Strange, Toward a Theory of Transnational Empire, in Czempiel &
Rosenau, GLOBAL CHANGES AND THEORETICAL CHALLENGES, supra note 280, at 161,
165.
477. Id.

478. Id.
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the extent that Strange's analysis is correct, the rules and principles of
international law embody the structure of the international political system, a system which the United States, by and large, determines, and
which serves the interests of the United States.
CONCLUSION
Professor Virally observed that the old expression ubi societas, ibi jus
(where there is society, there is law) is equally true if it is transposed to
read ubi jus, ibi societas (where there is law, there is society).' That
is to say, it is not necessarily political community that precedes law, but
that it is law that defines and gives coherence to political community.
Law, in fact, is the language in which political community is expressed;
and legal institutions and processes are the organizational manifestations
of political community. The formulation of legal principles and the
establishment of legal institutions are always mixed acts (actes
charni~res, to paraphrase Serge Sur); that is, they are expressions of
existing community on the one hand and claims or arguments that community exists on the other. Thus, law, even substantive law, is not only
normative, but also constitutive. This is equally true for the decisions of
courts interpreting and applying law.
When viewed in this light, the decisions of national courts interpreting and applying international agreements and the doctrinal rationales
which national courts advance for particular approaches, are not only
expressive of underlying ideas of international political community, but
are also claims and arguments for the existence of community. To the
extent that courts advance these claims, and people accept as reasonable
and appropriate their decisions based on these claims, community is
proclaimed, defined, and enhanced.'
One can also express similar conclusions in contemporary international relations terms. As Alexander Wendt has argued in an important

479. Virally, supra note 384,
ther terms takes precedence. It is
onic and primitive one, that a
enough to form a society." Id.
480. See generally PETER L.

at 36. Professor Virally writes that "in reality, neiin submitting itself to a legal order, even an embrysocial group consolidates and differentiates itself

BERGER & THOMiAS LUCKNMAN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCrION OF REALITY: A TREATISE ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOVLEOGE (1966)

(discussing the role of knowledge in Society, developing a theory for the sociology of
knowledge, and arguing that the sociology of knowledge is concerned with the analysis of the social construction of reality).
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article dealing with the consequences of the present "anarchy"'" in international society,
self-help and power politics do not follow either logically or causally
from anarchy and that if today we find ourselves in a self-help world,
this is due to process, not structure. There is no "logic" of anarchy apart
from the practices that create and instantiate one structure of identities
and interests rather than another; structure has no existence or causal
powers apart from process. Self-help and power politics are institutions,
not essential features of anarchy. Anarchy is what states make of it.

2

While cases involving the interpretation of international agreements by
national courts represent only one small part of the flow of decisions
that impact law in the international community, they are nonetheless a
highly significant part, for they represent the efforts of the states to
harmonize their actions and to settle their differences, as well as differences involving their nationals, on the basis of principles rather than
politics. The extent to which national courts contribute to the enlargement of this legal enclave, this sphere of legality, in the international
political process serves the interests of all states and their leaders in the

481. See generally HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 46-51 (1977) (discusssing the anarchical international society

as a result of the absence of government or rule, and attacking the argument that
states do not form a society because they are in a condition of international anarchy).
482. Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics, 46 INT'L ORG. 391, 394-95 (1992).
In short, we see international relations as an overlapping web of hierarchical
[directive-rules], heteronomous [commitment-rules], and hegemonical [instructionrules] relations of rule . . . . [Wie do not view the formally anarchic character
of interstate relations-as opposed to domestic politics-as the distinguishing
analytical feature of world politics. Rather the paradigm of rule forces us to
acknowledge the remarkable analytical similarities between domestic and international politics. It does so by turning our attention toward the pervasive presence
of rules and rule, and away from the presence or absence of specific institutions.
Nicholas Onuf & Frank F. Klink, Anarchy, Authority, Rule, 33 INT'L STUD. Q. 149,
170 (1989); see Nicholas Onuf, Do Rules Say What They Do? From Ordinary Language to International Law, 26 HARV. INT'L L. J. 385 (1985) (arguing that the reality
of the international order can be anchored in contemporary philosophy of language).
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construction of a more stable, predictable, and less contentious, and
ultimately
more peaceful, efficient, and harmonious international
483
order.

483. Kratochwil, supra note 229, at 59 (writing that "regimes are usually the
result of accretion and incremental choices . . . . Moreover.
[aictors are not only programmed by rules and norms, but they reproduce and
change by their practice the normative structures by which they are able to act.
share meanings, communicate intentions, criticize claims, and justify choices.
Thus, one of the most important sources of change . . . is the practice of the
actors themselves and its concomitant process of interstitial law-making in the
international arena.
Id. at 61; see John G. Ruggie, International Structure and International Transformation: Space, Time, and Method, in Czempiel & Rosenau, GLOBAL CHANGES AND
THEORETICAL CHALLENGES, supra note 280, at 21. 32 (stating, "'[Tlhe fabric of international life is made up of micro cases . . . . If change comes it will be the product
of micro practices. Hence if we want to understand change or help to shape it, it is
to these micro practices that we should look").

